Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

1,247 detections

Detects devices reaching P7 DarkSword exploit-delivery hosts (cdn/js.gotoiphone.com, mzpo30.cam) and the agdx53.cc C2, with delivery-then-C2 chaining surfaced as the highest-confidence match. Matching is limited to the exact listed hosts and successful/attempted connection events.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
17 days ago
003
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
15 days ago
001
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
20 days ago
006
Correlates ARTEX tool artifacts on a device with that device contacting the ARTEX host, xcai.pro, or the DeepSeek API within 24 hours.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
20 days ago
006
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
20 days ago
005
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known UAC-0099 MATCHBOIL/LONEPAGE indicators: SHA256 hashes, C2 IPs, C2 domains (including subdomains), and payload/C2 URLs. Matches are limited to public outbound connections, Defender self-activity is excluded from file hits, and repeat hits are collapsed to one row per device and indicator. The lists are a subset of the 142 IOCs in the source report.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
20 days ago
105
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known UAC-0099 MATCHBOIL/LONEPAGE indicators: SHA256 hashes, C2 IPs, C2 domains (including subdomains), and payload/C2 URLs. Matches are limited to public outbound connections, Defender self-activity is excluded from file hits, and repeat hits are collapsed to one row per device and indicator. The lists are a subset of the 142 IOCs in the source report.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
20 days ago
005
Detects endpoint connections to known DarkSword/Coruna exploit-host and C2 infrastructure. The shared AWS IP is only matched on C2 ports 8881/8882 to reduce collateral hits.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
17 days ago
002
Detects devices reaching P7 DarkSword exploit-delivery hosts (cdn/js.gotoiphone.com, mzpo30.cam) and the agdx53.cc C2, with delivery-then-C2 chaining surfaced as the highest-confidence match. Matching is limited to the exact listed hosts and successful/attempted connection events.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
17 days ago
002
Detects devices reaching P7 DarkSword exploit-delivery hosts (cdn/js.gotoiphone.com, mzpo30.cam) and the agdx53.cc C2, with delivery-then-C2 chaining surfaced as the highest-confidence match. Matching is limited to the exact listed hosts and successful/attempted connection events.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
17 days ago
002
Detects the handshake process for Blackwood/Chisel reverse SOCKS5 or TCP-over-HTTP tunneling to a known malicious Iranian-hosted C2 IP address. The detection matches specific HTTP headers used by the Chisel tool during its initialization phase.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
21 days ago
006
Detects network, DNS, email, and URL click events matching known IOC domains associated with AdFection, Candiru, and Discover-Tech threat intelligence reports.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
13 days ago
000
Detects the AdFection multi-stage infection chain where a device sequentially contacts advertising infrastructure, Candiru validator servers, exploit servers, and Candiru Command and Control domains within a short time window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
13 days ago
000
Detects the AdFection multi-stage infection chain where a device sequentially contacts advertising infrastructure, Candiru validator servers, exploit servers, and Candiru Command and Control domains within a short time window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
13 days ago
000
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known UAC-0099 MATCHBOIL/LONEPAGE indicators: SHA256 hashes, C2 IPs, C2 domains (including subdomains), and payload/C2 URLs. Matches are limited to public outbound connections, Defender self-activity is excluded from file hits, and repeat hits are collapsed to one row per device and indicator. The lists are a subset of the 142 IOCs in the source report.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
20 days ago
104
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known UAC-0099 MATCHBOIL/LONEPAGE indicators: SHA256 hashes, C2 IPs, C2 domains (including subdomains), and payload/C2 URLs. Matches are limited to public outbound connections, Defender self-activity is excluded from file hits, and repeat hits are collapsed to one row per device and indicator. The lists are a subset of the 142 IOCs in the source report.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
20 days ago
004
This rule monitors network traffic from CommonSecurityLog data to detect bidirectional communication between NetScaler appliances and known malicious infrastructure associated with the CVE-2026-88772 campaign, which is indicative of command-and-control activity.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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SlimKQL
28 days ago
10038
Detects potential remote shell behavior where a process named libgcrypt establishes an outbound connection on TCP port 9999 and spawns a shell (such as sh, bash, dash, zsh, or ash) within a short time window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
20 days ago
004
Detects potential remote shell behavior where a process named libgcrypt establishes an outbound connection on TCP port 9999 and spawns a shell (such as sh, bash, dash, zsh, or ash) within a short time window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
20 days ago
004
Detects potential remote shell behavior where a process named libgcrypt establishes an outbound connection on TCP port 9999 and spawns a shell (such as sh, bash, dash, zsh, or ash) within a short time window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
20 days ago
004
Detects endpoint and network activity matching known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with BPFDoor, AVERAT, and Rekoobe backdoors based on Rapid7 research. The query checks for specific file hashes, IP addresses, and domain names across process, file, image load, network, and DNS events.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
18 days ago
002
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