Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects usage of wevtutil to clear Security or System event logs
as observed in The Gentlemen ransomware operations for defense evasion and
covering tracks of their malicious activities.
as observed in The Gentlemen ransomware operations for defense evasion and
covering tracks of their malicious activities.
Detects the execution of DragonForce ransomware binary or its associated event log clearing batch script, as observed in attacks leveraging SimpleHelp vulnerabilities.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the wevtutil utility (clearing Security, System, or Application logs) or the native Windows event log clearing event ID 1102 (The audit log was cleared).
Detects the clearing of Windows Security or System event logs using either the 'wevtutil' command-line utility or the 'Clear-EventLog' PowerShell cmdlet. This activity is commonly associated with anti-forensic efforts by adversaries to remove evidence of malicious actions, such as credential harvesting, following a compromise.
This rule detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using either the 'wevtutil.exe' command-line utility or the 'Clear-EventLog' PowerShell cmdlet. Adversaries often clear event logs to hide evidence of their activity on a compromised host.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using either the command-line utility 'wevtutil.exe' or the PowerShell cmdlet 'Clear-EventLog'. Additionally, it monitors for Windows Security Event ID 1102, which specifically indicates the clearing of the Security log. These actions are common indicators of an adversary attempting to remove evidence of their activity from a host system.
Detects attempts by malicious processes, specifically those associated with Millennium RAT or launching from suspicious user-writable directories (AppData, Temp, etc.), to disable or tamper with security controls. This includes modifying Windows Defender configurations, stopping security services, clearing event logs, modifying audit policies, and terminating security-related processes.
Detects malicious attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using native utilities like wevtutil or PowerShell, or by direct file deletion of .evtx files. This behavior is common in post-exploitation cleanup phases by threat actors, such as The Gentlemen RaaS, to hinder incident response and forensic analysis.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs via common administrative tools such as 'wevtutil.exe', PowerShell, or the detection of specific system events indicating logs have been cleared (Event IDs 1102 and 104).
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using built-in utilities like wevtutil.exe, PowerShell Cmdlets, or WMI providers. These actions are common techniques for attackers to impair system defenses and remove evidence of their activities from a compromised host.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using common utilities including wevtutil, PowerShell (Clear-EventLog, EvtClearLog), or command-line wrappers. Clearing event logs is a common technique used by adversaries to disrupt incident response and cover their tracks after an intrusion.
This rule detects activities associated with post-exploitation cleanup and defense evasion on Windows systems. It identifies the clearing of Security and System event logs using 'wevtutil.exe' or PowerShell, as well as the modification of audit policies using 'auditpol.exe' to potentially disable logging or auditing capabilities.
This rule detects when the Windows Security Event Log has been cleared, which is often an indicator that an adversary is attempting to hide their tracks and remove evidence of unauthorized activities on a system.
This rule detects various techniques used by an adversary to clear, truncate, or delete system and audit logs to hide their activity. It monitors for commands targeting Windows Event Logs (wevtutil, Clear-EventLog), Linux system logs (/var/log/ via rm/shred), and journalctl vacuuming, as well as the deletion of .evtx files. It further enriches these detections by identifying if the process was spawned by suspicious parent processes often associated with remote access, lateral movement, or command-and-control activity.
This rule detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using either 'wevtutil.exe', PowerShell 'Clear-EventLog' command, or by monitoring specific Windows Event IDs (1102 and 104) which indicate logs have been cleared. Clearing event logs is a common technique used by attackers to hide malicious activity and evade detection.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using either the native 'wevtutil.exe' utility or the 'Clear-EventLog' PowerShell cmdlet. Clearing event logs is a common technique used by adversaries to hide traces of their activities on a compromised host.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using either the native 'wevtutil.exe' utility or the 'Clear-EventLog' PowerShell cmdlet. Clearing event logs is a common technique used by adversaries to hide traces of their activities on a compromised host.
Detects execution of processes associated with Grixba malware (GT_NET.exe) or suspicious attempts to clear Windows event logs using built-in utilities (wevtutil, wmic) in conjunction with common command shells or the malware itself.
Detects indicators of ransomware-related anti-forensic behavior, including the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin or wmic, disabling system recovery via bcdedit, and the clearing of Windows event logs via wevtutil or system event log clearing events.
Detects various methods of anti-forensics activity commonly used to hide attacker presence, including clearing Windows Event Logs via wevtutil or PowerShell, deleting the USN Journal via fsutil, and bulk file deletion using command-line utilities.
Detects evidence of log and artifact tampering on a Windows host, specifically the clearing of Windows System or Security logs using wevtutil or PowerShell, the stopping of the EventLog service, or the deletion of PowerShell PSReadLine history files. Such activity is often conducted by an adversary to conceal malicious actions.
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