Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Correlates the execution of a recently dropped LNK file that triggers cmd.exe or powershell.exe, deliberately bypassing Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) warnings.
This rule detects potential engagement with known phishing infrastructure by monitoring common email clients and browsers for DNS resolutions to specific malicious domains (holabrief.com, loopedin.io) or network connections to suspicious IP addresses associated with a healthcare-themed phishing campaign.
Detects a web browser saving an executable to disk immediately after the user conducts a search engine query for W2 tax forms, indicating SEO poisoning or malvertising.
This rule detects a behavioral transition where an active browser session (Chrome or Edge) navigates to a URL containing deceptive captcha/verify/human keywords, immediately followed by the invocation of PowerShell within a 3-minute window, initiated by explorer.exe. This pattern is indicative of the ClickFix attack, where a user is tricked into interacting with a malicious website that then triggers a PowerShell execution.
Detects the execution of osascript spawned directly from the Terminal application, a pattern identified in Meow RAT campaigns using ClickFix social engineering lures to execute malicious AppleScript in-memory.
This rule detects initial access attempts involving double-extension shortcuts (.lnk) that lead to the execution of VBScript (VBS) files, which subsequently launch PowerShell scripts for decryption. The detection logic specifically looks for a .lnk file executing a command line containing '.vbs', followed within 5 minutes by a PowerShell process executing a command line containing 'Profile.ps1' or '-bxor'. This chain of events is indicative of malicious activity often used in phishing campaigns to bypass security controls and execute obfuscated payloads.
Detects a browser being launched via LNK or script with explicit kiosk or fullscreen parameters to trap the user in a fake tech support HTML lure. This rule specifically looks for chrome.exe or msedge.exe being executed with command-line arguments such as '--kiosk' or '--start-fullscreen' in conjunction with an HTML or HTM file.
End-to-end correlation: Fake AI installer executes -> Drops pythonw.exe -> Network connection to Vidar C2.
Detects drive-by download via malicious advertisement networks
This rule detects inbound emails that have failed SPF and/or DKIM authentication checks and presents evidence of post-delivery user interaction. Authentication failures on inbound email are a strong indicator of email spoofing or unauthorized sending infrastructure, commonly associated with phishing campaigns targeting organizational users.
Unlike basic phishing detections that alert on email receipt alone, this rule correlates authentication failures with downstream activity to identify attacks that have progressed beyond the initial delivery phase of the MITRE ATT&CK kill chain. Specifically, the rule looks for three post-delivery indicators tied to the suspicious email:
URL Click Activity — A recipient clicked a link contained within the flagged email, suggesting potential engagement with a malicious payload or credential harvesting site
Malicious Attachment Match — An attachment delivered by the flagged email matched a known malicious SHA-256 hash present in the Threat Intelligence table, indicating a known-bad payload was delivered to the recipient
Endpoint File Creation — A file was created on an endpoint whose SHA-256 hash matches an attachment from the flagged email, suggesting the attachment was saved or executed on a host device
Any email triggering one or more of these conditions is surfaced with full metadata including sender, recipient, subject, SPF/DKIM/DMARC results, and the associated IOC for analyst review.
Unlike basic phishing detections that alert on email receipt alone, this rule correlates authentication failures with downstream activity to identify attacks that have progressed beyond the initial delivery phase of the MITRE ATT&CK kill chain. Specifically, the rule looks for three post-delivery indicators tied to the suspicious email:
URL Click Activity — A recipient clicked a link contained within the flagged email, suggesting potential engagement with a malicious payload or credential harvesting site
Malicious Attachment Match — An attachment delivered by the flagged email matched a known malicious SHA-256 hash present in the Threat Intelligence table, indicating a known-bad payload was delivered to the recipient
Endpoint File Creation — A file was created on an endpoint whose SHA-256 hash matches an attachment from the flagged email, suggesting the attachment was saved or executed on a host device
Any email triggering one or more of these conditions is surfaced with full metadata including sender, recipient, subject, SPF/DKIM/DMARC results, and the associated IOC for analyst review.
Detects creation of LNK shortcut files from browser or email context
Detects malicious LNK files using icon smuggling to hide their true nature
Detects browser processes launching PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA, or WScript. This behavior aligns with ClearFake-style social engineering campaigns that instruct users to copy and execute malicious commands.
Detects attempts to exploit the Windows Search URI handler vulnerability (CVE-2023-29357) which can lead to NTLM credential leaks. This rule specifically looks for process command lines that invoke the 'search' or 'search-ms' URI scheme with a 'crumb=location:' parameter pointing to an UNC path, indicating an attempt to coerce NTLM authentication.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where a shortened URL (from services like bit.ly, tinyurl, ow.ly, or t.co) is used in the HTTP referer header, and the HTTP response body contains the 'MZ' magic bytes, indicating a Windows executable file. This combination suggests a malicious redirect leading to the download of a payload, often associated with phishing or drive-by download attacks.
Detects successful device code flow sign-ins to the Microsoft Authentication Broker application targeting the Microsoft Graph resource, specifically when the sign-in does not originate from a trusted named location. This activity can indicate a device code phishing attempt where an attacker tricks a user into authenticating a malicious application.
Detects instances where curl.exe is used to download payloads from storage.googleapis.com, with the initiating process being a .lnk file. This behavior is characteristic of the PXDropper/10FXRAT LNK campaign.
This rule detects when a user clicks on a malicious link, indicated by a referrer from common email/webmail services (mail., webmail., outlook., gmail.), and the subsequent HTTP response contains a Windows executable (MZ header). This suggests a drive-by download attempt or a user being tricked into downloading malware after clicking a phishing link.
Detects when a web browser (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave, Opera) initiates a process that is not another instance of itself. This could indicate a drive-by download, execution of malicious code, or other suspicious activity originating from a browser.
This rule detects network connections or URL click events to a list of domains known to be associated with phishing or malware distribution. The rule specifically looks for connections to these domains that also contain certain path segments like '/wlc/', '/load/', or '/success/', which are often indicative of malicious activity or payload delivery. It also broadly checks for any URL click events containing these suspicious domains.
Detects browser processes launching PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA, or WScript. This behavior aligns with ClearFake-style social engineering campaigns that instruct users to copy and execute malicious commands.
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