Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
234 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
91
65
32
11
10
Contributors
44
31
29
23
20
Categories
88
86
85
64
29
Platforms
184
28
17
6
5
Products / Services
49
49
38
38
19
MITRE Techniques
18,113
15,640
12,591
8,389
6,208
CVEs
1
1
IDS Classtypes
3
1
IDS Protocols
3
1
Detects shadow copy deletion, boot recovery disabling, and the stopping of critical services or processes commonly halted prior to data encryption by ransomware operators.
The following analytic detects the use of the taskkill command in a process command line to terminate several known browser processes, a technique commonly employed by the Braodo stealer malware to steal credentials. By forcefully closing browsers like Chrome, Edge, and Firefox, the malware can unlock files that store sensitive information, such as passwords and login data. This detection focuses on identifying taskkill commands targeting these browsers, signaling malicious intent. Early detection allows security teams to investigate and prevent further credential theft and system compromise.
Detects service state changes recorded by ePO. Protection services stopping and
restarting across managed endpoints can indicate tampering — and because ePO
observes it centrally, the pattern across many hosts is visible in a way it is not
from any single machine.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-EPO is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 857).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=auditd where sourcename='TRELLIX-EPO' and action='SERVICE_STARTED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, process, commandline
restarting across managed endpoints can indicate tampering — and because ePO
observes it centrally, the pattern across many hosts is visible in a way it is not
from any single machine.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-EPO is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 857).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=auditd where sourcename='TRELLIX-EPO' and action='SERVICE_STARTED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, process, commandline
Detects the usage of binaries such as 'net', 'sc' or 'powershell' in order to stop, pause, disable or delete critical or important Windows services such as AV, Backup, etc. As seen being used in some ransomware scripts
Detects critical service crashes, fatal errors, and abnormal process terminations in Ollama that may indicate exploitation attempts, resource exhaustion attacks, malicious input triggering unhandled exceptions, or deliberate denial of service attacks designed to disrupt AI model availability and degrade system stability.
The following analytic detects attempts to stop a service on Linux systems. It leverages data from Linux Auditd. This activity is significant as adversaries often stop or terminate security or critical services to disable defenses or disrupt operations, as seen in malware like Industroyer2. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the disabling of security mechanisms, allowing attackers to persist, escalate privileges, or deploy destructive payloads, severely impacting system integrity and availability.
Detects potential abuse of the Linux Magic SysRq (System Request) key by adversaries with root or sufficient privileges to manipulate or destabilize a system.
Writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger can crash the system, kill processes, or bypass standard logging.
Monitoring SysRq abuse helps detect stealthy post-exploitation activity.
Correlate with related EXECVE or PROCTITLE events to identify the process or user responsible for the access or modification.
Writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger can crash the system, kill processes, or bypass standard logging.
Monitoring SysRq abuse helps detect stealthy post-exploitation activity.
Correlate with related EXECVE or PROCTITLE events to identify the process or user responsible for the access or modification.
The following analytic identifies attempts to stop services on a system using `net.exe`, `sc.exe` or the "Stop-Service" cmdlet. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry. This activity can be significant as adversaries often terminate security or critical services to evade detection and further their objectives. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to disable security defenses, facilitate ransomware encryption, or disrupt essential services, leading to potential data loss or system compromise.
Detects suspicious post-exploitation behaviors on Citrix NetScaler appliances, specifically tracking the modification of file permissions to grant setuid/setgid bits to the shell and the termination of httpd processes often associated with webshell persistence or manipulation.
Detects VMware ESXi shell activity associated with the ShinySp1d3r encryptor. This includes the termination of VM processes via esxcli or vim-cmd, the deletion of VM snapshots, and suspicious file renaming or encryption activity on datastores consistent with ransomware behaviors.
Detects a suspicious pattern where a high volume of security, backup, or antivirus services and processes are terminated on a host in a short time window, followed by extensive file modification activity. This behavior is highly indicative of pre-encryption preparations by ransomware, specifically patterns observed by the Everest group, intended to neutralize defenses and prevent restoration before encrypting files.
Detects a behavioral pattern characteristic of Everest ransomware, where a sequence of rapid process terminations occurs within a 20-second window. The rule identifies the coordinated termination of security/analysis tools, antivirus/backup/database services, and other high-memory processes on a single device, excluding known legitimate maintenance processes.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows administrative tools (vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, bcdedit, sc, net) to delete volume shadow copies, clear backup catalogs, disable boot recovery options, or stop critical backup and system services. This behavior is highly characteristic of ransomware activity aiming to prevent data restoration and system recovery.
Detects high-risk administrative activity on VMware ESXi or vCenter servers that is consistent with pre-ransomware staging, such as disabling lockdown mode, disabling syslog forwarding, mass deletion or modification of virtual machine files (.vmdk/.vmx), or shell command execution related to encryption tool staging.
Detects a suspicious burst of commands commonly used to disable security services, antivirus, or backup agents on a single host. The rule monitors for a high frequency of taskkill, net stop, sc stop, or PowerShell Stop-Service operations targeting a predefined list of sensitive security software process and service names within a short timeframe, which is a common precursor to ransomware encryption.
Detects the execution of known PAYLOAD ransomware process-termination utilities (killer.exe or kill.exe). These tools are used by adversaries to forcefully terminate security software, backup services, and database processes prior to file encryption.
Detects the use of the sc.exe command-line utility to stop or disable the Microsoft Defender Antivirus service (WinDefend). This activity is often associated with ransomware, such as Nova ransomware, to bypass security controls prior to malicious encryption or data destruction.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes (AV/EDR) using common administrative tools including taskkill.exe, wmic.exe, and PowerShell Stop-Process. This behavior is frequently observed during the pre-encryption phase of ransomware attacks, such as Nova and Gentlemen, to evade detection.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes (AV/EDR) using common administrative tools including taskkill.exe, wmic.exe, and PowerShell Stop-Process. This behavior is frequently observed during the pre-encryption phase of ransomware attacks, such as Nova and Gentlemen, to evade detection.
Detects a behavioral pattern characteristic of Everest ransomware, where a sequence of rapid process terminations occurs within a 20-second window. The rule identifies the coordinated termination of security/analysis tools, antivirus/backup/database services, and other high-memory processes on a single device, excluding known legitimate maintenance processes.
Detects a behavioral pattern characteristic of Everest ransomware, where a sequence of rapid process terminations occurs within a 20-second window. The rule identifies the coordinated termination of security/analysis tools, antivirus/backup/database services, and other high-memory processes on a single device, excluding known legitimate maintenance processes.
Page 1 of 12