Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
837 detections
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Hunting query for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup (SkyKick) application credential abuse reported in October 2026. It returns three signals, sorted by a Priority column. First, sign-ins by the seven ConnectWise and SkyKick application IDs from a public IP address. ConnectWise states the Cloud Backup app normally signs in from Azure private IPv6 addresses. Second, service principals that sign in from a public IP address in a country not seen in their 14-day baseline. This signal evaluates apps with at least 20 prior sign-ins. Third, Entra audit events initiated by applications. These include an application adding itself or another non-user identity to a directory role, an application adding or changing credentials for the first time in the baseline window and any credential change by an application named ConnectWise or SkyKick. Role additions with an unidentified target appear with Review priority. Audit events initiated by applications carry no source IP, so the IP indicator applies to the sign-in signals only. Routine credential changes by Azure services can still appear with Review priority. The query follows the Microsoft Defender advanced hunting schemas and runs without errors in Advanced Hunting. The audit signal was exercised against live Entra audit events in a Microsoft 365 tenant. Indicator columns are short-lived and used for enrichment only.
Hunting query for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup (SkyKick) application credential abuse reported in October 2026. It returns three signals, sorted by a Priority column. First, sign-ins by the seven ConnectWise and SkyKick application IDs from a public IP address. ConnectWise states the Cloud Backup app normally signs in from Azure private IPv6 addresses. Second, service principals that sign in from a public IP address in a country not seen in their 14-day baseline. This signal evaluates apps with at least 20 prior sign-ins. Third, Entra audit events initiated by applications. These include an application adding itself or another non-user identity to a directory role, an application adding or changing credentials for the first time in the baseline window and any credential change by an application named ConnectWise or SkyKick. Role additions with an unidentified target appear with Review priority. Audit events initiated by applications carry no source IP, so the IP indicator applies to the sign-in signals only. Routine credential changes by Azure services can still appear with Review priority. The query follows the Microsoft Defender advanced hunting schemas and runs without errors in Advanced Hunting. The audit signal was exercised against live Entra audit events in a Microsoft 365 tenant. Indicator columns are short-lived and used for enrichment only.
Detects the creation or renaming of the 'ESX Admins' Active Directory security group combined with the addition of members to it, which is often used for privilege escalation or persistence in VMware ESXi environments managed via Active Directory.
Detects execution of GoldenDMSA hacktool used for Directory Service Account manipulation.
Detects the creation of application-specific passwords followed by their initial use from unknown or new IP addresses using legacy authentication clients, which may indicate account compromise or persistence establishment.
Detects a potential app-only tenant-takeover sequence associated with Storm-3119 (YAM Store), where a single service principal performs an administrative password reset, a license assignment, and a privileged role grant within a one-hour window.
Detects when a domain user account is renamed (Event ID 4781) where the old account name ends with a dollar sign (indicating a computer account) but the new name does not, or vice-versa, specifically checking if the new name matches a Domain Controller. This behavior can be indicative of account manipulation or exploitation attempts such as golden ticket or related attacks.
Detects five or more Entra ID device registrations by a single account where device names match microsoft-* or WINDOWS-* patterns, occurring shortly after a device code flow sign-in by the same account. This behavior is indicative of device registration abuse or persistent access attempts.
Detects the removal of user accounts from a specific sensitive Microsoft Entra ID group, which may indicate unauthorized group membership changes or potential privilege escalation activities.
Detects a single application or service principal performing a password reset, a license assignment, and a privileged role grant within a one-hour window. This sequence matches Storm-3119 admin-panel abuse of a compromised tenant client secret through an app-only flow in Microsoft 365 or Entra ID.
Detects OAuth credential activity on GitHub. Tokens bypass password and multi-factor
controls and persist until revoked, making them the standard persistence mechanism
on the platform. A token created on a compromised account continues to work long
after the password is reset.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='GITHUB' and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby target, role, accesstype, operationtype, authtokenhash
controls and persist until revoked, making them the standard persistence mechanism
on the platform. A token created on a compromised account continues to work long
after the password is reset.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='GITHUB' and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby target, role, accesstype, operationtype, authtokenhash
Detects a Slack role change conferring administrative rights. A workspace admin can
read private content, export conversation history, add applications and change
retention — so this is a meaningful privilege grant in a system that holds a great
deal of candid organisational information.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='SLACK' and action='ROLE_ADDED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, workspace
read private content, export conversation history, add applications and change
retention — so this is a meaningful privilege grant in a system that holds a great
deal of candid organisational information.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='SLACK' and action='ROLE_ADDED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, workspace
Detects a successful device-code sign-in followed within 60 minutes by non-interactive replay from a different IP AND a persistence action (inbox rule, app consent, device add) from a non-original IP. Persistence is now mandatory (inner join) instead of optional, and the retired AADSignInEventsBeta table is replaced by EntraIdSignInEvents.
