Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,247 detections
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Detects network traffic on TCP port 3308 consistent with VectraRAT beaconing, utilizing MessagePack-over-TCP. The rule monitors for established connections to external networks with specific stream size and content characteristics typical of this C2 communication channel.
Detects network traffic on TCP port 3308 consistent with VectraRAT beaconing, utilizing MessagePack-over-TCP. The rule monitors for established connections to external networks with specific stream size and content characteristics typical of this C2 communication channel.
This rule detects network connections to known CRPx0 relay or Command and Control (C2) IP addresses, as well as DNS requests to domains associated with the CRPx0 infrastructure, including relay nodes, leak sites, and TLD-rotation services.
This rule detects potential exploitation or unauthorized interaction with an HAProxy service. It correlates process execution on Linux systems involving the HAProxy PID file with subsequent network traffic containing the suspicious string 'writeservice_info' within a one-hour window.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with a specific AutoIT-based malware delivery chain. It tracks the execution and presence of specific malicious file names and SHA256 hashes, as well as network connections to a identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure IP address (158.51.122.136). The detection spans file creation, process execution, image loading, and network communication events to identify the multi-stage attack lifecycle.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with a specific AutoIT-based malware delivery chain. It tracks the execution and presence of specific malicious file names and SHA256 hashes, as well as network connections to a identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure IP address (158.51.122.136). The detection spans file creation, process execution, image loading, and network communication events to identify the multi-stage attack lifecycle.
Detects activity from Anthropic network range across multiple event types
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious automated scraping behavior by identifying periodic, non-interactive tasks that perform high-volume outbound network requests to multiple external hosts. It specifically filters for processes launched via scheduling mechanisms (Task Scheduler, cron) that exhibit indicators of anti-bot or proxy-rotation bypass techniques (such as usage of headless browser tools or proxy-related keywords in command lines). The rule is tuned to ignore legitimate system maintenance, update, and monitoring processes.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious automated scraping behavior by identifying periodic, non-interactive tasks that perform high-volume outbound network requests to multiple external hosts. It specifically filters for processes launched via scheduling mechanisms (Task Scheduler, cron) that exhibit indicators of anti-bot or proxy-rotation bypass techniques (such as usage of headless browser tools or proxy-related keywords in command lines). The rule is tuned to ignore legitimate system maintenance, update, and monitoring processes.
Detects sensitive data exfiltration attempts (PII, credit card, OTP) via HTTP POST requests to suspicious lookalike domains, followed by a WebSocket connection to known IronToll C2 infrastructure.
Detects specific suspicious processes (identified by hash or path) initiating a listening network connection on non-standard ports typically associated with honeypot captures, specifically referencing Cowrie-related paths or known malicious samples.
Detects specific suspicious processes (identified by hash or path) initiating a listening network connection on non-standard ports typically associated with honeypot captures, specifically referencing Cowrie-related paths or known malicious samples.
Detects specific suspicious processes (identified by hash or path) initiating a listening network connection on non-standard ports typically associated with honeypot captures, specifically referencing Cowrie-related paths or known malicious samples.
Detects network activity (DNS lookups, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) associated with proxy infrastructure (iproyal.com and lightningproxies.net) known to be used by the HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK threat actors to mask Telegram-based command and control traffic.
Detects network activity (DNS lookups, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) associated with proxy infrastructure (iproyal.com and lightningproxies.net) known to be used by the HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK threat actors to mask Telegram-based command and control traffic.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for outbound network connections to a list of known malicious IP addresses associated with various C2 frameworks and malware families, as identified by threat intelligence feeds (e.g., ThreatFox). Identifying these connections helps detect potential C2 communication and ingress tool transfer.
Detects outbound network connections initiated by the VLC media player (vlc.exe) to public IP addresses using the RTSP protocol (port 554) or referencing common media file extensions (e.g., .m3u, .xspf) in the command line. This behavior is often associated with remote stream retrieval or, in adversarial contexts, the potential use of media players to exfiltrate data or retrieve malicious remote payloads.
Detects network requests to Google Sheets API containing specific markers (-tk- or val-) in the request body, indicative of potential command and control (C2) communication patterns often associated with malware payloads using Google Sheets for data exfiltration or command retrieval.
Detects periodic screen capture activity performed by Node.js or Electron-based processes, correlated with subsequent outbound network connections to public IP addresses within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of the JSCeal malware's surveillance and exfiltration module, where local reconnaissance via screenshotting is followed by data transmission.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious automated scraping behavior by identifying periodic, non-interactive tasks that perform high-volume outbound network requests to multiple external hosts. It specifically filters for processes launched via scheduling mechanisms (Task Scheduler, cron) that exhibit indicators of anti-bot or proxy-rotation bypass techniques (such as usage of headless browser tools or proxy-related keywords in command lines). The rule is tuned to ignore legitimate system maintenance, update, and monitoring processes.
Detects the creation, modification, or execution of a hidden file named '.rc' located in '/usr/local/bin/'. This behavior is suspicious as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or run malicious scripts via hidden configuration files, especially when performed by non-standard installers.
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