Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
189 detections
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This rule detects HTTP requests directed towards known malvertising domains that serve trojanized MSI installers. The rule identifies specific suspicious hostnames and a common URL pattern used for payload delivery.
Detects the exact watering-hole script fetch (fonts.chrorne[.]com /dist/js/*.chunk.js) injected into shared government webmail installations, which opens a WebSocket back to Jewelbug C2 and exfiltrates session cookies and usernames.
This rule detects when Microsoft Defender SmartScreen identifies and blocks or warns users about access to known 'ClickFix' phishing landing pages. These pages often attempt to social engineer users into executing malicious commands via copy-paste actions (e.g., in a terminal or Run dialog) as a deceptive remediation step for fake browser errors.
Summarizes Zscaler NSSWeblog transactions where DeviceAction was Allowed but Zscaler still recorded a malware/threat verdict (ClickFix, MalURL, Trojan.Gen families), broken down by user, threat name, and malware category for triage.
Detects a phishing page's /api/config fetch used to stage ClickFix instructions, requiring a Referer indicating an impersonated CRM login page (NetSuite, Odoo, HubSpot, or Salesforce) while excluding requests to the genuine vendor domains.
Summarizes Zscaler NSSWeblog transactions where DeviceAction was Allowed but Zscaler still recorded a malware/threat verdict (ClickFix, MalURL, Trojan.Gen families), broken down by user, threat name, and malware category for triage.
Detects the ClickFix execution chain: base64-encoded regsvr32 command pasted into the Windows Run dialog, staging TinyEgg as an OCX payload.
Detects execution or download activity tied to Nimbus Manticore (UNC1549) SEO
poisoning campaign delivering trojanized Oracle SQL Developer from getsqldeveloper.com and
related fake Zoom/career portal lures documented alongside Screening Serpens activity.
poisoning campaign delivering trojanized Oracle SQL Developer from getsqldeveloper.com and
related fake Zoom/career portal lures documented alongside Screening Serpens activity.
This rule monitors network logs (from proxies and firewalls) for web traffic (HTTP GET requests) containing suspicious JavaScript code injection patterns in the request context or message fields. It specifically looks for common XSS indicators such as <script tags, eval(), document.write(), fromCharCode(), and atob().
Detects when a web browser (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave, Opera) initiates a process that is not another instance of itself. This could indicate a drive-by download, execution of malicious code, or other suspicious activity originating from a browser.
Detects when a web browser (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave, Opera) initiates a process that is not another instance of itself. This could indicate a drive-by download, execution of malicious code, or other suspicious activity originating from a browser.
This rule monitors network logs (from proxies and firewalls) for web traffic (HTTP GET requests) containing suspicious JavaScript code injection patterns in the request context or message fields. It specifically looks for common XSS indicators such as <script tags, eval(), document.write(), fromCharCode(), and atob().
This rule monitors for the creation of .exe or .msi files within common user-writable directories (Downloads, Temp, AppData) initiated by web browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave). This behavior is often indicative of drive-by downloads or users interacting with malicious web content that delivers installers to the host.
Detects browser/node subprocesses spawned by AutoGen/Python processes making loopback WebSocket connections to the AutoGen Studio MCP control plane, which is indicative of the AutoJack exploit chain. This rule specifically looks for Python processes associated with 'autogen' or 'autogenstudio' that initiate network connections to loopback addresses on ports 8080 or 8081, often with specific URL paths related to the MCP WebSocket API.
This rule detects potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attack attempts by inspecting HTTP requests for common malicious patterns, such as embedded script tags, JavaScript URIs, or HTML event handlers like 'onload' and 'onerror'. These payloads are often used by attackers to execute arbitrary code within a user's browser session.
This rule detects potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attack attempts by inspecting HTTP requests for common malicious patterns, such as embedded script tags, JavaScript URIs, or HTML event handlers like 'onload' and 'onerror'. These payloads are often used by attackers to execute arbitrary code within a user's browser session.
This rule detects potentially malicious web traffic involving a redirect chain associated with HolaBrief and LoopedIn services, which are sometimes leveraged in phishing campaigns or credential harvesting. It identifies multi-hop redirect chains and connections to known suspicious IP addresses (217.182.211.237).
Detects exploit kit landing pages serving browser exploits
This rule monitors for the creation of .exe or .msi files within common user-writable directories (Downloads, Temp, AppData) initiated by web browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave). This behavior is often indicative of drive-by downloads or users interacting with malicious web content that delivers installers to the host.
Detects the 'BadBlocker' Adblock for YouTube browser extension communicating with its command-and-control infrastructure to fetch and execute arbitrary scriptlets in the MAIN JavaScript world. By injecting directly into the page context, the extension gains unauthorized access to the DOM, user browsing sessions, and sensitive form data.
Detects potential Remote Code Execution (RCE) in an AutoGen Studio environment by correlating an unexpected outbound network connection from the AutoGen process to an external endpoint, followed by the immediate spawning of a command interpreter (shell) child process containing common command-line interface indicators (e.g., whoami, curl, wget, encoded PowerShell).
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