Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,247 detections
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Detects the Tensorlake npm compromise (tensorlake@0.5.144, Shai-Hulud) through the two payload hashes, gh-token-monitor persistence, node or bun running lib/setup.mjs or Math_Symbol.js and node or bun connections to iseekaigogo.com or public Ethereum RPC hosts. It needs Defender for Endpoint events from developer machines and does not see lockfile or package cache contents. The query ran without errors in a live tenant
Detects malicious file hashes, suspicious process executions involving Node.js/Bun running setup scripts, schtasks/powershell persistence monitoring tasks, and connections to known domains/RPC endpoints associated with threat activity. The query ran without errors in a live tenant.
Detects reconnaissance commands (whoami, systeminfo) and PowerShell execution spawned as children of remote-access tools (such as AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, TeamViewer/QuickAssist variants, etc.), followed shortly by an outbound network connection to a .top domain from the same device.
Detects the execution of an application named avscan.exe from suspicious writable directories such as Users Public, ProgramData, or AppData Local, followed by an outbound public network connection within a one-hour window.
Detects process command lines containing Magento database audit strings (cms_block, cms_page) alongside specific loader domains, or network events communicating with these known loader domains.
Detects Microsoft Edge (msedge.exe) spawned by command shells or script hosts with hidden or headless window parameters, or communicating with webhook.site, which is commonly indicative of malicious browser automation or exfiltration.
Detects outbound network connections from Python processes associated with known indicators of compromise or specific suspicious command line arguments such as cook.py, cook.pth, or privcollect.
Detects potential C2 beaconing activity associated with Potassium by correlating a DNS query for a known C2 domain with a subsequent TCP connection to port 50792 from the same device within a short time window.
This detection identifies outbound IPv4 and IPv6 network connections to non-standard ports that may indicate suspicious network activity, unauthorized communication, or potential command-and-control (C2) traffic.
It excludes commonly used ports for DNS (53), HTTP (80), HTTPS (443), and alternate web services (8000, 8080), along with private, loopback, link-local, multicast, and documentation-only IP ranges to reduce noise.
It excludes commonly used ports for DNS (53), HTTP (80), HTTPS (443), and alternate web services (8000, 8080), along with private, loopback, link-local, multicast, and documentation-only IP ranges to reduce noise.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
Detects network connections to the npm registry (registry.npmjs.org) initiated by AI coding agent processes (such as Claude, Cursor, Copilot, Windsurf, Codeium, Aider) or by unexpected processes that are not standard package managers or browsers.
Detects outbound network connections from processes targeting a known hard-coded Potassium campaign C2 IP address (134.199.154.64), followed by fallback DNS resolver queries using standard public DNS servers by the same process.
Detects sandbox or training hosts performing DNS resolution followed shortly by outbound connections to public IP addresses on ports 80 or 443, which may indicate a firewall misconfiguration or unauthorized egress from isolated environments.
Detects a process with no prior AI API activity in the past 14 days suddenly generating a high volume (200+ calls) of network connections to public AI inference endpoints (OpenAI, Anthropic, Grok, OpenRouter). This behavior is consistent with stolen API keys being used to drain resources or exfiltrate data from a newly compromised host.
Detects newly seen devices (no Tailscale process activity in the prior 30 days) executing Tailscale enrollment or login commands followed by outbound network connections to Tailscale control infrastructure within 10 minutes, potentially indicating unauthorized VPN tunneling.
Detects host-side telemetry indicating Cairn agent worker artifacts, including specific process command line terms, tsec skill files and environment variables, combined with network connections to OpenRouter from the same host.
Detects googleupdate.exe loading an unsigned DLL from a non-standard path, followed by network communication to a known Command and Control (C2) domain or IP address.
Detects non-browser processes contacting multiple distinct cloud storage APIs within a one-hour timeframe, a pattern indicative of potential multi-service command and control or data exfiltration.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Detects a threat identified by Cisco Meraki. Meraki is the security stack for branch
offices, retail sites and small locations that have no local IT presence — the parts
of an estate least likely to be monitored and most likely to be the way in.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby srcip, dstip, threat, user
offices, retail sites and small locations that have no local IT presence — the parts
of an estate least likely to be monitored and most likely to be the way in.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby srcip, dstip, threat, user
Detects outbound network connections to domains associated with the AdFection / Discover-Tech / Controlium threat infrastructure using a Sentinel watchlist, filtering out known browser activity or allowing custom domain lists.
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