Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where a web browser accesses a domain listed in the 'AdFection_Domains' watchlist, followed closely by the browser spawning a script interpreter (such as PowerShell, wscript, cscript, mshta) or dropping an executable/script file in user profile or temporary directories.
Detects when a web browser (such as Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Brave, or Opera) spawns common command interpreters, scripting engines, or Living off the Land Binaries (LOLBins) like cmd, powershell, mshta, rundll32, or certutil. This behavior is often indicative of a drive-by compromise or browser exploitation attempt.
Detects a multi-stage exploit chain targeting iOS Safari clients, characterized by the sequential fetching of specific JavaScript modules (platform_module.js, utility_module.js, Stage1, Stage3, and bootstrap.dylib) and subsequent callback communication to a remote server. This pattern is consistent with a browser-based exploit framework targeting iOS devices.
Detects a multi-stage exploit chain targeting iOS Safari clients, characterized by the sequential fetching of specific JavaScript modules (platform_module.js, utility_module.js, Stage1, Stage3, and bootstrap.dylib) and subsequent callback communication to a remote server. This pattern is consistent with a browser-based exploit framework targeting iOS devices.
Detects network traffic associated with the ClickFix Traffic Distribution System (TDS), specifically targeting requests to known malicious domains like fsputnik.com and uasputnik.com, as well as associated fake Cloudflare verification lure pages.
This rule detects automated browser-based processes (such as chromedriver, msedgedriver, geckodriver, playwright, or node/python scripts leveraging browser automation frameworks) initiating network connections to domains or URLs identified in active threat intelligence as malicious. This behavior is indicative of an AI agent or automated script being steered toward attacker-controlled infrastructure, potentially for drive-by compromise or exploitation.
Detects outbound network requests to known infrastructure associated with the ClickFix Traffic Direction System (TDS), specifically targeting domains 'fsputnik.com' and 'uasputnik.com'. The rules monitor for requests to specific lure pages, tracker files, and established IP connections used by this malicious campaign to deliver fraudulent prompts or lures to victims.
Detects a multi-stage exploit chain targeting iOS Safari clients, characterized by the sequential fetching of specific JavaScript modules (platform_module.js, utility_module.js, Stage1, Stage3, and bootstrap.dylib) and subsequent callback communication to a remote server. This pattern is consistent with a browser-based exploit framework targeting iOS devices.
Detects a multi-stage exploit chain targeting iOS Safari clients, characterized by the sequential fetching of specific JavaScript modules (platform_module.js, utility_module.js, Stage1, Stage3, and bootstrap.dylib) and subsequent callback communication to a remote server. This pattern is consistent with a browser-based exploit framework targeting iOS devices.
Detects HTTP responses containing a file named 'ClaudeDesktop.exe' served from paths containing '/artifacts/' on the 'claude.ai' host where the request referrer is not 'claude.ai' or 'anthropic.com', suggesting a malvertising or supply chain delivery attempt of a malicious installer.
This rule detects suspicious HTTP POST requests to a /collect endpoint that contain tracking parameters (visitorId, stage, variant, events) associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns. These campaigns typically trick users into copying and pasting malicious code by simulating error prompts or CAPTCHAs.
Detects high volumes of HTTP redirect responses (3xx status codes) associated with a single client IP address, which is indicative of a redirect chain often used in malicious activity such as drive-by compromise or social engineering campaigns involving fake browser updates or 'ClickFix' lures.
Detects HTTP responses containing SocGholish (FakeUpdates) malware delivery signatures. The rule monitors for a 200 HTTP status code, a content type of 'javascript', and the presence of the specific string 'NDSW' in the response body, which is a known indicator of the SocGholish JavaScript-based loader.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with the SocGholish Traffic Distribution System (TDS). The rule identifies an HTTP 302 redirect response where the 'Location' header points to a URL containing 'update' and a .js extension, a characteristic behavioral signature used by SocGholish for its drive-by-download campaigns.
Detects network activity associated with a known malicious campaign using fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages as a lure. This includes requests to retrieve tracker scripts from 'fsputnik.com', loading of fake verification pages from 'uasputnik.com', and communication with a known command retrieval endpoint ('admin777111777.php') potentially used for clipboard hijacking.
Detects HTTP requests and responses involving the download of an executable file named 'ClaudeDesktop.exe' from the 'claude.ai' host, which is indicative of a malicious campaign distributing SectopRAT.
Detects HTTP proxy requests for ZIP archives where the Referer header indicates a navigation originated from a GitHub Pages (github.io) site, but the destination is not a GitHub domain. This behavior is indicative of a multi-hop redirect chain used in campaigns to deliver malicious payloads, such as infostealers, by abusing GitHub Pages to redirect users to external hosting for ZIP archive downloads.
Detects JavaScript loaders associated with the Exvicy/ErrTraffic campaign. The rule identifies obfuscated code that utilizes atob() for Base64 decoding, single-byte XOR operations, TextDecoder for content processing, and dynamic code execution via 'new Function()'. This pattern is commonly used to inject malicious payloads into compromised WordPress sites.
Detects network traffic associated with the Exvicy malware delivery chain. The rule identifies two behaviors: first, HTTP GET requests to a '/embed/' endpoint with specific 'embed=1' and 'host=cloudflare-check.net' parameters, and second, established TCP connections to a known command and control (C2) IP address related to the ClickFix social engineering delivery method.
Detects the presence of an injected script tag containing 'ganalytics-tracker-js' in HTTP server responses, a pattern commonly associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks where users are tricked into copying and executing malicious commands.
Detects HTTP traffic related to the Macfinger/ClickFix campaign, where malicious injected scripts or dns-prefetch entries point to known attacker-controlled infrastructure (velvet-otter-glagceis.life) or assets utilized for social engineering and malicious copy-paste exploitation.
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