Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
233 detections
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Detects the loading of the malicious NvFsFilter driver (a BYOVD technique often used by the Rapuncel infostealer) followed immediately by a mass burst of process terminations, indicating an attempt to disable security software.
Detects bulk or repeated attempts to stop security-related services and processes (such as EDR or AV agents) or modification of Windows Defender registry keys. This behavior is indicative of a pre-encryption phase in ransomware attacks where adversaries attempt to neutralize endpoint defenses.
Detects suspicious administrative activity involving privileged users performing bulk account/object deletions or stopping critical identity-related services (ADFS, Active Directory Certificate Services). The rule specifically flags events occurring outside standard business hours, involving privileged AD groups, or directly targeting identity infrastructure, indicating a potential attempt to disrupt authentication services or sabotage identity management.
Detects a behavioral pattern characteristic of Everest ransomware, where a sequence of rapid process terminations occurs within a 20-second window. The rule identifies the coordinated termination of security/analysis tools, antivirus/backup/database services, and other high-memory processes on a single device, excluding known legitimate maintenance processes.
Detects the creation of a suspicious 'com.apple.finder.agent' plist file within a user LaunchAgents directory followed shortly by the termination of known macOS notification and background management agents. This pattern is often associated with malware attempting to evade detection or manipulate user notifications by disabling system components.
Detects attempts to terminate or delete security-related services and logging agents, such as Sysmon, Filebeat, and various endpoint protection agents, using legitimate Windows system utilities like taskkill, sc, or wmic.
Detects the mass termination of security, backup, database, and virtualization services and processes. The rule monitors for the use of 'taskkill', 'sc', and 'net stop' commands, targeting a list of processes and services often associated with pre-encryption cleanup activities by ransomware actors to neutralize security tools and data access controls.
Detects the use of PowerShell Stop-Process being used to terminate common scripting and .NET-related processes, a behavior associated with the Veil#Drop loader to clear potential conflicts or interference from legitimate host processes.
Detects when a single process terminates two or more critical security, database, or backup related processes within a short window. This behavior is often associated with adversary attempts to disable security controls or disrupt database operations, commonly observed during the impact phase of an attack or preparatory to data destruction/encryption.
Detects unauthorized processes reading sensitive Chromium-based browser files (e.g., Cookies, Login Data) immediately following the termination of a browser process. This behavior is indicative of credential harvesting malware, such as RevStealer, which terminates the browser to release file locks before exfiltrating the databases.
Detects rapid, bulk process termination of critical system, security, database, and office applications using the Windows taskkill.exe utility. This behavior is characteristic of ransomware (such as DragonForce) attempting to release file locks prior to initiating encryption activities.
This rule detects the use of 'taskkill.exe' to terminate critical services, including security software (MsMpEng.exe), database processes (sql.exe, oracle.exe, sqlservr.exe), and common user applications (outlook.exe, onedrive.exe). This behavior is characteristic of the DragonForce ransomware, which disables protective services and applications before encryption to minimize interference and ensure successful file locking.
Detects the loading of rstrtmgr.dll by processes other than known Windows installers, update services, or explorers. The Restart Manager API is often abused by ransomware to terminate processes holding file locks, facilitating the encryption of files that would otherwise be in use.
Detects the loading or presence of the Alinubx.sys kernel driver, a malicious component used for Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks. This driver facilitates the mass termination of security product processes (AV/EDR) by exposing a specific IOCTL (0x222024) to interface with kernel-mode process termination primitives (e.g., ZwTerminateProcess), often serving as a precursor to the deployment of stealers like Rapuncel.
Detects the rapid termination of multiple critical processes (security, database, backup, and office applications) consistent with the kill list behavior exhibited by DragonForce ransomware. The rule monitors for a pattern of three or more unique processes from a defined list being terminated on the same host within a 5-minute window, a common precursor to file encryption.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the manipulation of Windows services using 'sc.exe' to stop or delete services, combined with the forceful termination of 'svchost.exe' processes via 'wmic.exe'. This pattern is often associated with adversaries attempting to disable security tools, logging agents, or other defensive mechanisms on an endpoint.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity where multiple critical processes (such as database engines or email clients) are terminated in a short time frame, correlated with a high volume of file creation or modification events on the same device. This behavior is indicative of destructive activity, such as ransomware encrypting data stores or disabling defensive software.
Detects the use of net.exe to stop critical system services commonly associated with ransomware operations, such as volume shadow copies, security services, and Windows update services, to facilitate data encryption or prevent system recovery.
Detects unauthorized attempts to disable or stop critical Windows Update services (wuauserv, UsoSvc, uhssvc, WaaSMedicSvc) via command line tools or service configuration changes. This behavior is indicative of defense evasion by malware such as Silver Fox/Gh0st RAT, aimed at preventing security updates or disabling security-related service monitoring.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the manipulation of Windows services using 'sc.exe' to stop or delete services, combined with the forceful termination of 'svchost.exe' processes via 'wmic.exe'. This pattern is often associated with adversaries attempting to disable security tools, logging agents, or other defensive mechanisms on an endpoint.
Detects the XHOPELESS wiper routine 'KillNetworkPermanent' which severs network connectivity by resetting the TCP/IP stack using netsh, blocking all traffic via Windows Advanced Firewall commands, and disabling network adapters via devcon.exe as a final destructive action.
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