Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,247 detections
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Detects network activity associated with the JWR Phishing Framework, specifically focusing on the initiation of a WebSocket upgrade request following the delivery of a checkout-themed page load containing a 'cart_data' parameter, which is characteristic of the framework's C2 communication flow.
Detects HTTP responses containing script content indicative of anti-analysis or anti-debugging techniques, such as timing checks, debugger detection, and proof-of-work challenges commonly used on adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing landing pages.
Detects the presence of a specific malicious _socket.pyd Python module associated with LegionLoader dropped into non-standard directories like 'Traiolx Custom Utils'. The detection leverages file path patterns and known file hashes of the malicious component.
This rule performs a retrospective hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ClosedQuorum malware. It identifies suspicious activity by matching against known file hashes, specific filenames, and network traffic directed towards services (such as DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Discord) which the malware uses for C2 or data exfiltration. The detection logic aggregates results from file system, process, and network telemetry.
This rule performs a retrospective hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ClosedQuorum malware. It identifies suspicious activity by matching against known file hashes, specific filenames, and network traffic directed towards services (such as DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Discord) which the malware uses for C2 or data exfiltration. The detection logic aggregates results from file system, process, and network telemetry.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign, which commonly targets users with fake error messages to trick them into executing malicious commands. The rule identifies communication with known malicious infrastructure (domains and IP addresses) found in CommonSecurityLog events, while implementing filters to exclude common security scanners and deduplicating per-host alerts.
Detects the use of common scripting and command-line utilities (such as curl, python, or bash) to interact with known Polygon blockchain RPC endpoints or specific smart contract addresses/selectors, which may indicate unauthorized interaction with decentralized applications or crypto-assets.
Detects network connection events initiated by known beaconing-related process names. These processes are associated with command and control infrastructure or pivot nodes often used by adversaries for post-compromise activity.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious IP associated with Meterpreter Java payload retrieval and post-exploitation Command and Control (C2) activity, potentially related to PaperCut vulnerability exploitation.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to known IP addresses associated with Exvicy Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) Command and Control (C2) or hosting infrastructure. This rule acts as an indicator of compromise (IOC) match to identify potential infected hosts communicating with malicious external servers.
This rule monitors for a variety of indicators associated with malicious activity, including connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific malicious file hashes or filenames, modifications to Windows system policies (specifically Legal Notice configuration), and changes to Active Directory Group Policy Objects using specified GUIDs.
This rule detects network connections from internal devices to a list of known malicious domains and IP addresses. These indicators are commonly associated with command and control (C2) infrastructure or malicious activity, and alerting on these connections can help identify compromised systems within the environment.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network destined for a known RMRLX RAT command and control (C2) server on port 4561. This signature identifies the client-side 'hello' beaconing behavior characteristic of this specific malware.
Detects anomalous, chained execution patterns initiated by AI agents integrated with Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. The rule identifies a multi-stage sequence involving the invocation of browser automation tools followed by shell execution and subsequent outbound network activity, potentially indicating an AI-driven attack chaining filesystem, shell, or cloud-API access in an unauthorized manner.
Detects anomalous, chained execution patterns initiated by AI agents integrated with Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. The rule identifies a multi-stage sequence involving the invocation of browser automation tools followed by shell execution and subsequent outbound network activity, potentially indicating an AI-driven attack chaining filesystem, shell, or cloud-API access in an unauthorized manner.
Detects anomalous, chained execution patterns initiated by AI agents integrated with Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. The rule identifies a multi-stage sequence involving the invocation of browser automation tools followed by shell execution and subsequent outbound network activity, potentially indicating an AI-driven attack chaining filesystem, shell, or cloud-API access in an unauthorized manner.
Detects instances where AI-assisted development tools (such as Claude, Codex, Copilot, or Gemini) initiate command-line processes (e.g., shells, interpreters, or network utilities) with arguments indicative of credential access, reconnaissance, or sensitive file interactions.
This rule detects network connections from internal devices to a list of known malicious IP addresses associated with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. It monitors for outbound traffic across all monitored network events on endpoints.
This rule monitors for outbound TCP and HTTP traffic to a known malicious infrastructure hosting a fake or compromised 'Corp MDM' (Mobile Device Management) admin panel, which serves as a Command and Control (C2) channel for spyware.
Detects anomalous post-exploitation behavior associated with SectopRAT, where a suspicious process (e.g., ReportDump.exe) establishes a persistent network connection to a known C2 IP address followed closely by the invocation of common command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, tasklist, etc.) used for file and process management.
Detects anomalous post-exploitation behavior associated with SectopRAT, where a suspicious process (e.g., ReportDump.exe) establishes a persistent network connection to a known C2 IP address followed closely by the invocation of common command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, tasklist, etc.) used for file and process management.
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