Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
114 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
37
32
20
8
6
Contributors
29
21
13
9
8
Categories
72
60
38
14
12
Platforms
114
5
5
4
Products / Services
66
40
21
15
9
MITRE Techniques
18,110
15,622
12,575
8,387
6,208
IDS Classtypes
2
2
IDS Protocols
4
The following analytic detects the use of the Windows binary attrib.exe to hide files or directories by marking them with specific flags. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments that include the "+h" flag. This activity is significant because hiding files can be a tactic used by attackers to conceal malicious files or tools from users and security software. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to persist in the environment undetected, potentially leading to further compromise or data exfiltration.
The following analytic identifies the modification of security permissions
on files or directories using tools like icacls.exe, cacls.exe, or xcacls.exe. It
leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific
command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and
maintain control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this behavior
could allow attackers to hinder investigation, impede remediation efforts, and maintain
persistent access to the compromised environment.
on files or directories using tools like icacls.exe, cacls.exe, or xcacls.exe. It
leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific
command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and
maintain control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this behavior
could allow attackers to hinder investigation, impede remediation efforts, and maintain
persistent access to the compromised environment.
The following analytic detects the execution of the SubInAcl utility. SubInAcl is a legacy Windows Resource Kit tool from the Windows 2003 era, used to manipulate security descriptors of securable objects. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for any process execution involving "SubInAcl.exe" binary. This activity can be significant because the utility should be rarely found on modern Windows machines, which mean any execution could potentially be considered suspicious. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to blind defenses by tampering with EventLog ACLs or modifying the access to a previously denied resource.
This detection identifies an Active Directory access-control list (ACL) modification event, which applies the minimum required extended rights to perform the DCShadow attack.
This detection monitors the addition of the following ACLs to an Active Directory group object: "Full control", "All extended rights", "All validated writes", "Create all child objects", "Delete all child objects", "Delete subtree", "Delete", "Modify permissions", "Modify owner", and "Write all properties". Such modifications can indicate potential privilege escalation or malicious activity. Immediate investigation is recommended upon alert.
ACL deletion performed on the domain root object, significant AD change with high impact. Following MS guidance all changes at this level should be reviewed. Drill into the logonID within EventCode 4624 for information on the source device during triage.
ACL modification performed on the domain root object, significant AD change with high impact. Following MS guidance all changes at this level should be reviewed. Drill into the logonID within EventCode 4624 for information on the source device during triage.
This analytic is looking for when an ACL is applied to an OU which denies listing the objects residing in the OU. This activity combined with modifying the owner of the OU will hide AD objects even from domain administrators.
AD Object Owner Updated. The owner provides Full control level privileges over the target AD Object. This event has significant impact alone and is also a precursor activity for hiding an AD object.
Detects the specific sequence of administrative utilities used by Gentlemen ransomware to seize control of files before encryption. This involves using 'takeown.exe' to claim ownership, 'icacls.exe' to grant full access to the Everyone group, and 'attrib.exe' to remove read-only file attributes, a common precursor to mass file encryption.
This rule detects attempts to modify file or directory permissions (e.g., using icacls, takeown, chmod, or chown) on paths associated with known security products. Such activity is often indicative of an adversary attempting to tamper with, disable, or exclude security tools from logging or inspection.
This rule detects attempts to modify file or directory permissions (e.g., using icacls, takeown, chmod, or chown) on paths associated with known security products. Such activity is often indicative of an adversary attempting to tamper with, disable, or exclude security tools from logging or inspection.
This rule detects attempts to modify file or directory permissions (e.g., using icacls, takeown, chmod, or chown) on paths associated with known security products. Such activity is often indicative of an adversary attempting to tamper with, disable, or exclude security tools from logging or inspection.
The following analytic detects instances where an adversary modifies security permissions of a file or directory using commands like "icacls.exe", "cacls.exe", or "xcacls.exe" with deny options.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions.
This activity is significant as it is commonly used by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and impede access to critical files.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence and hinder incident response efforts.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions.
This activity is significant as it is commonly used by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and impede access to critical files.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence and hinder incident response efforts.
This rule detects attempts to modify file or directory permissions (e.g., using icacls, takeown, chmod, or chown) on paths associated with known security products. Such activity is often indicative of an adversary attempting to tamper with, disable, or exclude security tools from logging or inspection.
This rule detects attempts to modify file or directory permissions (e.g., using icacls, takeown, chmod, or chown) on paths associated with known security products. Such activity is often indicative of an adversary attempting to tamper with, disable, or exclude security tools from logging or inspection.
This rule detects unauthorized attempts to modify the security descriptor, access control lists (ACLs), or security settings of the 'C:\Config.Msi' directory. This directory is used by the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe) for temporary operations; attackers often target this location by modifying permissions to gain persistent access, hide malicious payloads, or execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges.
Detects unauthorized modification of file permissions (using icacls), transfer of ownership (using takeown), or deletion (using del) of critical Windows boot-related files such as ntoskrnl.exe, winload.exe, and bootmgr. This activity is indicative of a potential attempt to destroy system boot stability, inhibit recovery, or prepare a host for secondary stage impacts.
Detects signs of GigaWiper malware attempting to disable system recovery, take ownership of critical Windows boot files, and subsequently delete them to ensure system failure or destruction.
Detects the use of the Windows 'takeown.exe' utility to recursively change the ownership of the 'Microsoft\User Account Pictures' directory. This specific behavior is associated with the NoEscape ransomware, which modifies permissions on system folders to facilitate file encryption or impede recovery operations.
Detects unauthorized modification of file permissions (using icacls), transfer of ownership (using takeown), or deletion (using del) of critical Windows boot-related files such as ntoskrnl.exe, winload.exe, and bootmgr. This activity is indicative of a potential attempt to destroy system boot stability, inhibit recovery, or prepare a host for secondary stage impacts.
Page 1 of 6