Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,247 detections
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Detects indicators of the MovieReaper loader, specifically the downloading of shellcode fragments disguised as image assets from known malicious C2 infrastructure, and the masquerading of a malicious binary as 'msedge.exe' within the Windows Telemetry folder for persistence. The rule specifically targets the loader's behavior of using PEB Ldr traversal to resolve APIs and evade hooking-based security controls.
Detects activity from Anthropic network range across multiple event types
Detects activity from Anthropic network range across multiple event types
Detects activity from Anthropic network range across multiple event types
The detection rule identifies network connections to 'dauntingmoon.online' specifically hitting '/api/verification/init' or '/api/verification/check' paths. It validates that both 'session' and 'link_id' query parameters are present in the request. This pattern is indicative of a specific adversary beaconing or command and control (C2) callback mechanism involving session-based authentication or handshake steps with a remote server.
This rule monitors DNS requests and network connections for activity targeting domains identified as malicious: 'gg-steelseries.com.cn' and 'org-bcut.com.cn'. These domains are often associated with command and control infrastructure or malware distribution, and their presence in network logs is a high-fidelity indicator of a potential compromise.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious IP associated with Meterpreter Java payload retrieval and post-exploitation Command and Control (C2) activity, potentially related to PaperCut vulnerability exploitation.
Detects network traffic matching a list of known malicious domains and IP addresses observed in CommonSecurityLog events, tightened to reduce noise from scanners/TI feeds, sinkholed infrastructure, and generic reused IPs by requiring domain-specific selectors and deduplicating repeated matches per host.
Detects network traffic matching a list of known malicious domains and IP addresses observed in CommonSecurityLog events, tightened to reduce noise from scanners/TI feeds, sinkholed infrastructure, and generic reused IPs by requiring domain-specific selectors and deduplicating repeated matches per host.
Detects network traffic matching a list of known malicious domains and IP addresses observed in CommonSecurityLog events, tightened to reduce noise from scanners/TI feeds, sinkholed infrastructure, and generic reused IPs by requiring domain-specific selectors and deduplicating repeated matches per host.
Detects the creation, modification, or execution of a hidden file named '.rc' located in '/usr/local/bin/'. This behavior is suspicious as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or run malicious scripts via hidden configuration files, especially when performed by non-standard installers.
Detects the creation, modification, or execution of a hidden file named '.rc' located in '/usr/local/bin/'. This behavior is suspicious as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or run malicious scripts via hidden configuration files, especially when performed by non-standard installers.
Detects periodic outbound network connections from internal hosts to external networks, consistent with command-and-control beaconing behavior often observed in malware like BabylonRAT.
Detects execution, file writing, or network activity associated with the process named 'Stella_Gary', which may indicate the retrieval or use of malicious plugin modules.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for outbound connections to a list of known malicious or suspicious IP addresses. This activity is indicative of potential command and control (C2) communication or unauthorized data exfiltration.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior by correlating intensive usage of graphics-related API calls (like BitBlt, GetDC, etc.) which are indicative of screen capture, with the execution of specific command identifiers typically associated with C2 (Command and Control) traffic. The combination suggests an adversary is capturing screen data and potentially staging or exfiltrating it via a C2 channel.
This rule monitors for network connections to known command-and-control (C2) IP addresses and the execution or presence of files matching known hashes associated with the 'PhantomC2' threat group or malware family. It correlates data from DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to identify potential compromise.
Detects network communication with known Command and Control (C2) IP addresses associated with Phantom Stealer malware. This rule monitors both outbound connections from the internal network and inbound traffic from the identified malicious infrastructure.
Detects network traffic on TCP port 3308 consistent with VectraRAT beaconing, utilizing MessagePack-over-TCP. The rule monitors for established connections to external networks with specific stream size and content characteristics typical of this C2 communication channel.
Detects network traffic on TCP port 3308 consistent with VectraRAT beaconing, utilizing MessagePack-over-TCP. The rule monitors for established connections to external networks with specific stream size and content characteristics typical of this C2 communication channel.
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