Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the execution of Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs via wscript.exe or cscript.exe, which may indicate an attempt to download remote files or perform privilege escalation. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify malicious use of a native Windows script for unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized file downloads or elevated privileges, posing a significant security risk.
Detects the abuse of the legitimate Windows script 'SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs' to proxy the execution of malicious commands, specifically by appending an arbitrary command separated by a semicolon.
Detects the execution of SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs via wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This legitimate Windows script can be abused by adversaries to proxy execution of malicious PowerShell commands, bypassing execution restrictions and evading defensive measures.
Detects the execution of SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs via wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This legitimate Windows script can be abused by adversaries to proxy execution of malicious PowerShell commands, bypassing execution restrictions and evading defensive measures.
Detects SyncAppvPublishingServer used for PowerShell proxy execution
Detects SyncAppvPublishingServer used for PowerShell proxy execution
Detects system scripts like PubPrn used as execution proxies for defense evasion
This rule detects HTTP requests where the URI contains "SyncAppvPublishingServer" case-insensitively. This pattern is often associated with script proxy execution, a technique used by attackers to execute malicious scripts by leveraging legitimate system utilities. The rule specifically looks for this string in the URI of established, to-server HTTP flows, indicating potential trojan activity or defense evasion.
This rule detects suspicious command-line activity involving several Windows executables (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, wmic.exe, ssh.exe) when combined with specific keywords. It looks for wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing 'SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs', wmic.exe executing 'process', 'call', or 'create', or ssh.exe using 'ProxyCommand'. Additionally, the rule filters for command lines containing keywords like 'gal', 'i*x', 'gcm', '*stM*', 'jsdelivr.net', 'github', or 'powershell', which are often associated with malicious activity, obfuscation, or external resource loading.
The rule detects the execution of a command line containing both SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs and a semicolon (;).
Detects PowerShell execution initiated by the signed Microsoft App-V script 'SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs'. This technique is used as a LOLBIN to proxy malicious PowerShell commands, as seen in campaigns delivering Amatera Stealer.
Detects the execution of the signed Microsoft App-V script 'SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs' by a script host like wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This technique is used as a LOLBIN to proxy execution of other code, such as PowerShell, bypassing detections that focus on direct PowerShell execution or common parent-child process relationships. This was observed in a campaign delivering Amatera Stealer.
Detects the execution of SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs via wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This legitimate Windows script can be abused by adversaries to proxy execution of malicious PowerShell commands, bypassing execution restrictions and evading defensive measures.
Detects the execution of SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs with a command line containing a semicolon, which is indicative of the ClearFake malware campaign's ClickFix technique. This technique abuses SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to proxy execution of malicious PowerShell commands, often delivered via social engineering involving malicious copy-paste actions.
This rule detects the execution of scheduled tasks that launch specific, potentially suspicious, Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBINs) or other uncommon programs. The detection focuses on programs like calc.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, mspaint.exe, notepad.exe, regsvr32.exe, and wscript.exe when they are initiated by the Task Scheduler. The intent is to identify potentially malicious activity where adversaries might use scheduled tasks for persistence, execution, or privilege escalation by leveraging legitimate system utilities in an unusual context.
KQL Query from file: glibc critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.8)
The following analytic detects the execution of Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs via wscript.exe or cscript.exe, which may indicate an attempt to download remote files or perform privilege escalation. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify malicious use of a native Windows script for unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized file downloads or elevated privileges, posing a significant security risk.
Detects the execution of a PowerShell script known as POWERHOLD, which has been attributed to the FIN7 threat group. The rule specifically looks for the presence of '$env:APPDATA', 'function MainPayload', '::WriteAllBytes', and 'wscript.exe' within the PowerShell script block text, indicating the execution of this specific malicious script.
This rule detects the creation of Microsoft Office macro-enabled files (docm, dotm, xlsm, xltm, potm, pptm) when the creating process or its parent process is a suspicious utility often abused by adversaries. The suspicious utilities include cscript.exe, mshta.exe, regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe, and wscript.exe. This behavior is indicative of potential initial access or execution techniques where malicious macros are delivered or generated.
Detects the execution of SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe, which can be abused by adversaries to bypass PowerShell execution restrictions. This rule specifically looks for the string 'SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe' within the 'ContextInfo' field of PowerShell module logs, indicating its use in a PowerShell context.
Detects the execution of SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe, which is often used by adversaries to bypass PowerShell execution restrictions. This technique is part of the LOLBAS (Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts) project, where legitimate system binaries are abused for malicious purposes, specifically to execute PowerShell commands in a way that might evade traditional security controls.
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