Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
281 detections
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Correlates an interactive MFA-satisfied user sign-in with a subsequent non-interactive or token-based successful authentication from a different IP address and country within a short time window for the same user and application. This pattern is indicative of adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing attacks where session cookies or tokens are intercepted and replayed.
Detects potential session hijacking or token theft where a user signs in using the Microsoft Teams app ID from an Android context with an unrecognized user agent, followed by Microsoft Graph API access from a different IP address and device ID within one hour.
Detects Chromium-based browsers launched with remote debugging port 9222 or execution of chrome-decryptor tooling by Python processes, indicative of credential theft or Chrome CDP cookie extraction (such as Armorsteal).
Detects a successful device-code sign-in whose session is replayed successfully within 60 minutes from a different IP and ASN. Only successful replays count (interrupt codes removed) and Microsoft first-party ASN egress is excluded.
Detects a successful device-code sign-in whose session is replayed successfully within 60 minutes from a different IP and ASN. Only successful replays count (interrupt codes removed) and Microsoft first-party ASN egress is excluded.
Detects creation of files or folders under the hard-coded staging
directory C:\Users\Public\Temp\ChromeAuto_. Astaroth's spambot
copies the victim's browser "User Data" profile directory to this path so it can
spawn a fresh browser instance carrying the victim's active WhatsApp Web session
cookies and stored browser credentials, bypassing authentication entirely.
directory C:\Users\Public\Temp\ChromeAuto_. Astaroth's spambot
copies the victim's browser "User Data" profile directory to this path so it can
spawn a fresh browser instance carrying the victim's active WhatsApp Web session
cookies and stored browser credentials, bypassing authentication entirely.
Detects a successful device-code sign-in whose session is replayed successfully within 60 minutes from a different IP and ASN. Only successful replays count (interrupt codes removed) and Microsoft first-party ASN egress is excluded.
Detects network activity associated with the TA419 threat group's 'Frameless' Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing campaign. The rules identify unauthorized OAuth2 authorization requests to non-Microsoft hosts that match known malicious client IDs, the delivery of BitB overlay scripts, and the subsequent execution of malicious scripts correlated with OneDrive-themed lookalike redirects, indicating a credential theft attempt.
Detects a successful device-code sign-in whose session is replayed successfully within 60 minutes from a different IP and ASN. Only successful replays count (interrupt codes removed) and Microsoft first-party ASN egress is excluded.
Detects a successful device-code sign-in whose session is replayed successfully within 60 minutes from a different IP and ASN. Only successful replays count (interrupt codes removed) and Microsoft first-party ASN egress is excluded.
Detects network activity associated with the TA419 threat group's 'Frameless' Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing campaign. The rules identify unauthorized OAuth2 authorization requests to non-Microsoft hosts that match known malicious client IDs, the delivery of BitB overlay scripts, and the subsequent execution of malicious scripts correlated with OneDrive-themed lookalike redirects, indicating a credential theft attempt.
Detects network activity associated with the TA419 threat group's 'Frameless' Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing campaign. The rules identify unauthorized OAuth2 authorization requests to non-Microsoft hosts that match known malicious client IDs, the delivery of BitB overlay scripts, and the subsequent execution of malicious scripts correlated with OneDrive-themed lookalike redirects, indicating a credential theft attempt.
Detects network activity associated with the TA419 threat group's 'Frameless' Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing campaign. The rules identify unauthorized OAuth2 authorization requests to non-Microsoft hosts that match known malicious client IDs, the delivery of BitB overlay scripts, and the subsequent execution of malicious scripts correlated with OneDrive-themed lookalike redirects, indicating a credential theft attempt.
This rule detects potential browser-based credential and session theft by monitoring for a process that accesses multiple sensitive web browser artifacts (cookies, local state, session storage) across several user profiles in a short timeframe. It correlates this activity with the subsequent creation of a compressed archive in a temporary directory followed by an outbound network connection, indicating a multi-stage exfiltration workflow.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read sensitive session files or databases associated with messaging applications like Telegram, Signal, and Discord. Accessing these files (such as 'tdata', 'db.sqlite', or 'leveldb') allows for full account takeover by extracting session tokens, enabling attackers to bypass authentication and 2FA.
Detects an anomalous OfficeHome sign-in from an unmanaged device that completes secondary auth (error 50074) followed by a keep-me-signed-in event (error 50140), with the same session/user then rapidly accessing multiple sensitive applications (My Apps, My Profile, Account Controls, My SignIns, SharePoint/OneDrive/Outlook) - consistent with AiTM-assisted MFA bypass and persistent session establishment
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain where a device shows signs of credential theft (accessing browser credential stores or cookies) followed closely by a successful cloud authentication from that same user using a device identifier not previously observed in the last 30 days.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session token theft by monitoring for an initial interactive sign-in followed shortly by a non-interactive token refresh from a different IP address and browser fingerprint without a multi-factor authentication (MFA) challenge. This behavior is indicative of an adversary replaying captured session cookies via reverse-proxy infrastructure.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing activity by identifying session token or cookie reuse. It monitors for instances where a valid authentication session is established from one IP address and then immediately used again by the same user with the same session ID from a different IP address and potentially a different User-Agent, indicating that an attacker has hijacked and replayed the MFA-satisfied session.
This rule monitors Azure AD sign-in logs for patterns indicative of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks. It triggers when a successful authentication includes MFA and exhibits specific flags associated with proxy-based session hijacking, such as unfamiliar risk details or clear evidence of proxy-based token issuance.
Detects unauthorized access by a non-browser process to Chromium-based 'Cookies' SQLite database files, which are used by browsers like Chrome, Edge, and Brave. This behavior is a strong indicator of credential theft or session hijacking, as attackers target these files to extract session cookies and bypass MFA for cloud services.
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