Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
122 detections
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Detects modifications to the Tor configuration file (torrc) that permit SSH traffic (port 22) in the exit policy, followed by a Tor service reload or restart on the same device within a 4-hour window. This behavior may indicate an adversary setting up an onion routing proxy or covert tunnel.
Detects the execution of the Tor executable or the launching of Tor Browser from Brave Browser. The detection also identifies command-line arguments associated with Tor configuration files and Control/SOCKS ports, providing visibility into potential Tor usage on Windows endpoints for further investigation.
Detects commands or file-write activity that configures a Tor ExitPolicy matching distinctive policy templates (Policy A or Policy B), indicating potential Tor relay or bridge deployment.
Detects commands or file-write activity that configures a Tor ExitPolicy matching distinctive policy templates (Policy A or Policy B), indicating potential Tor relay or bridge deployment.
Detects commands or file-write activity that configures a Tor ExitPolicy matching distinctive policy templates (Policy A or Policy B), indicating potential Tor relay or bridge deployment.
Detects commands or file-write activity that configures a Tor ExitPolicy matching distinctive policy templates (Policy A or Policy B), indicating potential Tor relay or bridge deployment.
Detects commands or file-write activity that configures a Tor ExitPolicy matching distinctive policy templates (Policy A or Policy B), indicating potential Tor relay or bridge deployment.
This rule monitors Entra ID Sign-in logs for authentication events flagged by risk detections related to anonymizing infrastructure, such as VPNs, TOR exit nodes, or proxies. It identifies successful logins and aggregate sign-in volume from these IP addresses, flagging successful logins as critical due to the potential for valid account abuse through multi-hop proxy chains.
This rule monitors Entra ID Sign-in logs for authentication events flagged by risk detections related to anonymizing infrastructure, such as VPNs, TOR exit nodes, or proxies. It identifies successful logins and aggregate sign-in volume from these IP addresses, flagging successful logins as critical due to the potential for valid account abuse through multi-hop proxy chains.
This rule monitors Entra ID Sign-in logs for authentication events flagged by risk detections related to anonymizing infrastructure, such as VPNs, TOR exit nodes, or proxies. It identifies successful logins and aggregate sign-in volume from these IP addresses, flagging successful logins as critical due to the potential for valid account abuse through multi-hop proxy chains.
Detects outbound network connections to common TOR entry, guard, or client service ports, or the execution of TOR-related processes. This behavior may indicate an adversary establishing C2 communication channels or attempting to perform anonymized data exfiltration.
Detects high-frequency access requests directed at authentication or API endpoints originating from known Tor exit-node IP addresses. This activity is indicative of credential stuffing or automated scanning patterns that attempt to evade IP-based reputation or rate-limiting filters.
Detects reconnaissance and persistence behaviors associated with the Akira ransomware attack chain, specifically the execution of the Cloudflare Tunnel daemon for remote access or the creation/modification of local user accounts via standard Windows tools.
Detects the initiation of a SOCKS5 proxy handshake from an internal host to an external destination. The rule monitors for the characteristic SOCKS5 greeting (0x05) while specifically excluding HTTP traffic to identify potential unauthorized proxy tunneling used for command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects outbound network connections to known Tor SOCKS (9050, 9150) or OR (9001, 9051) ports initiated by processes other than standard, authorized Tor client binaries. This is indicative of potential C2 traffic obfuscation or unauthorized use of the Tor network within the environment.
Detects the execution of the Chisel C2 tool by matching its unique command-line grammar, specifically the 'client' subcommand combined with reverse remote ('R:') configurations. This detection strategy is resilient against binary renaming and infrastructure rotation by focusing on the tool's required argument structure rather than static IOCs like filenames or C2 addresses. It is specifically useful for identifying unauthorized remote tunnels used for persistence and data exfiltration.
Detects the execution of the Chisel C2 tool by matching its unique command-line grammar, specifically the 'client' subcommand combined with reverse remote ('R:') configurations. This detection strategy is resilient against binary renaming and infrastructure rotation by focusing on the tool's required argument structure rather than static IOCs like filenames or C2 addresses. It is specifically useful for identifying unauthorized remote tunnels used for persistence and data exfiltration.
Detection rules designed to identify communication patterns associated with the CRPx0 ransomware, specifically targeting HTTP-based command-and-control (C2) traffic, including relay server interaction, unique Authorization headers, and connections to known onion-based proxies.
Detects network activity related to the exploitation of Dahua P2P relay services via easy4ipcloud.com. The rule monitors for unauthorized device probing, serial number enumeration, and illicit relay authentication attempts (e.g., using DHP2P protocols and X-WSSE authentication), which are indicative of attackers attempting to abuse IoT device remote access functionality (CVE-2025-31702).
Detects outbound network traffic consistent with the Chisel proxy/tunneling tool establishing a connection to an external VPS associated with the Miku threat actor. The rule monitors for established TCP connections to a specific remote IP address on port 443, utilizing a threshold to reduce noise by ensuring multiple connection attempts occur.
Detects outbound network traffic consistent with the Chisel proxy/tunneling tool establishing a connection to an external VPS associated with the Miku threat actor. The rule monitors for established TCP connections to a specific remote IP address on port 443, utilizing a threshold to reduce noise by ensuring multiple connection attempts occur.
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