Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
304 detections
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'Access attempts to Azure Portal from an unauthorized user. Either invalid password or the user account does not exist.'
Query #1: Look for public IP addresses that failed to logon to a computer multiple times, using multiple accounts, and eventually succeeded.
'Identifies privileged accounts that have been locked out. Verify these lockout are due to legitimate user activity and not due to threat actors attempting to access the accounts.
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#things-to-monitor'
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#things-to-monitor'
'Identifies spikes in failed sign-in events based on the volume of failed sign-in events over time. Use to identify patterns of suspicious behavior such as unusually high failed sign-in attempts from certain users.
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts'
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts'
'Query shows 1200+ failed attempts by cIP per hour on server, then successful logon. Only includes > 1 user agent string or port. Could indicate successful probing and brute force success on IIS servers.'
'An account could be blocked/locked out due to multiple reasons. This hunting query summarize blocked/lockout accounts and checks if most recent signin events for them is after last blocked accounts
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-successful-unusual-sign-ins'
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-successful-unusual-sign-ins'
'Identifies instances where Wazuh logged over 400 '403' Web Errors from one IP Address. To onboard Wazuh data into Sentinel please view: https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh-documentation/blob/master/source/azure/monitoring%20activity.rst'
'Query over SigninLogs summarizes login attempts per hour on weekdays. Kusto anomaly detection finds login spikes. Calculates percentage change between anomalous period and average logins. Determines success and failure rate for logins for 1 hour period.'
Detects command line parameters used by Hydra password guessing hack tool
Detect Attempt PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675) Remote code execution in Windows Spooler Service
Detects command line parameters used by Hydra password guessing hack tool
'Identifies when 20 or more failed attempts from a given client IP in 1 minute occur on the IIS server.
This could be indicative of an attempted brute force. This could also simply indicate a misconfigured service or device.
Recommendations: Validate that these are expected connections from the given Client IP. If the client IP is not recognized, potentially block these connections at the edge device.
If these are expected connections, verify the credentials are properly configured on the system, service, application or device that is associated with the client IP.
References:
IIS status code mapping: https://support.microsoft.com/help/943891/the-http-status-code-in-iis-7-0-iis-7-5-and-iis-8-0
Win32 Status code mapping: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc231199.aspx'
This could be indicative of an attempted brute force. This could also simply indicate a misconfigured service or device.
Recommendations: Validate that these are expected connections from the given Client IP. If the client IP is not recognized, potentially block these connections at the edge device.
If these are expected connections, verify the credentials are properly configured on the system, service, application or device that is associated with the client IP.
References:
IIS status code mapping: https://support.microsoft.com/help/943891/the-http-status-code-in-iis-7-0-iis-7-5-and-iis-8-0
Win32 Status code mapping: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc231199.aspx'
'Identifies IPs with failed attempts to sign in to one or more disabled accounts signed in successfully to another account.
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimAuthentication)'
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimAuthentication)'
'Identifies when 100 or more failed attempts by a given user in 10 minutes occur on the IIS Server.
This could be indicative of attempted brute force based on known account information.
This could also simply indicate a misconfigured service or device.
References:
IIS status code mapping - https://support.microsoft.com/help/943891/the-http-status-code-in-iis-7-0-iis-7-5-and-iis-8-0
Win32 Status code mapping - https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc231199.aspx'
This could be indicative of attempted brute force based on known account information.
This could also simply indicate a misconfigured service or device.
References:
IIS status code mapping - https://support.microsoft.com/help/943891/the-http-status-code-in-iis-7-0-iis-7-5-and-iis-8-0
Win32 Status code mapping - https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc231199.aspx'
'Identifies when failed logon attempts are 20 or higher during a 10 minute period (2 failed logons per minute minimum) from valid account.'
Sample query to detect If there are more then 3 failed logon authentications on high value assets.
Update DeviceName to reflect your high value assets.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com.
Update DeviceName to reflect your high value assets.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com.
Query #1: Look for public IP addresses that failed to logon to a computer multiple times, using multiple accounts, and eventually succeeded.
This rule detects a sequence of multiple failed login attempts (more than 4) followed by a successful login for the same user on the same hostname within a 15-minute window. It specifically targets Windows login events (event IDs 4625 for failure and 4624 for success) and correlates them with user and asset entity data, focusing on users in the 'Domain Admins' group and assets that are 'Domain Controllers'. This pattern is indicative of a brute-force attack or password guessing attempt that eventually succeeded.
This rule detects a pattern of multiple failed login attempts followed by a successful login for the same user on the same hostname within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a brute-force attack or password guessing attempt that eventually succeeded.
Detects failed logon attempts from clients with external network IP to an MSSQL server. This can be a sign of a bruteforce attack.
This analytic identifies high-severity intrusion events based on the classification assigned to Snort rules within Cisco Secure Firewall logs. It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and focuses on events classified as: A Network Trojan was Detected, Successful Administrator Privilege Gain, Successful User Privilege Gain, Attempt to Login By a Default Username and Password, Known malware command and control traffic, Known malicious file or file based exploit, Known client side exploit attempt, Large Scale Information Leak. These classifications typically represent significant threats such as remote code execution, credential theft, lateral movement, or malware communication. Detection of these classifications should be prioritized for immediate investigation.
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