Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
134 detections
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Detects instances where a process is created with a session ID that differs from its parent process, which is indicative of token manipulation or impersonation techniques like those observed in SparroWocky. The rule looks for cross-session process creation using the CreateProcessAsUserW API or specific command-line argument patterns.
This rule detects potential tampering with the Huorong security product by monitoring for specific process names (HipsTray.exe, HipsMain.exe, HipsDaemon.exe, wsctrlsvc.exe, TrafficProt.exe) interacting with suspicious API calls or command lines indicative of token privilege manipulation, service blinding, or security product disabling/downgrade.
Detects token duplication/impersonation targeting winlogon.exe to obtain SYSTEM privileges (SeDebugPrivilege abuse, DuplicateToken, SetTokenInformation to Untrusted integrity)
Detects a process enabling multiple sensitive Windows privileges simultaneously via a single AdjustTokenPrivileges event (Event ID 4703). This behavior is characteristic of malicious tools, such as the XHOPELESS wiper, attempting to gain broad system control for activities like tampering with firmware, killing protected processes, loading malicious drivers, or modifying boot configurations.
Detects token duplication/impersonation targeting winlogon.exe to obtain SYSTEM privileges (SeDebugPrivilege abuse, DuplicateToken, SetTokenInformation to Untrusted integrity)
This rule detects potential tampering with the Huorong security product by monitoring for specific process names (HipsTray.exe, HipsMain.exe, HipsDaemon.exe, wsctrlsvc.exe, TrafficProt.exe) interacting with suspicious API calls or command lines indicative of token privilege manipulation, service blinding, or security product disabling/downgrade.
This rule detects attempts to manipulate process access tokens using the Windows 'SetTokenInformation' API. Specifically, it monitors for adjustments to token privileges or integrity levels, or the presence of 'Untrusted' markers. These behaviors are often indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass Windows access controls, perform token manipulation, or conduct privilege escalation.
This rule detects attempts to manipulate process access tokens using the Windows 'SetTokenInformation' API. Specifically, it monitors for adjustments to token privileges or integrity levels, or the presence of 'Untrusted' markers. These behaviors are often indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass Windows access controls, perform token manipulation, or conduct privilege escalation.
Detects access-token duplication combined with CreateProcessAsUserA spawning the non-standard synchost.exe process outside System32 under a target interactive session.
Detects execution of processes that reference suspicious Windows API functions related to token manipulation or process injection, specifically when initiated by critical system processes like svchost.exe or lsass.exe. This activity often indicates attempts at credential access or privilege escalation.
Detects suspicious spawning of a process under a different user context than the parent process.
Processes such as notepad.exe, calculator etc. are generally spawned under the same user context and
also they are often targeted as sacrificial process or decoy process to check successful privilege escalation.
Processes such as notepad.exe, calculator etc. are generally spawned under the same user context and
also they are often targeted as sacrificial process or decoy process to check successful privilege escalation.
Detects Abyssos RAT modules (DCFINDER, VULNSCAN, ELEVATE_SYS_TOKEN, RDPWRAP) by requiring a shared XOR/AES-CBC key alongside a temp-folder write using a module-specific short prefix (dcf, vul, plg, rdp) that is followed by execution via an anomalous export function name (abyss or the module-specific Get*Text/Json exports)
Detects potentially suspicious explicit credential logon events where the user
is trying to logon with explicit credentials (username and password) that are
different from the current user context. It might indicate an attacker attempting
to escalate privileges after obtaining credentials for a different user account.
is trying to logon with explicit credentials (username and password) that are
different from the current user context. It might indicate an attacker attempting
to escalate privileges after obtaining credentials for a different user account.
This rule detects potential token impersonation or duplication events, often used to escalate privileges or move laterally, by monitoring 'TokenDuplication' and 'ImpersonationEvent' actions. It further refines these signals by looking for associated in-memory DLL loads performed by processes other than standard system components (svchost.exe or services.exe).
This rule detects potential token impersonation or duplication events, often used to escalate privileges or move laterally, by monitoring 'TokenDuplication' and 'ImpersonationEvent' actions. It further refines these signals by looking for associated in-memory DLL loads performed by processes other than standard system components (svchost.exe or services.exe).
correlates two OS-generated artifacts on the same PID within a 120-second window: a seclogon-spawned process (CreateProcessWithLogonW is the only unprivileged API for remote profile loading) and a PostBootReminders\ProfileError\TempProfile registry write (ProfSvc marks fallback when tampered ntuser.dat breaks normal initialization). neither artifact is attacker-controlled. the time window filters PID-reuse false positives. an attacker could theoretically delay the oplock release beyond the window, so a secondary hunting query without the time filter should be run periodically.
Detects the JC-46 AsyncRAT technique chain where the malware opens winlogon.exe's process token, duplicates it into an impersonation token, calls ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, enables SE_DEBUG_NAME via AdjustTokenPrivileges to reach SYSTEM context, then uses CNG (NCryptOpenStorageProvider/NCryptOpenKey/NCryptDecrypt) and BCrypt AES-GCM (BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider) APIs to unwrap Chromium v96+ App-Bound Encryption keys.
Detects cred_exec/token_run command tokens within the TAG-195 WebSocket C2 message schema, used for credential/token-backed lateral movement.
Detects the JC-46 AsyncRAT technique chain where the malware opens winlogon.exe's process token, duplicates it into an impersonation token, calls ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, enables SE_DEBUG_NAME via AdjustTokenPrivileges to reach SYSTEM context, then uses CNG (NCryptOpenStorageProvider/NCryptOpenKey/NCryptDecrypt) and BCrypt AES-GCM (BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider) APIs to unwrap Chromium v96+ App-Bound Encryption keys.
Detects the JC-46 AsyncRAT technique chain where the malware opens winlogon.exe's process token, duplicates it into an impersonation token, calls ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, enables SE_DEBUG_NAME via AdjustTokenPrivileges to reach SYSTEM context, then uses CNG (NCryptOpenStorageProvider/NCryptOpenKey/NCryptDecrypt) and BCrypt AES-GCM (BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider) APIs to unwrap Chromium v96+ App-Bound Encryption keys.
Detects the privilege escalation sequence used by VILE ransomware, which involves manipulating process tokens via a combination of OpenProcessToken, LookupPrivilegeValueW, AdjustTokenPrivileges, GetTokenInformation, SetTokenInformation, and DuplicateTokenEx. This is followed by the termination of processes using TerminateProcess, typically performed to release locked files before encryption.
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