Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
66 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
25
25
9
3
2
Contributors
15
12
10
9
6
Categories
47
34
13
11
5
Platforms
65
1
Products / Services
20
19
16
6
4
MITRE Techniques
18,113
15,640
12,591
8,389
6,208
CVEs
2
IDS Classtypes
2
1
IDS Protocols
3
Detects the execution of Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe, which are trusted Windows .NET binaries, from non-standard or user-writable directories (such as Temp, AppData, Downloads, or User profiles). Adversaries often abuse these binaries to proxy the execution of arbitrary malicious code (DLLs) by bypassing application control policies.
Detects the execution of Regasm.exe or Regsvcs.exe where the target assembly is located in a path other than standard Windows or .NET framework directories. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to use these signed utilities to load and execute malicious .NET payloads as a proxy, thereby bypassing application allowlisting.
Detects the execution of Microsoft-signed .NET utilities (RegSvcs, InstallUtil, MSBuild, CSC, VBC, ILAsm, AspNet_Compiler) when spawned by scripting engines like PowerShell, wscript, or cscript. This behavior is indicative of the Veil#Drop framework using trusted developer utilities as a fallback mechanism to execute secondary payloads or bypass security controls.
Detects the execution of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe where the command line arguments reference paths typically used for temporary files, user downloads, or public directories. These signed .NET utilities can be abused to proxy the execution of malicious code by loading custom COM assemblies via ComRegisterFunction or ComUnregisterFunction attributes, effectively bypassing application control.
Detects instances of the Windows utility RegSvcs.exe being executed from suspicious, user-writable directories (such as Temp or Public folders) or instances where RegSvcs.exe is used to spawn common command-line or scripting tools, which is a common indicator of living-off-the-land binary (LOLBin) abuse.
This rule detects potentially malicious usage of the Windows RegSvcs.exe binary, often used as a proxy for executing code. It monitors for two specific patterns: RegSvcs.exe being executed from user-writable directories (e.g., C:\Users\, C:\ProgramData\), or RegSvcs.exe spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, WScript, mshta), which is indicative of a living-off-the-land (LotL) attack technique to bypass application control or execute payloads.
This rule detects suspicious execution patterns of addinutil.exe, a legitimate .NET utility that can be abused for arbitrary code execution. It specifically looks for two conditions: 1) addinutil.exe being executed from its standard .NET Framework directories with the '-AddinRoot .' argument, which is a known LOLBAS technique to load a payload from the current directory, and 2) addinutil.exe being executed from an uncommon or non-standard directory, which could indicate an adversary has copied the utility to a different location for malicious purposes.
Detects the execution of known Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) such as certutil.exe, msiexec.exe, regsvcs.exe, and regasm.exe when their command line contains suspicious keywords like 'download', 'http', or 'encode'. This activity can indicate an attempt to download malicious payloads or bypass security controls.
Detects suspicious process injection attempts where common scripting/proxy execution tools (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, msiexec.exe) are used to inject into other processes (RegAsm.exe, InstallUtil.exe, vbc.exe, svchost.exe, explorer.exe) using CreateRemoteThread. The detection is further refined by looking for command-line indicators often associated with malicious activity, such as downloading content or executing scripts.
Detects instances where PowerShell.exe spawns Regasm.exe. Regasm.exe is a known Windows utility that can be abused to proxy execution of arbitrary code, a technique often used by adversaries to bypass application controls or execute malicious payloads.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the Windows binaries Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe, which can be abused to proxy the execution of arbitrary code. It specifically identifies three suspicious behaviors: spawning of common command shells or script engines by these binaries, execution of these binaries when located in or loading assemblies from user-writable directories (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), and module loading of DLLs from those same writable locations, especially when the binary is not Microsoft-signed.
Detects HTTP traffic where the User-Agent header references Regasm or Regsvcs, which are trusted Windows utilities often abused by attackers to proxy execution of malicious code (Living-off-the-Land Binary technique).
Detects suspicious process injection attempts where common scripting/proxy execution tools (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, msiexec.exe) are used to inject into other processes (RegAsm.exe, InstallUtil.exe, vbc.exe, svchost.exe, explorer.exe) using CreateRemoteThread. The detection is further refined by looking for command-line indicators often associated with malicious activity, such as downloading content or executing scripts.
Detects HTTP traffic where the User-Agent header references Regasm or Regsvcs, which are trusted Windows utilities often abused by attackers to proxy execution of malicious code (Living-off-the-Land Binary technique).
Detects suspicious process injection attempts where common scripting/execution binaries (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, msiexec.exe) are observed creating remote threads in other processes (RegAsm.exe, InstallUtil.exe, vbc.exe, svchost.exe, explorer.exe). The detection is further refined by looking for specific keywords in the initiating process's command line that are indicative of malicious activity, such as downloading content or executing scripts. This rule aims to identify advanced persistent threats and malware leveraging process injection for defense evasion and privilege escalation.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the Windows binaries Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe, which can be abused to proxy the execution of arbitrary code. It specifically identifies three suspicious behaviors: spawning of common command shells or script engines by these binaries, execution of these binaries when located in or loading assemblies from user-writable directories (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), and module loading of DLLs from those same writable locations, especially when the binary is not Microsoft-signed.
This rule detects the execution of a social engineered installer followed by the spawning of hollowed binaries. It correlates the execution of executables with names matching common AI tools or generic setup files (e.g., deepseek, gpt, kimi, fraudgpt, ProFluxeFlowAi, setup) with the subsequent execution of .NET utility tools (InstallUtil.exe, RegAsm.exe, MSBuild.exe) that are often abused for process hollowing, especially when their command line does not contain a hyphen, indicating non-standard usage.
Detects broad hollowing logic involving injected Microsoft utilities (InstallUtil.exe, RegAsm.exe, RegSvcs.exe, aspnet_compiler.exe, MSBuild.exe) communicating over non-standard web command and control ports (8443, 5443, 8041). This rule specifically excludes common initiating processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, explorer.exe, and svchost.exe to reduce noise.
Detects the execution of RegSvcs.exe initiated by a VBScript (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). This technique can be used by adversaries to bypass application control and execute malicious code.
Detects the execution of RegSvcs.exe initiated by a VBScript (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). This technique can be used by adversaries to bypass application control and execute malicious code.
This rule detects the execution of Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBins) such as certutil.exe, msiexec.exe, regsvcs.exe, regasm.exe, rundll32.exe, cscript.exe, and wscript.exe, when their command lines contain keywords indicative of malicious activity like 'download', 'encode', 'decode', 'http', 'ftp', or 'javascript'. It specifically filters out executions originating from explorer.exe or svchost.exe to reduce false positives and triggers when two or more such events occur within an hour on the same computer by the same user.
Page 1 of 4