Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the use of `bitsadmin.exe` to schedule a BITS job for persistence on an endpoint. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line parameters such as `create`, `addfile`, and `resume`. This activity is significant because BITS jobs can be used by attackers to maintain persistence, download malicious payloads, or exfiltrate data. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to persist in the environment, execute arbitrary code, or transfer sensitive information, necessitating further investigation and potential remediation.
The following analytic detects the use of `bitsadmin.exe` with the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because `bitsadmin.exe` can be exploited to download and execute malicious files without immediate detection. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to download and execute payloads, potentially leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment. Review parallel and child processes, especially `svchost.exe`, for associated artifacts.
The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell command `Start-BitsTransfer`, which can be used for file transfers, including potential data exfiltration. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because `Start-BitsTransfer` can be abused by adversaries to upload sensitive files to remote locations, posing a risk of data loss. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially leading to further exploitation of the network.
This analytic detects suspicious downloads from common file sharing and content delivery platforms using known living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins)
such as 'curl.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wmic.exe', and others.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path,
and parent process information. These tools are often abused by adversaries and malware to retrieve payloads from public hosting platforms
such as GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin.
This detection helps identify potential initial access, payload staging, or command and control activity using legitimate services.
such as 'curl.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wmic.exe', and others.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path,
and parent process information. These tools are often abused by adversaries and malware to retrieve payloads from public hosting platforms
such as GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin.
This detection helps identify potential initial access, payload staging, or command and control activity using legitimate services.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) via the bitsadmin command-line tool or PowerShell's Start-BitsTransfer to download files (such as .exe, .dll, or .ps1) or facilitate potential persistence. Adversaries use these methods to transfer malicious payloads stealthily in the background or to maintain persistence on a compromised host.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows system utilities certutil.exe and bitsadmin.exe to perform remote file downloads or decode remote content. Adversaries often use these dual-use tools to bypass network security controls by masquerading as standard system processes for staging second-stage payloads.
This rule monitors for execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be malicious, and network connections to a known malicious domain associated with Vultr storage. It aggregates file creation, process execution, and network connection events to detect potential threat activity.
Detects Bitsadmin connections to domains with uncommon TLDs
Detects the use of BITSAdmin or PowerShell 'Start-BitsTransfer' to download files from non-reputable/non-Microsoft sources to suspicious directories such as Temp, AppData, or ProgramData, which is a common technique for ingress tool transfer during malware delivery.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin or PowerShell 'Start-BitsTransfer' to download files from non-reputable/non-Microsoft sources to suspicious directories such as Temp, AppData, or ProgramData, which is a common technique for ingress tool transfer during malware delivery.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin to download files to suspicious directories (Temp, AppData, ProgramData) or to register persistent command execution via the /SetNotifyCmdLine parameter. This detection correlates process execution events with BITS Client operational log events to confirm the completion or status of the BITS job.
Detects the use of the BITSAdmin command-line utility to perform file downloads or add files to a transfer job. Adversaries may abuse the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) for downloading malicious files while evading detection or maintaining persistence.
After the initial FileFix paste-and-execute step, observed campaigns chain into a secondary download of the real payload using LOLBins or PowerShell web clients.
Detects the use of bitsadmin.exe to create or modify Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) jobs, specifically when combined with the /setnotifycmdline flag. This technique is used by adversaries to download malicious payloads and trigger their execution upon job completion, often bypassing network security controls that might otherwise flag traditional download-and-execute activity.
Detects the use of bitsadmin.exe to initiate file transfers from remote URLs to sensitive or writable system directories, or the use of /SetNotifyCmdLine to define a command to execute upon job completion. These techniques are often used by adversaries to download payloads or establish persistence via BITS jobs.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (File, Process, and Network events) to identify activity associated with a pre-defined set of known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, and domains. It correlates these indicators to detect potential malware execution, persistence, or command-and-control communication on monitored devices.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (File, Process, and Network events) to identify activity associated with a pre-defined set of known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, and domains. It correlates these indicators to detect potential malware execution, persistence, or command-and-control communication on monitored devices.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (File, Process, and Network events) to identify activity associated with a pre-defined set of known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, and domains. It correlates these indicators to detect potential malware execution, persistence, or command-and-control communication on monitored devices.
This rule monitors for execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be malicious, and network connections to a known malicious domain associated with Vultr storage. It aggregates file creation, process execution, and network connection events to detect potential threat activity.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (File, Process, and Network events) to identify activity associated with a pre-defined set of known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, and domains. It correlates these indicators to detect potential malware execution, persistence, or command-and-control communication on monitored devices.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (File, Process, and Network events) to identify activity associated with a pre-defined set of known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, and domains. It correlates these indicators to detect potential malware execution, persistence, or command-and-control communication on monitored devices.
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