Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule is meant to help analysts quickly spot a high-confidence indicator related to Google WinRAR CVE-2025-8088 Exploitation. It is written to be easy to understand and to keep false alarms low by focusing on a very specific match: WinRAR launching a command shell or scripting engine. A match does not automatically prove an attacker is currently active, and it does not prove a file was executed, but it does mean the event is important because it lines up with a public threat intelligence source. When this triggers, start by identifying the host, user, and timeframe involved, then decide whether the activity is expected for that system. If it is unexpected, preserve the related logs and any files, and look for nearby events that could explain how the indicator appeared, such as a download, a new process, or a new connection. If the same indicator appears on multiple systems, treat it as a scoping signal and expand the investigation window. Use the reference link (https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/exploiting-critical-winrar- vulnerability) to document where the indicator came from and to support incident notes and reporting.
This detection identifies activity related to .NET Process Hollowing, specifically focusing on the use of InstallUtil.exe as the target process. It triggers when InstallUtil.exe attempts to access a source image located in a user's AppData or Temp directory, with a file extension of .exe or .bin. This behavior is indicative of a specific threat intelligence report detailing process hollowing techniques involving InstallUtil.exe. A match suggests a strong reason for investigation, as it aligns with published threat reporting, though it does not confirm compromise or success of the activity.
The rule detects the execution of a command line containing both SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs and a semicolon (;).
Detects the execution of common Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) initiated from Windows Explorer. The detection logic specifically looks for command lines that contain indicators of obfuscation or padding, which are common techniques used in malicious LNK (shortcut) files to hide their true purpose. This rule identifies processes like mshta.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe, certutil.exe, cscript.exe, and wscript.exe being launched by explorer.exe with suspicious command-line arguments.
This rule detects attempts to download the 'clawd.bot' or 'openclaw.ai' installation scripts using various command-line tools. It specifically looks for the use of 'curl', 'wget', 'aria2c', 'fetch', 'powershell', 'pwsh', 'certutil', 'bitsadmin', or 'mshta' when their command lines contain either 'clawd.bot/install.sh' or 'openclaw.ai/install.sh'. This activity is indicative of potential malware deployment or initial access attempts related to the OpenClaw/Clawd threat.
FileFix is a sophisticated social engineering attack, emerging in mid-2025, that abuses the Windows File Explorer address bar to execute malicious PowerShell commands. It is an evolution of the "ClickFix" technique, shifting from the Run dialog (Win+R) to the Explorer address bar (Ctrl+L).
This rule detects suspicious process creation events where `explorer.exe` (Windows Explorer) launches various scripting or utility executables (`powershell.exe`, `cmd.exe`, `wscript.exe`, `mshta.exe`, `rundll32.exe`, `regsvr32.exe`, `installutil.exe`, `wmic.exe`, `certutil.exe`, `msdt.exe`). The detection is specifically triggered when the command line of the launched process contains indicators of network communication (e.g., `http://`, `https://`, `iwr`, `invoke-webrequest`, `curl`, `wget`, `bitsadmin`, `downloadstring`, `downloadfile`), encoded commands (`-e` or `-encodedcommand` with base64-like strings), or UNC paths (`\\`). It also specifically looks for `certutil` being used with `-urlcache`, `-decode`, or `-f` flags. The rule includes exclusions for common legitimate activities such as downloads from `chocolatey.org`, `nuget.org`, `aka.ms`, `cmd.exe` launching a browser to a URL, and `certutil -hashfile` operations.
This detection identifies potential abuse of the Windows Package Manager (winget.exe) for malicious activities, including arbitrary command execution, execution from temporary directories, suspicious network egress, and installation of unsigned binaries from non-admin accounts.
Detects the abuse of the Windows 'finger.exe' utility to download and execute commands, a technique observed in the CrashFix campaign. The rule looks for finger.exe (or its renamed variant 'ct.exe') piping output to cmd.exe.
This rule detects various activities associated with the ClawdBot campaign, which uses a fake VS Code extension to drop the ScreenConnect RAT. Detection logic includes suspicious network activity fetching malicious payloads (config.json, lightshot files, zoomupdate.msi) from known malicious domains or Dropbox, identification of known malicious file hashes, outbound connections to ScreenConnect C2 servers on port 8041, creation or start of ScreenConnect services, file dropping/staging in temporary directories, and execution of Code.exe or ScreenConnect binaries from temporary paths.
Detects the abuse of finger.exe as a download cradle, a technique used by the CrashFix campaign. This involves cmd.exe launching finger.exe (or a renamed copy) to retrieve a payload from a remote server and pipe it directly into cmd.exe for execution.
This rule detects activity associated with the 'ClawdBot' campaign, which involves dropping the ScreenConnect Remote Access Trojan (RAT) via a fake VS Code extension. It identifies suspicious network connections to known malicious domains or Dropbox (when initiated by Code.exe), known malicious file hashes, outbound connections to ScreenConnect C2 ports, creation or start of ScreenConnect services, file drops in temporary directories related to ScreenConnect or Lightshot, and execution of Code.exe or ScreenConnect binaries from temporary folders. It also looks for initial payload downloads from attacker command and control infrastructure.
Detects the execution of automated Nginx configuration modification scripts by identifying the use of 'csplit', 'awk', or 'sed' in close proximity to Nginx service management commands (reload, restart, or testing). This pattern is a hallmark of the 'bt.sh', 'zdh.sh', and '4zdh.sh' toolkits used to inject malicious proxy_pass directives.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook) spawning suspicious child processes like command shells or script interpreters. This behavior can be indicative of malicious macro execution or exploitation of vulnerabilities, where an embedded OLE object leads to code execution.
Detects the use of a command injection vulnerability in the legitimate Windows script 'SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs' to execute arbitrary code. As seen in the ClearFake campaign, attackers can append a semicolon to the command-line arguments to execute subsequent malicious PowerShell commands.
Detects the presence and execution of Defendnot components. This tool is used to disable Microsoft Defender by exploiting the Windows Security Center trust model, which involves injecting a malicious DLL into the trusted Task Manager process.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain characteristic of the 'ClickFix' technique. This involves 'explorer.exe' spawning a headless 'conhost.exe', which subsequently executes a Living Off the Land Binary (LOLBin) such as 'curl', 'pwsh', 'powershell', or 'mshta' to download a payload from an HTTP/HTTPS source. This chain indicates an attempt to bypass traditional security controls and execute malicious code.
Detects the execution of the UnRAR utility with a password to extract an archive. This technique is used by threat actors like the Kimsuky group and XWorm RAT to deliver malicious payloads.
A detection triggered on endpoint events where common system binaries (e.g., mshta.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe) were launched by user-facing parent processes (explorer.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, iexplore.exe) and executed suspicious command-lines. The pattern matches the evolving technique used in ClickFix-style campaigns whereby malicious pages dynamically place payloads into the clipboard and prompt users to paste or execute them.
Detects the execution of a remote HTA file using mshta.exe, where the parent process is cmd.exe. This is a common technique for code execution via malicious HTA files.
Detects specific process behavior observed with Devil Bait malware samples. This rule identifies the execution of 'cmd.exe' as a child process of 'wscript.exe', attempting to redirect output to an XML or TXT file within the APPDATA\Microsoft directory. Additionally, it looks for reconnaissance commands such as 'ipconfig /all', 'dir', 'systeminfo', and 'tasklist' executed via 'cmd.exe'. This combination of behaviors is indicative of Devil Bait malware performing initial system reconnaissance and data collection.
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