Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
34 detections
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Detection Looks for powershell been used to disable AV/Defender within a system or evade detection through excluding drives/files. Actors will use this to bypass defenses or set up file exclusions to allow their custom files/binaries to execute.
KQL Query from file: FileFix Detection
KQL Query from file: Suspicious CLI Obfuscation
KQL Query
KQL Query from file: Cookie-Bite Detection
KQL Query
KQL Query from file: PowerShell Self-Pwn
SPL Query
Detects suspicious process creation where a web browser spawns a command interpreter or scripting host. This behavior is indicative of the "FileFix" attack, where users are socially engineered to paste malicious commands into the File Explorer address bar opened by a browser's file upload functionality.
This query searches for a string pattern detected in evasive PowerShell usage. Jupyter or SolarMarker will iterate on this pattern multiple times to read data and call additional processes. This query is not fully specific to Jupyter or SolarMarker, and will also return other malicious malware, but is unlikely to return false positives.
' This hunting query looks for process command line activity related to activity observed by Dev-0056.The command lines this query hunts for are used as part of the threat actor's post exploitation activity.
This query uses the Microsoft Sentinel Information Model - https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/normalization'
This query uses the Microsoft Sentinel Information Model - https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/normalization'
'This query looks for command lines that contain a public IP address. Attackers may use a hard coded IP for C2 or exfiltration.
This query can be filtered to exclude network prefixes that are known to be legitimate.'
This query can be filtered to exclude network prefixes that are known to be legitimate.'
This query looks for identity add through exchange PowerShell
This query looks for persistence or priviledge escalation done using Windows Accessibility features.
It covers some of the techniques that could be used to utilize these features for malicious purposes,.
Including attaching a debugger using a registry config or overwriting these files.
Note: some developers might use such hacks for all sort of troubleshooting and testing purposes,.
But this better be prohibited, as it allows any account with access to the machine to run processes as SYSTEM.
Read more here: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1015.
Tags: #AccessibilityFeatures, #StickyKeys, #ImageFileExecutionOptions, #Debugger, #PriviledgeEscalation, #Persistence.
It covers some of the techniques that could be used to utilize these features for malicious purposes,.
Including attaching a debugger using a registry config or overwriting these files.
Note: some developers might use such hacks for all sort of troubleshooting and testing purposes,.
But this better be prohibited, as it allows any account with access to the machine to run processes as SYSTEM.
Read more here: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1015.
Tags: #AccessibilityFeatures, #StickyKeys, #ImageFileExecutionOptions, #Debugger, #PriviledgeEscalation, #Persistence.
This query looks for processes that load an older version of the system.management.automation libraries. While not inherently malicious, downgrading to PowerShell version 2
can enable an attacker to bypass some of the protections afforded by modern PowerShell. It is worth noting that some tools and scripts perform this to enable
backwards compatibility, so the technique is not inherently malicious. You will likely need to filter the processes within your environment that legitimately use this
capability for this to be effective.
can enable an attacker to bypass some of the protections afforded by modern PowerShell. It is worth noting that some tools and scripts perform this to enable
backwards compatibility, so the technique is not inherently malicious. You will likely need to filter the processes within your environment that legitimately use this
capability for this to be effective.
Looks for rare process launch as a scheduled task and activity done by the processes.
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/hunting-for-malicious-scheduled-tasks/
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/hunting-for-malicious-scheduled-tasks/
This query will detect encoded powershell based on the parameters passed during process creation. This query will also work if the PowerShell executable is renamed or tampered with since detection is based solely on a regex of the launch string.
Identifies potential service tampering related to Microsoft Defender services.
Query insprired by Azure Sentinel detection https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/MultipleDataSources/PotentialMicrosoftDefenderTampering.yaml
Query insprired by Azure Sentinel detection https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/MultipleDataSources/PotentialMicrosoftDefenderTampering.yaml
PowerShell Execution
Sigma
Detects execution of PowerShell
'This hunting query looks for hosts that have attempted to interact with the Discord CDN. This activity is not normally invoked from the command line and could indicate C2, exfiltration, or malware delivery activity.'
'Looks for Base64-encoded commands associated with the Nishang reverse TCP shell.
Ref: https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1'
Ref: https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1'
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