Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects multiple attempts (10 or more within an hour) from a single IP address to access administrative interfaces on a web server. It specifically looks for URI queries containing keywords like 'admin', 'wp-admin', or 'administrator' in W3CIISLog data. Such activity often indicates a brute-force attack or scanning for administrative login pages.
Detects an unusually high volume (100 or more within an hour) of API calls (POST, DELETE, PUT methods to URIs containing 'api') originating from a single IP address. This activity could indicate various malicious behaviors such as brute-force attacks, credential stuffing, web application attacks, or a denial-of-service attempt against the API endpoint.
Detects anomalous authentication failure patterns against Azure AD Service Principals from a single IP address. The rule identifies potential brute force attacks (high volume of failures) or service principal enumeration (multiple distinct service principals targeted).
Detects high-volume authentication failures originating from a single IP address with a large number of unique target accounts within a 30-minute window, indicative of a password spraying or brute force attack against network services.
This rule detects potential brute force or credential stuffing attacks against Azure AD by identifying multiple failed sign-in attempts followed by a successful sign-in from the same user and IP address within a short time frame (1 minute). It specifically looks for scenarios where the successful sign-in occurs after the failed attempts and involves different applications, excluding common Office 365 services to reduce noise.
This rule detects potentially malicious credential abuse patterns, such as credential stuffing or brute force attacks, originating from external IP addresses against edge appliance VPN or administrative interfaces. It identifies activity by correlating a high volume of failed authentication attempts followed by a successful login from the same external IP address.
Detects high volumes of authentication failures (EventID 4625) using sub-status 0xC0000064, which indicates the attempted username does not exist. A high frequency of these events targeting multiple non-existent accounts is a strong indicator of automated username enumeration or credential stuffing.
This rule detects multiple failed SSL login attempts from a single source IP to a destination IP within a 24-hour period. A threshold of 10 failed attempts is used to identify potential brute-force attacks or credential stuffing against SSL-enabled services.
Detects multiple failed Kerberos pre-authentication attempts (EventID 4771 with status codes 0x18 or 0x1f) from a single IP address against a target user within a short timeframe (20 attempts in 5 minutes). This pattern is indicative of a brute-force attack against Kerberos accounts.
This rule detects potential exploitation activity related to CVE-2026-45657 involving the Windows Kernel tcpip.sys driver. It monitors for a combination of system crashes (Kernel-Power 41 or EventLog 6008) correlated with Windows Error Reporting (WER) events referencing 'tcpip.sys', or significant spikes in external authentication attempts occurring shortly before a system crash. The rule aims to identify potential remote code execution attempts manifesting as kernel instability.
Detects multiple failed SSH authentication attempts against a server from a single source within a short timeframe, which is indicative of a brute force password attack.
Detects multiple TCP connection attempts to port 22 (SSH) from the same source within a 60-second window, which is indicative of a brute-force or password guessing attack against SSH services.
Detects multiple failed SSH authentication attempts originating from a single source IP within a short timeframe, which is indicative of a brute-force or credential-stuffing attack against SSH services.
Detects high-frequency failed logon attempts (Event ID 4625) from a single IP address within a short time window, indicating potential brute force or password spraying activity targeting Windows systems.
Detects a high frequency of incoming TCP SYN packets targeting port 3389 (RDP) from a single source within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of a brute-force or credential-stuffing attack against Remote Desktop services.
This rule detects an unusually high volume of logon events (both successful and failed) or a large number of unique users attempting to log on within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential brute-force attacks or credential stuffing attempts against Windows systems.
Detects the use of 'sshpass' to automate SSH authentication, often used for lateral movement. The rule monitors command lines for the 'sshpass' utility combined with 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no' and specific service accounts (psoft, oracle, linuxadm) often targeted by threat actors such as ShinyHunters.
Detects Zerologon exploitation attempts against domain controllers by monitoring for anomalous machine account password resets, execution of known exploitation tooling (e.g., zerologon_tester, secretsdump), and patterns of rapid Netlogon zero-credential authentication failures.
This rule detects the use of 'sshpass' in conjunction with specific command-line arguments that indicate automated SSH logins. It specifically looks for the presence of '/sshpass/' and '/StrictHostKeyChecking=no/' in the command line, combined with common administrative account names like 'psoft', 'oracle', or 'linuxadm'. This activity is often associated with lateral movement techniques, as observed in attacks like those by ShinyHunters targeting Oracle/PeopleSoft environments.
Monitors for the use of 'sshpass' to automate SSH logins using specific accounts commonly associated with Oracle/PeopleSoft administration (psoft, oracle, linuxadm). This technique was observed in ShinyHunters attacks.
Detects multiple failed SSH login attempts from a single source IP address, indicating a potential brute force attack. The rule identifies 'Invalid user' or 'Failed password' messages in syslog from the 'sshd' process and groups them by source IP and time to count unique attempted users and total attempts. A threshold of more than 5 attempted users from a single source IP within a 10-minute window triggers an alert.
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