Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a sequence of events indicating the creation of a user account, a successful login by that user, and the subsequent deletion of the same user account within a 4-hour timeframe. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary creating temporary accounts for malicious activities, using them, and then removing them to cover their tracks or evade detection. The rule specifically targets Windows login events (event code 4624).
This analytic identifies when changes are made to the external guest policies within Azure AD. Specifically, it looks for the "Update policy." operation targeting "B2BManagementPolicy" in the Office 365 Universal Audit Log. The rule extracts and highlights the specific changes made to allowed/blocked domains for B2B collaboration, indicating whether domains were added or removed. Monitoring these changes is crucial as modifications to external identity policies can impact unauthorized access, as described in the BlackHat 2022 talk "Backdooring and Hijacking Azure AD Accounts by Abusing External Identities."
This analytic identifies when more than five unique Windows accounts are disabled within a 10-minute window, as indicated by Event Code 4725 in the Windows Security Event Log. This behavior may indicate internal policy breaches or an external attacker's attempt to disrupt operations. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to widespread account lockouts, hindering user access and potentially disrupting business operations.
The following analytic detects successful API calls to view, update, or delete the password policy in an AWS organization. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events such as "UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy," "GetAccountPasswordPolicy," and "DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy." This activity is significant because it is uncommon for regular users to perform these actions, and such changes can indicate an adversary attempting to understand or weaken password defenses. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to compromised accounts and increased attack surface, potentially allowing unauthorized access and control over AWS resources.
This detection identifies when an Azure Service Principal elevates privileges by adding itself to a new app role assignment. This activity indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt where a service principal grants itself additional permissions, which could lead to unauthorized access or control within the Azure environment.
The following analytic identifies IAM users attempting to update or modify AWS Lambda code via the AWS CLI. It leverages CloudTrail logs to detect successful `UpdateFunctionCode` events initiated by IAM users. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to gain persistence, further access, or plant backdoors within your AWS environment. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could upload and execute malicious code automatically when the Lambda function is triggered, potentially compromising the integrity and security of your AWS infrastructure.
This analytic identifies when a new owner is assigned to an application registration within an Azure AD and Office 365 tenant. This activity is significant because assigning a new owner to an application registration can grant significant control over the application's configuration, permissions, and behavior. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could modify the application's settings, permissions, and behavior, leading to unauthorized data access, privilege escalation, or the introduction of malicious behavior within the application's operations.
This analytic detects modifications to privileged groups in Active Directory, including creation, deletion, and changes to various types of groups such as local, global, universal, and LDAP query groups. It specifically monitors for changes to high-privilege groups like "Administrators", "Domain Admins", "Enterprise Admins", and "ESX Admins", among others. This detection is particularly relevant in the context of potential exploitation of vulnerabilities like the VMware ESXi Active Directory Integration Authentication Bypass (CVE-2024-37085), where attackers may attempt to manipulate privileged groups to gain unauthorized access to systems.
The following analytic identifies when a policy is deleted in AWS. It leverages Amazon Security Lake logs to detect the DeletePolicy API operation. Monitoring policy deletions is crucial as it can indicate unauthorized attempts to weaken security controls. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to remove critical security policies, potentially leading to privilege escalation or unauthorized access to sensitive resources.
This analytic detects an increase in modifications to AD user objects. A large volume of changes to user objects can indicate potential security risks, such as unauthorized access attempts, impairing defences or establishing persistence. By monitoring AD logs for unusual modification patterns, this detection helps identify suspicious behavior that could compromise the integrity and security of the AD environment.
The following analytic detects excessive usage of `net.exe` within a one-minute interval. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to create, delete, or disable multiple user accounts rapidly, a tactic observed in Monero mining incidents. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized user account manipulation, potentially compromising system integrity and enabling further malicious actions.
The analytic detects failed attempts to delete AWS IAM groups, triggered by access denial, conflicts, or non-existent groups. It monitors CloudTrail logs for specific error codes related to deletion failures. This behavior is significant as it may indicate unauthorized attempts to modify access controls or disrupt operations by removing groups, potentially as part of a larger attack aiming to escalate privileges or impair security protocols. Identifying these attempts allows for timely investigation and mitigation, preventing potential impact on the organization's security posture.
The analytic detects the addition of a new owner to a Service Principal within an Azure AD tenant. This activity is significant because Service Principals do not support multi-factor authentication or conditional access policies, making them a target for adversaries seeking persistence or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain access to the Azure AD environment with single-factor authentication, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over critical resources.
This analytic detects the addition of a new member to the DnsAdmins group in Active Directory by leveraging Windows Security Event ID 4732. Monitoring this activity is crucial because members of the DnsAdmins group can manage the DNS service, often running on Domain Controllers, and potentially execute malicious code with SYSTEM privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges and gain control over critical domain services, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic detects the successful deletion of a group within AWS IAM, leveraging CloudTrail IAM events. This action, while not inherently malicious, can serve as a precursor to more sinister activities, such as unauthorized access or privilege escalation attempts. By monitoring for such deletions, the analytic aids in identifying potential preparatory steps towards an attack, allowing for early detection and mitigation. The identification of this behavior is crucial for a SOC to prevent the potential impact of an attack, which could include unauthorized access to sensitive resources or disruption of AWS environment operations.
The analytic detects an Azure AD user enabling a previously disabled account and resetting its password within 2 minutes. This activity is significant because it may indicate an adversary with administrative access attempting to establish a backdoor identity within the Azure AD tenant. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to maintain persistent access, escalate privileges, and potentially exfiltrate sensitive information from the environment.
This analytic detects instances where a user adds themselves to an Active Directory (AD) group. This activity is a common indicator of privilege escalation, where a user attempts to gain unauthorized access to higher privileges or sensitive resources. By monitoring AD logs, this detection identifies such suspicious behavior, which could be part of a larger attack strategy aimed at compromising critical systems and data.
The following analytic identifies the use of Ldifde.exe, a command-line utility for creating, modifying, or deleting LDAP directory objects. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution and command-line arguments. Monitoring Ldifde.exe is significant because it can be used by attackers to manipulate directory objects, potentially leading to unauthorized changes or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain control over directory services, escalate privileges, or access sensitive information within the network.
The following analytic detects instances where more than five unique Windows account passwords are changed within a 10-minute interval. It leverages Event Code 4724 from the Windows Security Event Log, using the wineventlog_security dataset to monitor and count distinct TargetUserName values. This behavior is significant as rapid password changes across multiple accounts are unusual and may indicate unauthorized access or internal compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to widespread account compromise, unauthorized access to sensitive information, and potential disruption of services.
The analytic detects the deletion of more than five unique Windows accounts within a 10-minute period, using Event Code 4726 from the Windows Security Event Log. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to erase traces of their actions. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access removal, hindering incident response and forensic investigations.
The following analytic detects the deletion of an IAM policy in AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `DeletePolicy` events, excluding those from AWS internal services. This activity is significant as unauthorized policy deletions can disrupt access controls and weaken security postures. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could remove critical security policies, potentially leading to privilege escalation, unauthorized access, or data exfiltration. Monitoring this behavior helps ensure that only authorized changes are made to IAM policies, maintaining the integrity and security of the AWS environment.
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