Detects configuration changes to the PAM platform itself. Vault configuration governs
who may retrieve which credentials and what is recorded; altering it is how an
attacker grants themselves durable privileged access while suppressing the evidence
of having done so.
Changes made by an account that does not normally administer the vault are the ones
worth escalating.
Onboarding: PAM360 is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 879).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='PAM360' and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip, role
who may retrieve which credentials and what is recorded; altering it is how an
attacker grants themselves durable privileged access while suppressing the evidence
of having done so.
Changes made by an account that does not normally administer the vault are the ones
worth escalating.
Onboarding: PAM360 is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 879).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='PAM360' and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip, role
The following analytic detects when a unprivileged user changes an Admin accounts password. This is a common artifact of successful exploitation of the BlueHammer Windows Defender privilege escalation. The attacker's process momentarily changes the passwords of high-value local accounts including the built-in Administrator to spawn an authenticated shell session, then immediately reverts the passwords to avoid detection. This uses EventID 4723 to log this activity.
Detects a role change in Zendesk. An administrator can read every ticket, export
data, alter automations and add agents — and support platforms are a favoured
target for social engineering precisely because agents are trained to be helpful to
strangers.
Onboarding: ZENDESK is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 831).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/zendesk-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ZENDESK' and action='USER_UPDATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role
data, alter automations and add agents — and support platforms are a favoured
target for social engineering precisely because agents are trained to be helpful to
strangers.
Onboarding: ZENDESK is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 831).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/zendesk-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ZENDESK' and action='USER_UPDATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role
Detects a role being added in Centrify for Linux. Roles determine which servers an
identity can reach and what it may do there, so adding one is a durable grant of
access to Unix infrastructure that frequently sits outside the scope of Windows
centric monitoring.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX' and action='ROLE_ADDED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, group, domain
identity can reach and what it may do there, so adding one is a durable grant of
access to Unix infrastructure that frequently sits outside the scope of Windows
centric monitoring.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX' and action='ROLE_ADDED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, group, domain
Detects a role change on the Mimecast platform. A gateway administrator can read
quarantined mail, release held messages and alter policy — so this grant provides
both access to content and the ability to control what the organisation receives.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='ROLE_UPDATED'
| groupby user, srcip, reason
quarantined mail, release held messages and alter policy — so this grant provides
both access to content and the ability to control what the organisation receives.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='ROLE_UPDATED'
| groupby user, srcip, reason
Detects modification of a monitored file on a Centrify-managed Linux host. File
integrity events on Unix servers catch tampering with configuration, authorised keys
and service definitions — the common Linux persistence routes, which leave no
registry trace and no Windows-style artefact.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX' and action='FILE_MODIFIED'
| groupby user, targetuser, domain
integrity events on Unix servers catch tampering with configuration, authorised keys
and service definitions — the common Linux persistence routes, which leave no
registry trace and no Windows-style artefact.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX' and action='FILE_MODIFIED'
| groupby user, targetuser, domain
Detects a privilege change recorded by Centrify on a Linux server. Centrify brokers
privileged access to Unix estates, so it sees elevation decisions that native auditd
may record only partially — and in many estates it is the only consistent record
across heterogeneous Linux and AIX systems.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX'
and action='PRIVILEGE_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
privileged access to Unix estates, so it sees elevation decisions that native auditd
may record only partially — and in many estates it is the only consistent record
across heterogeneous Linux and AIX systems.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX'
and action='PRIVILEGE_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
Detects creation of an Atlassian API token. Tokens authenticate without a password
and without multi-factor, and they persist until revoked — which makes token creation
one of the most durable persistence mechanisms available on a SaaS platform holding
an organisation's project and documentation estate.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='API_TOKEN_CREATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, sitename, domain
and without multi-factor, and they persist until revoked — which makes token creation
one of the most durable persistence mechanisms available on a SaaS platform holding
an organisation's project and documentation estate.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='API_TOKEN_CREATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, sitename, domain
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