Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules in Exchange Online that target financial-related keywords and hide/delete mail, or rules that mark all incoming mail as read and delete them, which may indicate a Business Email Compromise (BEC) attack or mailbox evasion technique.
This rule correlates multiple telemetry sources to detect a sophisticated cloud identity compromise chain. It identifies suspicious MFA-satisfied logins (potentially via Adversary-in-the-Middle) followed by the granting of high-risk OAuth application consents, the creation of persistent mailbox rules for hiding or forwarding communications, and finally mass data access or exfiltration from the user's account.
Detects a potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) persistence chain where a user grants an OAuth application mail-read or mail-write permissions, followed by the creation of a malicious inbox rule designed to forward, move, or delete sensitive email threads. This combination enables persistent exfiltration and stealth, bypassing password resets as the OAuth token remains active.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange mailbox or transport rules that exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as external forwarding, movement to hidden or system folders, automatic deletion/marking as read, or rules containing keywords related to financial fraud. The rule specifically monitors for activities occurring via non-standard or automated clients to increase detection fidelity.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange mailbox or transport rules that exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as external forwarding, movement to hidden or system folders, automatic deletion/marking as read, or rules containing keywords related to financial fraud. The rule specifically monitors for activities occurring via non-standard or automated clients to increase detection fidelity.
This rule detects when a user grants OAuth application permissions for high-risk scopes (e.g., Mail, Files) to an application that was registered within the last 7 days. It correlates this event with subsequent suspicious actions performed by the same user, specifically mailbox rule modifications or file download activity, which are common indicators of post-compromise activity following OAuth consent phishing.
Detects a sequence of events starting with a device code OAuth sign-in, followed within two hours by the creation or modification of inbox rules and high-frequency enumeration of email items (contacts, folders, messages, threads, people) via Microsoft Graph API. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise activity where an adversary uses OAuth device code grants to maintain access and subsequently automates inbox analysis or data harvesting.
Detects a sequence of events starting with a device code OAuth sign-in, followed within two hours by the creation or modification of inbox rules and high-frequency enumeration of email items (contacts, folders, messages, threads, people) via Microsoft Graph API. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise activity where an adversary uses OAuth device code grants to maintain access and subsequently automates inbox analysis or data harvesting.
Detects a sequence of events starting with a device code OAuth sign-in, followed within two hours by the creation or modification of inbox rules and high-frequency enumeration of email items (contacts, folders, messages, threads, people) via Microsoft Graph API. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise activity where an adversary uses OAuth device code grants to maintain access and subsequently automates inbox analysis or data harvesting.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange Online inbox rules that either contain specific sensitive keywords (e.g., payroll, bank, direct deposit) or perform actions that hide, delete, or move messages. This behavior is commonly used by attackers to intercept sensitive communications or conceal evidence of their presence in a compromised mailbox.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms associated with Microsoft Outlook, specifically targeting registry modifications related to Outlook security settings or suspicious child processes (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) spawned by outlook.exe.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms associated with Microsoft Outlook, specifically targeting registry modifications related to Outlook security settings or suspicious child processes (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) spawned by outlook.exe.
This rule detects potential lateral phishing attempts originating from a compromised Microsoft 365 account. It flags outbound internal emails containing payroll-related keywords, such as direct deposit or salary redirection, which are sent to HR or finance departments. This activity is correlated with recent mailbox rule modifications (like transport or inbox rules) by the same user, a technique often used by threat actors to hide communications or exfiltrate data, consistent with identified campaigns like Payroll Pirate.
This rule detects events generated by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint's Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules in either Audit or Block mode.
(**Toggle by commenting out line 94/95. Default is both Audit & Block**).
It covers all 19 ASR rules by matching ActionType patterns or falling back to GUIDs found in AdditionalFields. The rule extracts the friendly name of the ASR rule, the mode (Audit/Block), and relevant process information.
This rule is especially noisy when ran over an entire environment. It's recommended to scope using Audit/Block, Machine Group, and filtering to the rules you want by commenting others out.
(**Toggle by commenting out line 94/95. Default is both Audit & Block**).
It covers all 19 ASR rules by matching ActionType patterns or falling back to GUIDs found in AdditionalFields. The rule extracts the friendly name of the ASR rule, the mode (Audit/Block), and relevant process information.
This rule is especially noisy when ran over an entire environment. It's recommended to scope using Audit/Block, Machine Group, and filtering to the rules you want by commenting others out.
This rule detects the creation of malicious Outlook rules via Exchange Web Services (EWS). It specifically looks for HTTP traffic to '/EWS/Exchange.asmx' containing the 'CreateRule' string in the client body, indicating an attempt to establish persistence within an Outlook environment.
Detects HTTP POST requests to the OWA directory containing rule or forwarding parameters, which may indicate an attacker attempting to establish persistence via inbox rule manipulation after hijacking a session. Associated with CVE-2026-42897 post-exploitation activity.
This is a classic Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) pattern. By proxying the authentication process in real-time, the FlowerStorm-like actors are bypassing standard MFA by intercepting the session token.
The query is a triple-threat hunting as it looks for the delivery (the domain), the access (the ASNs), and the persistence/evasion (the "LinkedIn" rule) all at once.
The query is a triple-threat hunting as it looks for the delivery (the domain), the access (the ASNs), and the persistence/evasion (the "LinkedIn" rule) all at once.
NotDoor is a Outlook Macros to monitor incoming emails for specific triggers, and when the system receives such an email, it executes code paths found in the VBA macro. This allows an attacker to exfiltrate data, upload files, and execute commands on the victimโs computer while using an inconspicuous application as the C2.
Detects an attacker trying to enable the Outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows Outlook to run applications or execute macros. This can be used for persistence or defense evasion.
KQL Query
KQL Query from file: Detect & mitigate potential Specula Exploitation
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