Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
149 detections
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Detects Microsoft 365 activity (Exchange and SharePoint) initiated by known compromised service principal UUIDs associated with the ConnectWise supply-chain attack.
Detects high-volume Microsoft Graph API activity using attacker-associated user agents, such as python-requests, curl, or httpx, which may indicate automated token sweeping or data collection associated with supply-chain attacks.
Detects PHP script execution interacting with the Microsoft Exchange Web Services (EWS) API, which may indicate web shell usage, email collection, or exfiltration activity.
Detects post-exploitation activities associated with FortiMail vulnerability CVE-2026-104286 (FG-IR-26-175). The rule identifies potential unauthorized persistence and data exfiltration, including the creation or modification of archive accounts with remote destinations, execution of 'migadmin' via root cron, and specific admin logout anomalies.
This rule detects potentially malicious bulk mailbox exfiltration operations (such as New-MailboxExportRequest, New-ComplianceSearch, or Search-Mailbox) performed by an account within 24 hours of experiencing a high or medium-risk sign-in event, suggesting post-compromise data harvesting.
Detects anomalous, high-volume mailbox read (MailItemsAccessed) activity for a specific user compared to their historical daily baseline. The rule triggers when access volume significantly exceeds baseline averages, particularly when the activity originates from an IP address not previously observed for that specific user, which is a common indicator of automated email exfiltration via stolen session token replay.
Detects the granting of elevated mailbox permissions (FullAccess, SendAs, SendOnBehalf, or broad folder access) by an OAuth application or service principal. This behavior is indicative of a compromise where an actor uses an App-only context to establish persistence and stage internal spearphishing, bypassing standard administrative monitoring controls.
Detects OAuth application consent events where an application is granted a combination of 'offline_access' (allowing refresh token issuance) and email-read permissions. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistent, long-term access to user mailboxes for data exfiltration or Business Email Compromise (BEC) activities, surviving password changes until the consent is explicitly revoked.
This rule correlates events across the end-to-end kill chain of an enterprise intrusion, specifically tracking the progression from initial endpoint-based infostealer activity (credential access), through anomalous or non-interactive sign-in activity, into privilege escalation or mailbox delegation within the cloud environment, and finally to mass data exfiltration or mail access. It detects accounts involved in at least three distinct stages of this progression within a 72-hour window.
Detects mailbox items being accessed or bound by an OAuth-based application (app-only context) in Microsoft 365, filtering out expected interactive client signatures like Outlook or OWA. This behavior is indicative of potential post-compromise mailbox enumeration or data harvesting by malicious applications using stolen or illicitly granted OAuth access tokens.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user exhibits signs of account compromise—either through impossible travel patterns or the use of OAuth tokens on a new device—followed within one hour by the modification of mailbox settings, such as creating new inbox rules or modifying mailbox permissions, which is a common indicator of persistence and email exfiltration.
Detects evidence of account persistence and potential mailbox manipulation following an anomalous sign-in event in Google Workspace. The rule identifies suspicious post-compromise activity such as the addition of new MFA methods, new OAuth application grants, or mailbox forwarding/inbox rules, which are consistent with the reuse of captured authenticated sessions.
Detects evidence of account persistence and potential mailbox manipulation following an anomalous sign-in event in Google Workspace. The rule identifies suspicious post-compromise activity such as the addition of new MFA methods, new OAuth application grants, or mailbox forwarding/inbox rules, which are consistent with the reuse of captured authenticated sessions.
Detects OAuth application consent events where an application is granted a combination of 'offline_access' (allowing refresh token issuance) and email-read permissions. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistent, long-term access to user mailboxes for data exfiltration or Business Email Compromise (BEC) activities, surviving password changes until the consent is explicitly revoked.
Detects mailbox permission changes (FullAccess, SendAs) or abnormally high volume of mailbox item access events occurring shortly after a risky, non-interactive, or unusual location sign-in. This pattern indicates a potential follow-on activity from a successful session hijacking or token theft attack.
Detects mailbox permission changes (FullAccess, SendAs) or abnormally high volume of mailbox item access events occurring shortly after a risky, non-interactive, or unusual location sign-in. This pattern indicates a potential follow-on activity from a successful session hijacking or token theft attack.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange mailbox or transport rules that exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as external forwarding, movement to hidden or system folders, automatic deletion/marking as read, or rules containing keywords related to financial fraud. The rule specifically monitors for activities occurring via non-standard or automated clients to increase detection fidelity.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange mailbox or transport rules that exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as external forwarding, movement to hidden or system folders, automatic deletion/marking as read, or rules containing keywords related to financial fraud. The rule specifically monitors for activities occurring via non-standard or automated clients to increase detection fidelity.
Detects when a user account that has exhibited anomalous or risky sign-in behavior subsequently grants mailbox delegation, full-access, or Send-As permissions to another user (who is not the mailbox owner). This activity is indicative of a compromised account being used to establish persistence or facilitate email exfiltration and spoofing by expanding access to sensitive mailboxes.
Detects high-volume mailbox item access (MailItemsAccessed) within 15-minute intervals, correlated with risky Entra ID sign-in events within a 60-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated mail reconnaissance or data exfiltration following potential cloud account compromise.
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules in Office 365 that exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as external forwarding, automatic deletion/moving of sensitive emails (e.g., security alerts, junk), or rules containing keywords related to fraud. The rule optionally correlates this activity with recent anomalous sign-in attempts by the same user to identify potential account compromise.
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