Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
132 detections
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Detects a single identity/IP querying Microsoft Graph endpoints for directory roles, role management, registered authentication methods, applications, service principals, OAuth2 permission grants, and app role assignments within a short window - control-plane reconnaissance mapping privilege escalation and persistence opportunities
Detects anomalous, high-volume account enumeration against the Microsoft Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) endpoint from a single source IP. The rule identifies a pattern of mixed response codes, specifically interleaving '50034' (Account does not exist) with successful or other outcomes, which indicates the use of automated tools to validate the existence of corporate accounts via response differentiation.
Detects a suspicious sequence of behavior where an Azure service principal authenticates and immediately performs broad reconnaissance (enumeration) across multiple subscriptions and resource types. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary using a compromised service principal credential to map out an environment.
Detects a suspicious pattern often associated with Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) activity: prolonged, high-volume Azure resource enumeration by one service principal, followed shortly by a second service principal performing rapid, multi-subscription enumeration from the same source IP address.
Detects a suspicious pattern often associated with Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) activity: prolonged, high-volume Azure resource enumeration by one service principal, followed shortly by a second service principal performing rapid, multi-subscription enumeration from the same source IP address.
Detects anomalous, high-volume reconnaissance activity against multiple Microsoft Graph API endpoints (users, groups, roles, authentication methods, service principals, sites, and drives) by a single identity within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise enumeration, often associated with threats like UNC6671/Storm-3121.
Detects anomalous post-authentication reconnaissance activities against the Microsoft Graph API, specifically the enumeration of directory objects, roles, or service principals. The rule triggers when a user account performs multi-endpoint enumeration via the Graph API within 30 minutes of a successful authentication session initiated via a device code flow that was flagged with elevated risk signals. This behavior is consistent with post-compromise reconnaissance techniques such as 'EvilTokens', where an adversary attempts to map the environment after gaining access.
Detects Microsoft Graph API requests targeting user information endpoints (/v1.0/users or /v1.0/me) using specific search filters associated with payroll or human resources and identified by the Axios HTTP client User-Agent string. This pattern is consistent with reconnaissance activities.
Detects a suspicious sequence of behavior where an Azure service principal authenticates and immediately performs broad reconnaissance (enumeration) across multiple subscriptions and resource types. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary using a compromised service principal credential to map out an environment.
Detects a suspicious sequence of behavior where an Azure service principal authenticates and immediately performs broad reconnaissance (enumeration) across multiple subscriptions and resource types. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary using a compromised service principal credential to map out an environment.
Detects a suspicious sequence of behavior where an Azure service principal authenticates and immediately performs broad reconnaissance (enumeration) across multiple subscriptions and resource types. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary using a compromised service principal credential to map out an environment.
Detects reconnaissance activity targeting sensitive personnel groups (payroll, HR, finance) via Microsoft Graph API. The rule identifies suspicious URI patterns combined with the use of the 'axios' User-Agent library, potentially indicating automated enumeration by an adversary to map high-value targets for future business email compromise or credential theft.
Detects anomalous post-authentication reconnaissance activities against the Microsoft Graph API, specifically the enumeration of directory objects, roles, or service principals. The rule triggers when a user account performs multi-endpoint enumeration via the Graph API within 30 minutes of a successful authentication session initiated via a device code flow that was flagged with elevated risk signals. This behavior is consistent with post-compromise reconnaissance techniques such as 'EvilTokens', where an adversary attempts to map the environment after gaining access.
Detects anomalous, high-velocity enumeration of IAM entities and cloud infrastructure resources by a single principal within a 5-minute window. This behavior is consistent with automated reconnaissance performed by agentic AI or scripted tools, often used to map cloud environments prior to exploitation.
Detects high-privileged Entra ID accounts successfully reaching the verification stage of the Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) process. While SSPR is automatically enabled for administrative accounts, this activity is anomalous and potentially indicates an attacker focusing on discovered privileged accounts after performing broader enumeration.
Detects high-privileged Entra ID accounts successfully reaching the verification stage of the Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) process. While SSPR is automatically enabled for administrative accounts, this activity is anomalous and potentially indicates an attacker focusing on discovered privileged accounts after performing broader enumeration.
Detects high-privileged Entra ID accounts successfully reaching the verification stage of the Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) process. While SSPR is automatically enabled for administrative accounts, this activity is anomalous and potentially indicates an attacker focusing on discovered privileged accounts after performing broader enumeration.
Detects anomalous, high-volume account enumeration against the Microsoft Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) endpoint from a single source IP. The rule identifies a pattern of mixed response codes, specifically interleaving '50034' (Account does not exist) with successful or other outcomes, which indicates the use of automated tools to validate the existence of corporate accounts via response differentiation.
Detects anomalous, high-volume account enumeration against the Microsoft Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) endpoint from a single source IP. The rule identifies a pattern of mixed response codes, specifically interleaving '50034' (Account does not exist) with successful or other outcomes, which indicates the use of automated tools to validate the existence of corporate accounts via response differentiation.
Detects anomalous Microsoft Graph API activity characterized by user enumeration or querying for sensitive organizational groups (e.g., payroll, finance, HR) often associated with post-AiTM account-takeover reconnaissance. This detection specifically identifies multiple requests for sensitive URIs or high-count enumeration requests originating from suspicious User-Agent strings like 'axios/1.18.1', commonly observed in threat actor activity such as Storm-2755.
Detects a suspicious sequence of behavior where an Azure service principal authenticates and immediately performs broad reconnaissance (enumeration) across multiple subscriptions and resource types. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary using a compromised service principal credential to map out an environment.
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