Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
236 detections
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Correlates a Webcam.dll image load with VM-detection commands (such as queries for VirtualBox, VMware, vbox, vmtoolsd, Win32_ComputerSystem, or Win32_BIOS) executed by the same RegSvcs.exe process, which is characteristic of XWorm malware behavior.
Correlates a Webcam.dll image load with VM-detection commands (such as queries for VirtualBox, VMware, vbox, vmtoolsd, Win32_ComputerSystem, or Win32_BIOS) executed by the same RegSvcs.exe process, which is characteristic of XWorm malware behavior.
Detects network traffic associated with Wazza phishkit anti-bot gates, including beacon communications, TLS SNI patterns, fingerprint iframe URIs, and challenge-platform requests.
Detects network traffic associated with Wazza phishkit anti-bot gates, including beacon communications, TLS SNI patterns, fingerprint iframe URIs, and challenge-platform requests.
Detects network traffic associated with Wazza phishkit anti-bot gates, including beacon communications, TLS SNI patterns, fingerprint iframe URIs, and challenge-platform requests.
Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
Detects network traffic associated with Wazza phishkit anti-bot gates, including beacon communications, TLS SNI patterns, fingerprint iframe URIs, and challenge-platform requests.
Detects a multi-stage evasion sequence where a process first queries the system for virtualization or sandbox artifacts (e.g., VM tools, system information), followed by an intentional sleep or delay to bypass sandbox analysis, and concluding with subsequent process activity. This pattern is characteristic of malware attempting to detect and evade automated analysis environments.
Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
Detects a multi-stage evasion sequence where a process first queries the system for virtualization or sandbox artifacts (e.g., VM tools, system information), followed by an intentional sleep or delay to bypass sandbox analysis, and concluding with subsequent process activity. This pattern is characteristic of malware attempting to detect and evade automated analysis environments.
Detects a multi-stage evasion sequence where a process first queries the system for virtualization or sandbox artifacts (e.g., VM tools, system information), followed by an intentional sleep or delay to bypass sandbox analysis, and concluding with subsequent process activity. This pattern is characteristic of malware attempting to detect and evade automated analysis environments.
Detects sophisticated in-memory loader activity characterized by a sequence of events: process module loads involving AMSI patching (amsi.dll), fresh ntdll.dll remapping to bypass EDR hooks, and the enumeration of hypervisor-related drivers or services, often associated with advanced payload execution chains like ClickFix.
Detects instances where rundll32.exe loads a DLL file named Use.dll from a subdirectory named 'ComponentsFolder' within the AppData directory. This pattern is indicative of sandbox evasion techniques used by malware, such as the DarkMe RAT, where the DLL acts as an anti-sandbox gateway to check the execution environment.
Detects a trojanized Electron application performing anti-sandbox environment checks by querying GPU hardware information via WMI or PowerShell CIM cmdlets. This activity is characterized by the presence of the PYTHONUTF8 environment variable and is identified as a precursor step to attempting Microsoft Defender exclusions and launching a malicious payload.
Detects malicious processes or scripts that perform multi-stage environment fingerprinting to identify virtualization or sandbox environments. The rule identifies chains of suspicious activities, including querying registry keys related to virtualization (e.g., VMware, VirtualBox, QEMU), WMI queries for BIOS/Computer system details, API calls common to sandbox evasion (GetCursorPos, GetTickCount), and artificial execution delays (sleep/timeout), typically used by malware like LummaC2 to perform conditional exits if an analysis environment is detected.
Detects processes querying registry keys or accessing file paths associated with common virtualization and sandbox environments (e.g., VMware, VirtualBox, Hyper-V, Sandboxie). This behavior is often indicative of malware attempting to identify if it is running in an analysis or sandbox environment to evade detection.
Detects network activity associated with ORAX Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS), specifically identifying fake Cloudflare security-verification pages and emoji-based CAPTCHA gates used as anti-analysis techniques to frustrate automated sandboxing.
Detects network indicators associated with the ORAX Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This includes patterns for emoji-matching CAPTCHAs, spoofed Cloudflare security pages, specific wildcard subdomain DNS queries, and the use of anti-analysis gate sequences to prevent sandbox inspection.
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