Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,247 detections
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Comprehensive IOC sweep across endpoint file/process/network telemetry for the full set of known SilkParasite/SpiceRAT/NodeEdgeRAT/NomadRAT/BloodAlchemy infrastructure indicators reported by Hunt.io and Security Affairs: all listed C2/decoy/certificate-hosting IPs, all listed spoofed/infrastructure domains, and known file/certificate hashes (SHA256, SHA1).
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign, which commonly targets users with fake error messages to trick them into executing malicious commands. The rule identifies communication with known malicious infrastructure (domains and IP addresses) found in CommonSecurityLog events, while implementing filters to exclude common security scanners and deduplicating per-host alerts.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign, which commonly targets users with fake error messages to trick them into executing malicious commands. The rule identifies communication with known malicious infrastructure (domains and IP addresses) found in CommonSecurityLog events, while implementing filters to exclude common security scanners and deduplicating per-host alerts.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign, which commonly targets users with fake error messages to trick them into executing malicious commands. The rule identifies communication with known malicious infrastructure (domains and IP addresses) found in CommonSecurityLog events, while implementing filters to exclude common security scanners and deduplicating per-host alerts.
Detects the initialization and persistence of a 'tailcat.exe' process operating from a non-standard, user-profile directory, typically mimicking legitimate tools. The rule monitors for the specific 'forward' command-line argument containing port mapping strings, an immediate loopback connection to that port, and subsequent periodic external network keep-alive traffic originating from the same process or parent lineage, indicating a C2 tunnel setup.
Hunts telemetry for published NeedyMantis indicators: three known SHA-256 hashes (WinSparkle.dll first-stage loader and its encrypted archive, plus the older libcurl archive), the C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com, and the C2 URL path /library/zip/ on that domain. Domain/URL matching parses the actual host out of RemoteUrl and requires an EXACT match (not substring 'has/contains'), so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') or as a prefix of an unrelated domain (e.g. 'corp.tripswithengine.com.evil.net') cannot match. No malicious IP address has been published for this campaign, so IP-based matching is intentionally not included.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign, as detailed in Lab52 threat research. It monitors for file and process activity matching known malicious hashes, as well as network connections to specific domains and URLs associated with the campaign's command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign, as detailed in Lab52 threat research. It monitors for file and process activity matching known malicious hashes, as well as network connections to specific domains and URLs associated with the campaign's command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects specific markers in UDP traffic on ports 3478, 5349, and 443 that are associated with the DragonForce malware's TRN1 C2 beaconing protocol. The rules identify session initiation, task polling, task acknowledgment, and result uploading behaviors.
Matches distinctive DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign artifact filenames only when combined with byte-level markers unique to the malware (PE structure, TURN/MQTT C2 infrastructure strings, or the loader's pipe-caret-pipe thread-trigger byte pattern), to avoid false positives on unrelated benign files sharing these names.
Matches distinctive DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign artifact filenames only when combined with byte-level markers unique to the malware (PE structure, TURN/MQTT C2 infrastructure strings, or the loader's pipe-caret-pipe thread-trigger byte pattern), to avoid false positives on unrelated benign files sharing these names.
Detects network activity associated with the DragonForce backdoor, specifically the use of MQTT for command and control. The rules monitor for unique 16-character client IDs used during registration on non-standard ports, subsequent command retrieval structures containing 'cmdnum', and DNS queries for the hardcoded broker 'broker.emqx.io'.
Detects network activity associated with the DragonForce backdoor, specifically the use of MQTT for command and control. The rules monitor for unique 16-character client IDs used during registration on non-standard ports, subsequent command retrieval structures containing 'cmdnum', and DNS queries for the hardcoded broker 'broker.emqx.io'.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign, which commonly targets users with fake error messages to trick them into executing malicious commands. The rule identifies communication with known malicious infrastructure (domains and IP addresses) found in CommonSecurityLog events, while implementing filters to exclude common security scanners and deduplicating per-host alerts.
Detects established, bidirectional TCP connections between internal hosts and known infrastructure associated with the SIDEEYE backdoor on specific control and data ports (3333 and 3334).
Detects network activity (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) associated with known RedFlick command-and-control (C2) infrastructure domains: etia.ca, groy.cc, and secure-dns-hub.com.
This rule performs a retrospective hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ClosedQuorum malware. It identifies suspicious activity by matching against known file hashes, specific filenames, and network traffic directed towards services (such as DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Discord) which the malware uses for C2 or data exfiltration. The detection logic aggregates results from file system, process, and network telemetry.
This rule detects network connections originating from hosts to specific remote domains ('codeonicinc.com', 'setupsoftwarecenter.com') which are associated with OpenSUpdater command and control (C2) activity. It leverages Microsoft Defender DeviceNetworkEvents to identify endpoints communicating with these known malicious infrastructure components.
This rule detects outbound network connections originating from managed devices where the remote URL or domain matches known underground LLM-based services, such as WormGPT, FraudGPT, or EvilGPT, which are often used by threat actors for malicious activities like generating phishing content or malware.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
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