Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
132 detections
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This rule detects reconnaissance activity targeting sensitive employee information within Microsoft Graph. Specifically, it looks for 'Directory.Read.All' actions in Microsoft Graph events where the raw event data contains keywords like 'jobTitle' or 'displayName' and also includes terms such as 'payroll', 'hr', 'finance', or 'admin'. This combination suggests an attacker is attempting to enumerate or collect information about employees in sensitive departments, potentially for purposes like payroll hijacking or social engineering.
This rule detects reconnaissance activity targeting sensitive employee information within Microsoft Graph. Specifically, it looks for 'Directory.Read.All' actions in Microsoft Graph events where the raw event data contains keywords like 'jobTitle' or 'displayName' and also includes terms such as 'payroll', 'hr', 'finance', or 'admin'. This combination suggests an attacker is attempting to enumerate or collect information about employees in sensitive departments, potentially for purposes like payroll hijacking or social engineering.
Detects bulk Azure AD group membership enumeration via Graph API
This rule detects a potential Azure AD user account bulk enumeration attempt. It triggers when a source IP makes 20 or more HTTP requests within 30 seconds to 'graph.microsoft.com' with the URI containing '/users'. This pattern is indicative of an attacker attempting to enumerate multiple user accounts in Azure AD.
This rule detects AWS IAM user account enumeration attempts via the ListUsers API call. It triggers when five or more HTTP requests to 'iam.amazonaws.com' containing 'ListUsers' in the URI are observed from a single source IP within a 30-second window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker trying to discover valid IAM user accounts.
Identifies bursts or requests to high-value Microsoft Graph API discovery endpoints. Tycoon 2FA operators frequently perform automated burst reconnaissance against these endpoints post-compromise to map out roles, tenant relationships, mailbox settings, and contacts.
Identifies bursts or requests to high-value Microsoft Graph API discovery endpoints. Tycoon 2FA operators frequently perform automated burst reconnaissance against these endpoints post-compromise to map out roles, tenant relationships, mailbox settings, and contacts.
Detects when a successful AWS Console Login is immediately followed by discovery actions from the same user and IP address. This pattern is indicative of an attacker performing reconnaissance after gaining initial access, as seen in recent AWS phishing campaigns.
Detects the use of TruffleHog for AWS credential validation by identifying GetCallerIdentity API calls where the userAgent indicates TruffleHog. Threat actors leverage TruffleHog to enumerate and validate exposed AWS keys. Successful exploitation allows threat actors to confirm the validity of compromised AWS credentials, facilitating further unauthorized access and actions within the AWS environment.
Detects the use of TruffleHog for AWS credential validation by identifying GetCallerIdentity API calls where the userAgent indicates TruffleHog.
Threat actors leverage TruffleHog to enumerate and validate exposed AWS keys.
Successful exploitation allows threat actors to confirm the validity of compromised AWS credentials, facilitating further unauthorized access and actions within the AWS environment.
Threat actors leverage TruffleHog to enumerate and validate exposed AWS keys.
Successful exploitation allows threat actors to confirm the validity of compromised AWS credentials, facilitating further unauthorized access and actions within the AWS environment.
KQL Query
KQL Query
This detection leverages Azure Graph activity logs to identify when Graph APIs have been used to identify 10 or more service principals. This type of behavior is associated with tools such as Azure enumeration tools like AzureHound or ROADtools.
This detection identifies the presence of the default AzureHound user-agent string within Microsoft Graph Activity logs and NonInteractive SignIn Logs. AzureHound is a tool used for gathering information about Azure Active Directory environments, often employed by security professionals for legitimate auditing purposes. However, it can also be leveraged by malicious actors to perform reconnaissance activities, mapping out the Azure AD infrastructure to identify potential vulnerabilities and targets for further exploitation. Detecting its usage can help in identifying unauthorized access attempts and preemptively mitigating potential security threats to your Azure environment.
'This query identifies attackers trying to enumerate the Storage keys as well as updating roles using AzureActivity,SigninLogs
and AuditLogs'
and AuditLogs'
'This hunting query will help detect successful sign-ins from devices that are marked non-compliant along with bulk download activity.
Attackers may attempt to get a list of accounts, groups, registration details within an environment which could help in follow-on behavior.
Best practice is to block sign ins from non-complaint devices, however if allowed monitor these events to ensure they do not lead to other risky activity.
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in'
Attackers may attempt to get a list of accounts, groups, registration details within an environment which could help in follow-on behavior.
Best practice is to block sign ins from non-complaint devices, however if allowed monitor these events to ensure they do not lead to other risky activity.
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in'
Detects attempts by an identity to enumerate its Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) permissions. This activity is often observed in the early stages of a breach as attackers try to understand their access within a compromised Kubernetes environment. This can be achieved by querying the Kubernetes API server's SelfSubjectRulesReview API, for example, using the "kubectl auth can-i --list" command.
Detects identities attempting to enumerate their Kubernetes RBAC permissions.
In the early stages of a breach, attackers will aim to list the permissions they have within the compromised environment.
In a Kubernetes cluster, this can be achieved by interacting with the API server, and querying the SelfSubjectAccessReview API via e.g. a "kubectl auth can-i --list" command.
This will enumerate the Role-Based Access Controls (RBAC) rules defining the compromised user's authorization.
In the early stages of a breach, attackers will aim to list the permissions they have within the compromised environment.
In a Kubernetes cluster, this can be achieved by interacting with the API server, and querying the SelfSubjectAccessReview API via e.g. a "kubectl auth can-i --list" command.
This will enumerate the Role-Based Access Controls (RBAC) rules defining the compromised user's authorization.
The following analytic identifies attempts by users to access Okta applications that have not been assigned to them. It leverages Okta Identity Management logs, specifically focusing on failed access attempts to unassigned applications. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate potential unauthorized access attempts, which could lead to exposure of sensitive information or disruption of services. If confirmed malicious, such activity could result in data breaches, non-compliance with data protection laws, and overall compromise of the IT environment.
This rule identifies enumeration of user inboxes within an Entra ID tenant via the Microsoft Graph API. It specifically looks for multiple GET requests to the `/v1.0/users/*/mailFolders/Inbox/messages` endpoint from a single IP address and session within a 5-minute window. The detection is based on the behavior of tools like Invoke-GraphOpenInboxFinder in GraphRunner, but is applicable to any tool performing similar inbox scanning. The rule provides outcomes detailing the number of scanned users, successful accesses (HTTP 200), forbidden accesses (HTTP 403), and not found inboxes (HTTP 404).
This rule detects attempts to enumerate updatable groups within Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) using the Microsoft Graph API. Specifically, it looks for a combination of a GET request to the `/v1.0/groups` endpoint and a POST request to the `/beta/roleManagement/directory/estimateAccess` endpoint within a 5-minute window from the same IP address and session. This activity is indicative of tools like GraphRunner's `Get-UpdatableGroups` function, which adversaries might use to identify groups they can modify for privilege escalation or persistence.
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