Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
292 detections
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Detects the command line executed when TeamViewer starts a session initiated by a remote host. This specific command line indicates that TeamViewer_Desktop.exe is being launched by TeamViewer_Service.exe with an IPC port of 5939 and module 1, which is characteristic of a remote connection being established. An investigator can verify connection details by reviewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder.
This correlation rule identifies multiple risk events associated with the "Living Off The Land" analytic story. It aggregates and correlates events tagged under this story, focusing on systems with a high count of distinct sources (5 or more). The rule aims to detect suspicious behavior involving the use of legitimate tools for malicious purposes, which could lead to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within an environment.
This analytic detects instances where web or application server processes (such as Java, Tomcat, Apache, Nginx, Node, Caddy, IIS, PHP) spawn a Linux or Windows shell. This activity is highly indicative of successful exploitation, potentially related to vulnerabilities like Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) or Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965), leading to unauthorized command execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access. The detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on parent-child process relationships and process names.
Detects addition of users to the local Remote Desktop Users group via "Net" or "Add-LocalGroupMember".
Detects the command line executed when TeamViewer starts a session started by a remote host.
Once a connection has been started, an investigator can verify the connection details by viewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder.
Once a connection has been started, an investigator can verify the connection details by viewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder.
This rule detects VPN connections originating from countries that are not the user's usual work country. It leverages VPN logs, specifically Zscaler VPN logs, to identify active connections and compares the source IP's country with a lookup of the user's expected work country. Alerts are generated when a mismatch is found, indicating a potentially unauthorized or suspicious access attempt.
Detects the command line executed when TeamViewer starts a session started by a remote host.
Once a connection has been started, an investigator can verify the connection details by viewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder.
Once a connection has been started, an investigator can verify the connection details by viewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder.
Detects an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
Detects an unexpected file being deleted by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
Detects an unexpected process spawning from dns.exe which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
Detects ScreenConnect program starts that establish a remote access to a system.
Detects the command line executed when TeamViewer starts a session started by a remote host.
Once a connection has been started, an investigator can verify the connection details by viewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder.
Once a connection has been started, an investigator can verify the connection details by viewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder.
This rule identifies unusual activity from locations not previously observed for a user within a defined lookback period. It leverages Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) Behavior Analytics and SigninLogs to baseline legitimate user locations and filter out trusted devices/IPs. The rule flags unusual activity where the source IP location is new for the user and exceeds a configurable threshold of 'unusual' behavior indicators, while also excluding specified trusted countries.
This analytic detects the creation or modification of network interfaces on Cisco devices, which could indicate an attacker establishing persistence or preparing for lateral movement. After gaining initial access to network devices, threat actors like Static Tundra often create new interfaces (particularly loopback interfaces) to establish covert communication channels or maintain persistence. This detection specifically looks for the configuration of new interfaces, interface state changes, and the assignment of IP addresses to interfaces. These activities are particularly concerning when they involve unusual interface names or descriptions containing suspicious terms.
Detects a variety of post-exploitation techniques observed in attacks leveraging SonicWall vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-40766). These techniques are associated with the Akira ransomware group and include defense evasion, credential access, and data staging.
This rule detects successful network connections from external (internet) IP addresses to common Industrial Control System (ICS) ports, such as Modbus (502) and EtherNet/IP (44818). This activity could indicate unauthorized access attempts, reconnaissance, or exploitation of internet-exposed ICS assets. The rule specifically filters for allowed/accepted/permitted connections and excludes connections from RFC 1918 private IP addresses and a configurable list of authorized external IPs.
This analytic monitors Windows RDP client connection sequence events (EventCode 1024) from the Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RDPClient/Operational log. These events track when RDP ClientActiveX initiates connection attempts to remote servers. The connection sequence is a critical phase of RDP where the client and server exchange settings and establish common parameters for the session. Monitoring these events can help identify unusual RDP connection patterns, potential lateral movement attempts, unauthorized remote access activity, and RDP connection chains that may indicate compromised systems.
Detects indicators and behaviors related to the Chaos ransomware group including command-line patterns, suspicious registry changes, and specific known IOCs.
The following analytic detects instances where a Duo admin login originates from a country outside of the United States, which may indicate suspicious or unauthorized access attempts. It works by analyzing Duo activity logs for admin login actions and filtering out events where the access device's country is not within the expected region. By correlating user, device, browser, and location details, the analytic highlights anomalies in geographic login patterns. This behavior is critical for a SOC to identify because admin accounts have elevated privileges, and access from unusual countries can be a strong indicator of credential compromise, account takeover, or targeted attacks. Early detection of such activity enables rapid investigation and response, reducing the risk of unauthorized changes, data breaches, or further lateral movement within the environment. The impact of this attack can be severe, potentially allowing attackers to bypass security controls, alter configurations, or exfiltrate sensitive information.
Detects activity related to exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-0282, CVE-2025-22457) using MDifyLoader, Cobalt Strike, vshell, DslogdRAT, and Fscan. Includes file, process, and network-based IOCs from JPCERT report.
This analytic detects exploitation activity of CVE-2025-5777 using Cisco Secure Firewall Intrusion Events. It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense IntrusionEvent logs to identify cases where Snort signature 65118 (Citrix NetScaler memory overread attempt) is triggered. If confirmed malicious, this behavior is highly indicative of a potential exploitation of CVE-2025-5777.
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