Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects an unusually high number of web search queries (identified by 'search' or 'query' in the URI) originating from a single IP address within a one-hour window. A threshold of 100 or more queries triggers the alert. This behavior could indicate automated activity such as web scraping, reconnaissance, or a denial-of-service attempt against the search functionality.
This rule detects NTP amplification DDoS attacks by looking for UDP traffic on port 123 (NTP) with a specific content signature ('|17 00 03 2a|') and a high threshold of 50 packets within 5 seconds from the same destination. This pattern is indicative of an NTP monlist request, which can be abused for amplification attacks.
This rule detects an ICMP flood Denial of Service (DoS) attack. It triggers an alert when more than 200 ICMP echo request (type 8) packets are observed targeting a single destination within a 5-second window. This high volume of ICMP traffic is indicative of an attempt to overwhelm a target system or network, leading to service disruption.
This rule detects devices making a high volume of outbound network connections (more than 1000 connections within a one-minute window) to a single remote IP address. This behavior could indicate a network denial-of-service (DoS) attack originating from the device, or potentially other forms of high-volume network activity such as data exfiltration or scanning.
This rule detects a high volume (50 or more) of HTTP errors (status codes 400 and above) originating from a single client IP address within a 5-minute time window. This behavior can be indicative of various malicious activities such as brute-force attacks, web application vulnerability scanning, or denial-of-service attempts against a web server.
This rule detects a DNS Amplification Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. It triggers an alert when UDP traffic destined for port 53 (DNS) on the home network has a data size greater than 512 bytes and exceeds a threshold of 100 packets within 5 seconds, tracked by destination IP address. This pattern is indicative of a DNS amplification attack where small queries result in large responses, overwhelming the target.
This rule detects an unusually high number of network connection events originating from a single device to a remote IP address within a one-minute interval. This behavior can be indicative of various malicious activities, including network scanning, port scanning, or a denial-of-service (DoS) attempt. It could also signal a compromised host attempting to establish numerous connections for command and control, data exfiltration, or further reconnaissance.
Detects an unusually high volume (100 or more within an hour) of API calls (POST, DELETE, PUT methods to URIs containing 'api') originating from a single IP address. This activity could indicate various malicious behaviors such as brute-force attacks, credential stuffing, web application attacks, or a denial-of-service attempt against the API endpoint.
This rule detects a high volume of network connection retries (more than 500 within a one-minute window) to a distinct remote IP address. This behavior can be indicative of a network denial-of-service (DoS) attack, where an attacker attempts to overwhelm a target by repeatedly trying to establish connections.
This rule detects potential HTTP/2 Rapid Reset or similar denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by identifying an unusually high number of streams and total requests within a single HTTP/2 network connection over a one-minute interval. Such behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to exhaust server resources by rapidly opening and closing streams.
This rule identifies an anomalous surge in network connection attempts to a particular remote IP address. It establishes a baseline of average daily connection counts to each remote IP over the past week. It then compares the current hourly connection count to this baseline, triggering an alert if the current count is more than five times the baseline and surpasses a total of 500 connections within that hour. This could indicate various malicious activities such as data exfiltration, command and control communication, or a denial-of-service attack originating from the monitored environment.
This rule detects an unusually high number of network connection events originating from a single device to a remote IP address within a one-minute interval. This behavior can be indicative of various malicious activities, including network scanning, port scanning, or a denial-of-service (DoS) attempt. It could also signal a compromised host attempting to establish numerous connections for command and control, data exfiltration, or further reconnaissance.
This rule detects a high volume of HTTP/2 requests (more than 3000 per minute) originating from a single remote IP address, especially when these requests target a diverse set of URIs (more than 10 distinct URIs). This pattern can indicate a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, a web scanner, or other malicious automated activity attempting to overwhelm a service or enumerate resources.
This rule detects an unusually high number of web search queries (identified by 'search' or 'query' in the URI) originating from a single IP address within a one-hour window. A threshold of 100 or more queries triggers the alert. This behavior could indicate automated activity such as web scraping, reconnaissance, or a denial-of-service attempt against the search functionality.
This rule detects a UDP flood Denial of Service (DoS) attack targeting the home network. It triggers an alert if more than 1000 UDP packets are observed from any source to any destination within the home network within a 5-second interval, tracked per destination.
This rule detects a TCP SYN Flood Denial of Service (DoS) attack. It triggers when a high volume of TCP SYN packets (1000 packets within 5 seconds) are observed targeting a single destination IP address within the HOME_NET, indicating an attempt to overwhelm the target's network resources.
This rule detects potential HTTP/2 Rapid Reset or similar denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by identifying an unusually high number of streams and total requests within a single HTTP/2 network connection over a one-minute interval. Such behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to exhaust server resources by rapidly opening and closing streams.
This rule detects devices making a high volume of outbound network connections (more than 1000 connections within a one-minute window) to a single remote IP address. This behavior could indicate a network denial-of-service (DoS) attack originating from the device, or potentially other forms of high-volume network activity such as data exfiltration or scanning.
This rule detects unusual network connection patterns characterized by a high volume of connections to a remote IP address within a 5-minute window, combined with anomalous connection durations. Specifically, it flags scenarios where there are more than 1000 connections and either the 95th percentile of connection durations is very short (less than 50ms) or the 5th percentile of connection durations is very long (greater than 30000ms). These patterns can indicate activities such as network scanning, denial-of-service attempts, or command and control communication.
Detects DNS resolution requests for known Masjesu botnet command and control (C2) domains. Masjesu relies on multiple failover domains to fetch its secondary payload and receive DDoS commands.
This rule detects a high volume of UDP network connections originating from a single process on a device. A count exceeding 50 UDP connections from the same process to the same remote IP address is considered anomalous and could indicate a UDP flood or other denial-of-service attempt.
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