Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects mail redirection on Zimbra Collaboration. Zimbra is widely deployed in
government, education and smaller enterprises, has been the subject of repeated
mass-exploitation campaigns, and is rarely covered by commercial detection content —
the combination makes it a persistent soft target.
Redirection is the standard persistence on a compromised mailbox: it survives
password resets and quietly copies correspondence onward.
Onboarding: ZIMBRA is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 123).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='ZIMBRA' and action='EMAIL_REDIRECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip, subject
government, education and smaller enterprises, has been the subject of repeated
mass-exploitation campaigns, and is rarely covered by commercial detection content —
the combination makes it a persistent soft target.
Redirection is the standard persistence on a compromised mailbox: it survives
password resets and quietly copies correspondence onward.
Onboarding: ZIMBRA is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 123).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='ZIMBRA' and action='EMAIL_REDIRECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip, subject
Detects a message having its recipient altered during processing. Recipient
rewriting redirects mail away from its intended reader, and is a quiet way to
intercept correspondence or to suppress a notification that would otherwise reveal
an ongoing compromise.
Onboarding: TREND-MICRO-DDEI is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 265).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='TREND-MICRO-DDEI'
and action='EMAIL_RECIPIENT_CHANGED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip
rewriting redirects mail away from its intended reader, and is a quiet way to
intercept correspondence or to suppress a notification that would otherwise reveal
an ongoing compromise.
Onboarding: TREND-MICRO-DDEI is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 265).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='TREND-MICRO-DDEI'
and action='EMAIL_RECIPIENT_CHANGED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip
Detects mail being redirected to an external recipient. Redirection rules are the
classic persistence mechanism on a compromised mailbox: they survive password resets,
require no further access, and quietly copy correspondence to the attacker for as
long as they remain in place.
This is among the most under-monitored controls in most estates, because the rule is
set once and never fires an alert again.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_REDIRECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip
classic persistence mechanism on a compromised mailbox: they survive password resets,
require no further access, and quietly copy correspondence to the attacker for as
long as they remain in place.
This is among the most under-monitored controls in most estates, because the rule is
set once and never fires an alert again.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_REDIRECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip
Detects scenarios where a user's password is reset or sessions are revoked in Azure Active Directory, followed closely by mailbox access (items accessed, sent, or deleted) from a client IP address that was never seen interacting with that mailbox prior to the password reset event.
This rule monitors for the addition of new credentials (secrets) to service principals or applications in an Azure/Entra ID environment. It then correlates this event with subsequent mailbox activity (such as accessing mail items, sending mail, or message binding) performed by the application within 7 days of the credential creation. This detection pattern is indicative of potential OAuth application-based persistence and mailbox data exfiltration.
This rule monitors for the addition of new credentials (secrets) to service principals or applications in an Azure/Entra ID environment. It then correlates this event with subsequent mailbox activity (such as accessing mail items, sending mail, or message binding) performed by the application within 7 days of the credential creation. This detection pattern is indicative of potential OAuth application-based persistence and mailbox data exfiltration.
Detects the assignment of highly privileged OAuth scopes or application roles to service principals or users within Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). This activity is often associated with consent phishing or token abuse, where an adversary attempts to gain long-term programmatic access to sensitive resources like email, files, or directory services using a malicious or compromised application.
This rule detects when an OAuth application is granted sensitive Exchange Online permissions, such as 'full_access_as_app', 'Mail.Read', 'Mail.ReadWrite', or 'Mail.Send'. Granting these permissions allows an application to access mailboxes across the tenant without requiring a signed-in user context, which is a common persistence and data exfiltration technique used in Business Email Compromise (BEC) and espionage campaigns.
This rule detects potentially malicious bulk mailbox exfiltration operations (such as New-MailboxExportRequest, New-ComplianceSearch, or Search-Mailbox) performed by an account within 24 hours of experiencing a high or medium-risk sign-in event, suggesting post-compromise data harvesting.
This rule monitors for the addition of new credentials (secrets) to service principals or applications in an Azure/Entra ID environment. It then correlates this event with subsequent mailbox activity (such as accessing mail items, sending mail, or message binding) performed by the application within 7 days of the credential creation. This detection pattern is indicative of potential OAuth application-based persistence and mailbox data exfiltration.
Detects adversarial prompts designed to induce an Large Language Model (LLM) to disclose sensitive information, such as PII, secrets, or internal training data. This rule monitors the input prompt for extraction-based patterns and evaluates the model's response for indicators of a sensitive data leak (DLP hit).
This rule detects the creation or modification of mailbox rules (forwarding, redirection, or deletion) that occurs within two hours of a sign-in event flagged as high-risk, specifically those indicative of AiTM or token-replay attacks. It further filters for rules involving sensitive keywords, suggesting an attempt to intercept or hide specific categories of emails post-compromise.
Detects OAuth application consent events where an application is granted a combination of 'offline_access' (allowing refresh token issuance) and email-read permissions. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistent, long-term access to user mailboxes for data exfiltration or Business Email Compromise (BEC) activities, surviving password changes until the consent is explicitly revoked.
Detects potential reconnaissance or data collection activity within Office 365 Exchange mailboxes. The rule monitors for mailbox access operations (MailItemsAccessed, SearchQueryInitiated, FolderBind, or MessageBind) originating from new or uncommon application IDs, IP addresses, or ASNs for a specific user, or indicates bulk folder enumeration behavior in a short timeframe, which may suggest session token reuse or unauthorized mailbox access.
Detects automated mailbox monitoring (mailbox access cadence) followed by searches for sensitive finance-related keywords (e.g., invoice, payment, wire, ACH). This pattern is characteristic of a 'Box Monitor' or 'Inbox Monitor' actor, which maintains persistence via API polling to exfiltrate financial information from a compromised account.
Detects post-exploitation indicators of CVE-2026-62911, an authentication-bypass-by-capture-replay vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange. The rule identifies anomalous behavior following a potential bypass: either the assignment of the ApplicationImpersonation management role or a single impersonation session accessing an abnormally high number of distinct mailboxes (FolderBind, MessageBind, or SendAs).
This rule detects when an OAuth application is granted sensitive Exchange Online permissions, such as 'full_access_as_app', 'Mail.Read', 'Mail.ReadWrite', or 'Mail.Send'. Granting these permissions allows an application to access mailboxes across the tenant without requiring a signed-in user context, which is a common persistence and data exfiltration technique used in Business Email Compromise (BEC) and espionage campaigns.
Detects OAuth application consent events where an application is granted a combination of 'offline_access' (allowing refresh token issuance) and email-read permissions. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistent, long-term access to user mailboxes for data exfiltration or Business Email Compromise (BEC) activities, surviving password changes until the consent is explicitly revoked.
Detects OAuth application consent events in Azure Active Directory where the application is from an unverified publisher, requests high-risk scopes (specifically offline_access plus at least two others like Mail, Files, Contacts, or Directory), and potentially indicates a mass-campaign if multiple users consent to the same application.
Detects bulk mailbox export or content search operations performed by an identity shortly after a high-risk sign-in event. This pattern is indicative of potential account takeover where an adversary attempts to harvest sensitive email data at scale for BEC or extortion.
Detects anomalous, high-volume activity in cloud-based services such as SharePoint, OneDrive, and Exchange, specifically tracking file access, downloads, and mailbox exports. This behavior may indicate bulk data collection, unauthorized exfiltration, or malicious data staging by a compromised account.
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