Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
252 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
132
41
32
18
12
Contributors
65
49
41
38
11
Categories
210
128
39
10
9
Platforms
248
2
1
1
Products / Services
97
77
28
20
8
MITRE Techniques
18,123
15,639
12,581
8,394
6,215
CVEs
2
1
1
1
1
IDS Classtypes
2
IDS Protocols
1
1
The following analytic identifies instances where the regsvr32.exe binary has been renamed and executed. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, specifically focusing on the original filename metadata. Renaming regsvr32.exe is significant as it can be an evasion technique used by attackers to bypass security controls. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary DLLs, potentially leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.
The following analytic identifies the abuse of Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code, specifically detecting the loading of "scrobj.dll" by Regsvr32.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line executions. This activity is significant because Regsvr32.exe is a trusted, signed Microsoft binary, often used in "Squiblydoo" attacks to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and persistent access.
The following analytic detects the loading of a DLL using the regsvr32 application with the silent parameter and DLLInstall execution. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line arguments and parent process details. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by RAT malware like Remcos and njRAT to load malicious DLLs on compromised machines. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and further compromise the system.
Detects the execution of known Windows 'Living-off-the-Land' binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, mshta.exe) when they originate from web browsers or office productivity applications, or when they are executed with command-line arguments indicative of network resource loading, remote scripting, or code execution bypasses.
Detects the abuse of built-in Windows binaries 'regsvr32.exe' and 'msbuild.exe' for proxy execution. Specifically, it flags 'regsvr32.exe' loading remote scriptlets via HTTP and 'msbuild.exe' processing project files containing inline tasks, which are common techniques used to execute arbitrary malicious code while bypassing security controls.
Detects instances where AI agent runtime processes (e.g., Python, Node.js) initiate child processes using common Windows Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBAS). This behavior may indicate an AI agent has been compromised or misused to execute unauthorized system commands for defense evasion or post-exploitation activities.
Detects the abuse of native Windows binaries Regsvr32.exe and Rundll32.exe to execute code from remote sources. Regsvr32 is monitored for 'Squiblydoo'-style execution where scrobj.dll is used to execute remote scriptlets via a URL. Rundll32 is monitored for loading DLLs from remote UNC/WebDAV paths or HTTP URLs, which is a common pattern for proxying malicious code execution to bypass local security controls.
Detects the suspicious execution of common Windows system binaries (LOLBAS) often used for proxying malicious code execution or deobfuscating payloads. This includes regsvr32.exe for remote scriptlet execution, mshta.exe for remote HTA execution, rundll32.exe for JavaScript or DLL function execution, and certutil.exe for decoding or retrieving remote files.
Detects instances of rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe executing from suspicious locations or with suspicious command-line arguments (e.g., URLs, JavaScript, or script file extensions) initiated by an unsigned process. This is a common technique used to proxy malicious code execution while evading security monitoring.
Detects the execution of regsvr32.exe with command line arguments containing 'scrobj.dll' and '/i:http'. This behavior indicates the abuse of the Windows Registry Server utility to load a remote COM scriptlet, a technique frequently observed in TA505 adversary activity to execute malicious payloads, such as the Get2 downloader or SDBbot RAT.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe where the command line arguments reference a DLL that was recently written to the disk on the same host. This behavior is indicative of a RAT or malware dropping a secondary payload (DLL) and immediately executing it using built-in Windows binary proxies to bypass security controls.
Detects a suspicious command-line chain where 'cmdkey' is used to add credentials, followed by the execution of 'regsvr32' targeting a DLL file hosted on a remote UNC path. This pattern is commonly associated with ClickFix or FileFix techniques where an adversary attempts to force authentication and execute malicious code via proxy execution.
Detects the execution of known Windows 'Living-off-the-Land' binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, mshta.exe) when they originate from web browsers or office productivity applications, or when they are executed with command-line arguments indicative of network resource loading, remote scripting, or code execution bypasses.
Detects the abuse of built-in Windows binaries 'regsvr32.exe' and 'msbuild.exe' for proxy execution. Specifically, it flags 'regsvr32.exe' loading remote scriptlets via HTTP and 'msbuild.exe' processing project files containing inline tasks, which are common techniques used to execute arbitrary malicious code while bypassing security controls.
This rule detects the suspicious execution of rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe, which are commonly abused as Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins). It identifies potential malicious activity by analyzing command-line arguments for patterns like remote URL requests, usage of scrobj.dll, JavaScript protocols, or specific Squiblydoo attack patterns. Additionally, it monitors for these binaries being executed by parents other than explorer.exe, which is indicative of potential process injection or proxy execution.
Detects the abuse of the legitimate Windows system binaries regsvr32.exe and rundll32.exe to execute remote scripts or scriptlets, a technique often used to bypass application control and proxy execution of malicious code (similar to Squiblydoo).
Detects execution of rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe with potentially malicious command-line arguments, including references to external URLs, protocol handlers like javascript:, or loading DLLs from user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, Downloads). This behavior is characteristic of Living-off-the-Land (LotL) techniques used to proxy execution and bypass application control or security monitoring.
Detects the abuse of signed Windows system binaries regsvr32.exe and rundll32.exe for proxy execution, defense evasion, and credential access. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns including Squiblydoo (regsvr32 with remote scriptlets), rundll32 executing JavaScript via mshtml.dll, rundll32 performing LSASS credential dumping via comsvcs.dll, and the loading of DLLs from untrusted user-writable locations like Temp or Downloads folders.
This rule detects the invocation of rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, or mshta.exe with arguments pointing to remote resources (UNC, WebDAV, or HTTP(S) URLs). This pattern is commonly used by attackers to execute remote scriptlets (e.g., .sct, .hta, .dll) for living-off-the-land bypasses or initial staging of malicious payloads, such as the Squiblytwo or Squiblydoo techniques.
Detects various system utilities executing files or payloads staged in user-specific temporary directories (%AppData%\Local\Temp). This pattern is consistent with malware loaders (such as the Sauron Loader) that write payloads to the Temp folder before utilizing trusted Windows binaries (LOLBins) like rundll32, regsvr32, powershell, or wscript for execution. It also tracks potential driver installation or direct process memory access attempts from the same location.
Detects execution of rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe when spawned by powershell.exe or mshta.exe, specifically targeting DLLs located in common user-writable or temporary directories (AppData, ProgramData, Downloads). This pattern is consistent with the delivery of CastleLoader shellcode loaders following ClickFix-style social engineering lures.
Page 1 of 12