Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
189 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
82
65
21
5
5
Contributors
32
28
21
20
10
Categories
62
58
53
43
38
Platforms
104
68
17
13
9
Products / Services
80
47
41
16
8
MITRE Techniques
18,115
15,635
12,576
8,388
6,215
CVEs
2
IDS Classtypes
43
27
4
4
1
IDS Protocols
55
13
12
Detects potential malicious JavaScript obfuscated using the JSFireTruck technique, characterized by the repeated use of characters like [], (), !, and +. This rule looks for the presence of multiple distinct characters from the core JSFireTruck set within web response bodies.
Detects potential malicious JavaScript obfuscated using the JSFireTruck technique, specifically looking for the combination of core JSFireTruck characters and checks for document.referrer, often used to target traffic from search engines.
Detects potential malicious JavaScript obfuscated using the JSFireTruck technique, specifically looking for the combination of core JSFireTruck characters and checks for document.referrer, often used to target traffic from search engines.
'Malware authors will sometimes hardcode user agent string values when writing the network communication component of their malware. Malformed user agents can be an indication of such malware.'
Detects several different DNS-answers by one domain with IPs from internal and external networks. Normally, DNS-answer contain TTL >100. (DNS-record will saved in host cache for a while TTL).
'Potential code injection into web server roles via IIS logs scan. Represents attempt to gain initial access using drive-by compromise technique. Detection flags events for review and filtering of authorized activity.'
'This rule identifies a web request to a URL that holds a file type, including .ps1, .bat, .vbs, and .scr that can be harmful if downloaded. This analytic rule uses [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) and supports any built-in or custom source that supports the ASIM WebSession schema (ASIM WebSession Schema)'
'Identifies a match for XSS attack in the Application gateway WAF logs. The Threshold value in the query can be changed as per your infrastructure's requirement.
References: https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A7_2017-Cross-Site_Scripting_(XSS)'
References: https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A7_2017-Cross-Site_Scripting_(XSS)'
ZLoader was delivered in a campaign in late summer 2021 using malvertising to download malicious .msi files onto affected machines. This campaign was originally tweeted by @MsftSecIntel on Twitter.
In this campaign, the malicious .msi files create registry keys that use that attacker-created comapny names.
In this campaign, the malicious .msi files create registry keys that use that attacker-created comapny names.
These queries was originally published in the threat analytics report, Attacks on gov't, think tanks, NGOs.
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
This query shows the source of the AV detections (e.g., the website the file was downloaded from etc.).
Get the list of AV detections.
Get the list of AV detections.
ZLoader was delivered in a campaign in summer 2021 via malvertising. This campaign was tweeted about by @MsftSecIntel on twitter.
Use this query to locate successful delivery of associated malicious downloads that can lead to ransomware
This rule detects web traffic to a recently expired domain followed by the creation of an executable (.exe) file on the same host. It correlates network access events with WHOIS data to identify expired domains and then looks for subsequent file creation events where the file path ends with '.exe'. The file creation must occur after the network access event on the same principal hostname.
The analytic identifies potential exploit attempts involving command and script interpreters that are blocked by Zscaler. It uses web proxy logs to detect incidents where actions are blocked due to exploit references. The detection compiles statistics by user, threat name, URL, hostname, file class, and filename. This activity is significant as it helps identify and mitigate exploit attempts, which are critical for maintaining security. If confirmed malicious, such activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.
This rule detects when a user bypasses Chrome Safe Browsing warnings for potentially dangerous content or downloads. It specifically looks for events where Chrome Management reports a bad navigation event, dangerous download event, content transfer event, or unscanned file event, and the security result indicates the event was 'BYPASSED' by the user. The rule also assigns a risk score based on the category of the bypassed threat, with higher scores for malware, dangerous hosts, and social engineering.
This rule detects attempts to inject Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) payloads via GET requests in web access logs. It specifically looks for common XSS strings and encoded variations within the request URL, such as '<script>', '<iframe>', '<svg>', 'document.cookie', 'document.domain', 'onerror=', 'onresize=', 'onload=', 'onmouseover=', '${alert', 'javascript:alert', and their URL-encoded forms. The rule filters out requests that result in a 404 HTTP status code to reduce false positives.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned from web browsers on macOS. This activity often indicates a potential web browser exploitation attempt, where an attacker leverages a browser vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands or scripts on the system. The rule specifically looks for common scripting and command-line interpreters being launched as child processes of various browsers, while filtering out known legitimate browser-related activities like updates or recovery scripts.
Detects attempts to download a Flash Player update from a suspicious, non-official location. This rule specifically looks for requests containing '/flash_install.php' or ending with '/install_flash_player.exe' that do not originate from a legitimate Adobe domain.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned from browsers. This could be a result of a potential web browser exploitation.
Page 9 of 9