Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
304 detections
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Detects an address whose sign-ins are mostly failures across many accounts in a short window, with scripted clients and Storm-0940 campaign addresses flagged, which is how the password spray in Microsoft's ARTEX reporting looked. It does not cover the ConnectWise application sign-ins (service principal events) or a spray spread over many addresses. The query ran without errors in a live tenant.
Detects a high volume of authentication failures followed by a successful authentication from the same source IP address against edge devices like FortiGate or Palo Alto GlobalProtect within a specific time window.
Detects execution of GoldenDMSA hacktool used for Directory Service Account manipulation.
This rule monitors Linux system authentication logs to identify potential unauthorized access attempts. It triggers when a single source IP initiates a high volume of failed SSH login attempts (brute force) or when a single user account is targeted by multiple distinct source IPs within a short time window (password spraying).
Detects repeated SSH authentication failures originating from an external source on port 22, where the username pattern appears to be programmatically generated or enumerated (e.g., username followed by digits). This behavior is characteristic of automated brute-force attempts targeting common SSH services.
This rule detects a potential brute force attack against the Microsoft SQL Server 'sa' administrative account. It identifies a high volume of failed authentication events (Event ID 18456) for the 'sa' account within a 10-minute window, followed by a successful authentication event (Event ID 18453 or 18454) from the same source IP address. The rule specifically filters for successful logins originating from non-private (internet-facing) IP addresses, suggesting an attempt from an external threat actor.
This rule identifies potential brute force or password spraying attacks against network edge devices, such as firewalls and VPN gateways. It aggregates authentication failures and denied connection attempts by source IP address. The rule differentiates between brute force attacks, characterized by a high volume of failed attempts against one or more users from a single source, and password spraying, indicated by multiple unique usernames failing authentication from the same source.
This rule detects potential brute force activity against network infrastructure devices (firewalls/UTMs). It identifies a sequence where a specific Source IP records multiple failed authentication attempts within a 1-hour window, followed by a successful authentication attempt from the same IP address. This pattern suggests a successful compromise of an account via credential guessing.
Detects a sequence of multiple RDP authentication failures (Event ID 4625, Logon Type 10) from a specific source IP, followed by a successful RDP authentication (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 10) from the same source IP. This pattern indicates a successful credential brute force or password spraying attack against RDP, which is a common initial access vector for ransomware and lateral movement.
Detects authentication to Snowflake instances where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is absent and the account authenticates from multiple distinct source IP addresses within a 14-day window. This behavior is indicative of potential account takeover using compromised non-MFA credentials, a pattern consistent with activities attributed to threat actors like ShinyHunters/UNC5537.
This rule detects a credential-based attack where a single source IP performs multiple failed RDP (LogonType 3/10) attempts against various user accounts, followed by a successful authentication from the same source within an hour. This pattern is indicative of password spraying or brute-forcing followed by successful lateral movement via Remote Desktop.
Detects a high frequency of SSH connection attempts originating from a single source address within a short timeframe, specifically targeting the initial SSH handshake string. This is indicative of automated brute force or credential stuffing activity against SSH services.
Detects high-volume RDP X.224 connection requests originating from a single source within a short timeframe, which is a strong indicator of a brute force or password spraying attack targeting Remote Desktop Protocol services.
Detects high-volume SSH authentication attempts originating from a single source IP targeting a server on port 22, indicating a potential brute force attack.
This rule detects potential RDP brute force and password spraying attacks by correlating Windows Event ID 4625 (failed logins) and 4624 (successful logins) via RDP (Logon Type 10). It monitors for high volumes of failed attempts across multiple accounts or high volume of failed attempts from a single source, followed by successful authentication from the same source.
The following analytic identifies instances where CrushFTP has blocked access due to exceeding the maximum number of simultaneous connections from a single IP address. This activity may indicate brute force attempts, credential stuffing, or automated attacks against the CrushFTP server. This detection is particularly relevant following the discovery of CVE-2025-31161, an authentication bypass vulnerability in CrushFTP versions 10.0.0 through 10.8.3 and 11.0.0 through 11.3.0.
Detects a high volume of failed SSH password authentication attempts from a single source IP address against one or more target hosts within a short time window, which is indicative of an SSH brute-force attack.
Detects a successful authentication to Microsoft SQL Server using the 'sa' account from a non-local address. This rule is designed to alert on potentially unauthorized access following a brute-force attack, as identified by the correlation of high-volume authentication failures (Event ID 18456) followed by a successful login (Event ID 18453/18454).
Detects high-volume credential brute-forcing activity targeting Dahua IP camera administrative interfaces (Ports 80/37777). The rule identifies a pattern of multiple connection failures across multiple distinct targets followed by a successful connection, which is highly characteristic of automated credential stuffing or password spraying attacks against embedded IoT devices.
This rule monitors for successful sign-in events that follow a threshold of failed authentication attempts within a one-hour window, specifically flagging cases where the successful login originated from a new location or a previously unseen device, which is often indicative of successful brute force or password spraying attacks.
Detects high-frequency authentication failures (Event ID 4625) originating from a single IP address against multiple different user accounts, indicating potential automated brute force or credential spraying activity.
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