Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
170 detections
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Detects Gryxa staging behavior where files are written across 2 or more distinct toolkit directories (such as WinRTCS, WER .wucache, and Diagnosis .etlcache) within a 1-hour window on a single device.
Detects ProFTPD FTP server commands where an adversary uses SITE CPFR (Copy From) to reference a sensitive file path (such as /etc/passwd or SSH keys) followed by SITE CPTO (Copy To) on the same host within a 10-minute window, which indicates potential staging or unauthorized copying of sensitive system files via FTP.
Detects Gryxa staging behavior where files are written across 2 or more distinct toolkit directories (such as WinRTCS, WER .wucache, and Diagnosis .etlcache) within a 1-hour window on a single device.
Detects potential exfiltration staging by copying files from Windows mounts (/mnt/) into the WSL Linux filesystem using wsl.exe -e cp/mv
Detects the execution of command-line archiving utilities (e.g., 7z, rar, zip) to create potentially password-protected archives within common staging directories (Temp, Public, ProgramData), followed by an outbound network connection to an external destination. This behavior is consistent with data staging and subsequent exfiltration.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious actions indicative of credential theft, including LSASS memory access for dumping, followed by the acquisition of browser or cryptocurrency wallet files, and the subsequent staging of data in temporary directories, all correlated by the same process and device within a 15-minute window.
Detects repeated file creation or modification events involving the specific file 'bot_log.txt' in directory paths containing '\Temp\' on endpoints where 'msedge_proxy.exe' is also running. This pattern is indicative of potential data staging or logging activities by an unauthorized proxy or tunnel process.
Detects unauthorized data staging activities using archival utilities followed by data exfiltration to known public cloud storage providers. The rule specifically excludes hosts experiencing mass file renaming activity, focusing on extortion-only scenarios where data is stolen without encryption.
Detects a sequence of activity indicative of data exfiltration preparation. This rule identifies the creation of multiple large archive files (.zip, .rar, .7z) in temporary or staging directories on an endpoint, followed by a network connection transferring a significant volume of data to an external, non-private IP address within a 30-minute window.
This rule detects potential staging activity for ClickFix or Vidar malware campaigns. It identifies the creation of files or folders in directories mimicking Windows Diagnostics infrastructure (WDI) or known payload paths, correlated with the execution of suspicious PowerShell commands or archive-related utilities within a 30-minute window on the same device.
Detects a specific attack chain attributed to ClosedQuorum, involving LSASS memory dumping, subsequent access to browser-based credential stores or cryptocurrency wallet files, and finally staging the stolen data in C:\Windows\Temp\ within a short time window.
Detects the staging of ChainScript files into specific, masquerading subdirectories within user AppData folders that mimic legitimate Windows system paths. This activity is indicative of the _scatter.ps1 script redistributing components such as the Node.js runtime, agent configuration, and helper utilities before execution.
This rule detects potential staging activity for ClickFix or Vidar malware campaigns. It identifies the creation of files or folders in directories mimicking Windows Diagnostics infrastructure (WDI) or known payload paths, correlated with the execution of suspicious PowerShell commands or archive-related utilities within a 30-minute window on the same device.
Detects a specific attack chain attributed to ClosedQuorum, involving LSASS memory dumping, subsequent access to browser-based credential stores or cryptocurrency wallet files, and finally staging the stolen data in C:\Windows\Temp\ within a short time window.
Detects the creation of files in the Windows Temp directory that match specific naming patterns associated with UnixStealer, including tool executables, database files, stolen data archives, and debug logs. These artifacts are characteristic of the tool's staging and activity tracking behaviors.
This rule detects instances where Windows script hosts (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) create directories with suspicious naming conventions (starting with 'Libs_' or containing 'Temp Documents') within the 'C:\Users\Public\' directory. This activity is often associated with the staging of malicious payloads or collected data prior to exfiltration or execution.
This rule detects potential staging activity for ClickFix or Vidar malware campaigns. It identifies the creation of files or folders in directories mimicking Windows Diagnostics infrastructure (WDI) or known payload paths, correlated with the execution of suspicious PowerShell commands or archive-related utilities within a 30-minute window on the same device.
This rule monitors for the creation of files with the .ent extension within the Microsoft Internet Explorer directory. The rule specifically looks for files with a six-character alphanumeric name (e.g., abc123.ent), which may indicate the use of custom scripts, configuration files, or data staging by potentially malicious actors leveraging the browser's directory structure for persistence or data storage.
Detects the creation of files within the 'SystemFolder32' or 'System Folder32' directory under the user's Local AppData path, a known behavioral pattern for payload staging used by the Transparent Tribe threat actor.
Detects the creation of specific file paths and files associated with the PSNATCH file stealer tool, specifically monitoring for the presence of SmartUploader application directories and its associated upload index files. This behavior is indicative of an adversary staging collected data on a local system for subsequent exfiltration.
Detects a specific attack chain attributed to ClosedQuorum, involving LSASS memory dumping, subsequent access to browser-based credential stores or cryptocurrency wallet files, and finally staging the stolen data in C:\Windows\Temp\ within a short time window.
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