Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
74 detections
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Detects the Tensorlake npm compromise (tensorlake@0.5.144, Shai-Hulud) through the two payload hashes, gh-token-monitor persistence, node or bun running lib/setup.mjs or Math_Symbol.js and node or bun connections to iseekaigogo.com or public Ethereum RPC hosts. It needs Defender for Endpoint events from developer machines and does not see lockfile or package cache contents. The query ran without errors in a live tenant
Detects evidence of exploitation and post-exploitation activity related to CVE-2026-59310, an unauthenticated RCE vulnerability in the VMware vCenter Syslog Server. The rule monitors for suspicious child processes spawned by vmsyslogcollector, directory traversal patterns in command lines, and persistence mechanisms involving SSH authorized_keys modification, cron job creation, or systemd unit deployment on the VCSA shell.
Detects anomalous process activity associated with the RatHat Android malware, specifically the execution of 'liblocal-service.so' as a daemon and its use for silent APK reinstallation or monitoring of package paths (via 'pm' commands).
Detects evidence of ONYXC2 malware activity by correlating process-related events (mutex creation, remote thread injection, named pipes) with suspicious registry key or value modifications containing the 'ONYXC2' indicator within a 5-minute window.
Detects the execution of 'SimpleService.exe' when the binary is located within a restricted subdirectory associated with JWrapper-Remote Access. This pattern may indicate the execution of unauthorized or restricted remote access tools.
Rileva l'esecuzione del binario /usr/bin/acpid (path anomalo rispetto al legittimo /usr/sbin/acpid) con command line contenente artefatti di un toolkit di persistenza Linux.
Detects the creation or modification of files within the /etc/init.d/ directory, followed by process activity related to that same directory. This pattern is commonly associated with attackers establishing persistence on Linux systems via SysVinit scripts.
Detects the 'LegacyHive.exe' process initiating child processes running under the SYSTEM account context. This behavior is indicative of potential privilege escalation or malicious persistence mechanisms where a process spawns a child with elevated permissions.
Detects creation of new scheduled tasks (cron), systemd services, or startup entries that reference the reverse_ssh tool, consistent with attacker persistence established after vCenter compromise.
Detects post-exploitation persistence and anti-forensic activity associated with the RufRoot/CVE-2026-59726 vulnerability. The rule identifies the creation of unauthorized .js files within application directories, the modification of 'index.js' followed by a SIGKILL to process ID 1 to force a container restart, and attempts to clear bash command history to hide malicious footprints.
Detects a Node.js process termination followed by a quick respawn of a new Node.js process by the same parent process. This pattern suggests a watchdog persistence mechanism where the parent process monitors the child, automatically restarting it if it is terminated, consistent with behaviors observed in malware such as Void Dokkaebi.
Detects file creation, modification, or renaming events within sensitive macOS Application Support directories that mimic core system components such as Finder or Software Update. This behavior is indicative of potential masquerading or persistence techniques where an attacker replaces legitimate application resources with malicious ones.
Detects the creation of or connection to the specific named pipe '\\pipe\\RoguePlanet', which is used as a synchronization and callback channel by the Nightmare Eclipse RoguePlanet exploit (CVE-2026-50656). This exploit leverages the named pipe to facilitate communication between a low-privileged exploit process and a SYSTEM-level Windows Error Reporting (WER) task payload during a local privilege escalation attempt.
Detects instances where the Console Host process (conhost.exe) is executed at a System integrity level with a parent process of the Windows Error Reporter (wermgr.exe). This pattern is atypical as conhost.exe typically runs within the context of the user session or the initiating process, and spawning it from wermgr.exe at System level may indicate an attempt to hide a console window or manipulate system processes via an elevated parent.
Detects unauthorized child process creation by the Windows Error Reporting Manager (wermgr.exe). The rule identifies scenarios where wermgr.exe, executed under the SYSTEM context via the QueueReporting scheduled task (often abused in the RoguePlanet exploit chain), spawns interactive shells or command processors like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or cscript.exe. Legitimate instances of wermgr.exe do not spawn interactive user interfaces or shells.
Detects execution of processes named 'Finder' or 'Software Update' that originate from within the '/Library/Application Support/' directory on macOS. This pattern is indicative of potential masquerading where malicious binaries or persistent payloads are placed in shared application support folders to mimic legitimate system components.
Detects execution of GS-Netcat covert C2 tunnels or masqueraded 'uptime' binaries running from non-standard system paths, consistent with persistent implants used by the Velvet Ant threat actor in Operation Highland.
Detects instances where ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe spawns sc.exe, which is indicative of Windows service creation or modification occurring via WinGet Desired State Configuration (DSC) abuse to establish persistence.
Detects suspicious app installations, custom app creation, and bot additions within Microsoft Teams. This rule identifies activities such as sideloaded app installations, which can bypass standard vetting processes and serve as a persistence mechanism for attackers. It also flags custom app creation outside of typical development teams, which could indicate the deployment of command and control (C2) bots or data exfiltration applications. Additionally, the rule looks for the addition of bots to teams and suspicious keywords in app names that might suggest impersonation or malicious tooling.
Detects the creation or modification of suspicious Launch Agent or Launch Daemon .plist files, or a hidden application support directory, masquerading as 'com.apple.accountsd' on macOS. This behavior is often indicative of persistence mechanisms used by adversaries.
This rule detects the creation or modification of specific Launch Agent or Launch Daemon plist files on macOS, particularly those masquerading as 'com.apple.accountsd'. It also identifies the creation of a hidden directory '.com.apple.accountsd' within '/Library/Application Support'. This activity is highly suspicious as it indicates an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious code by mimicking legitimate system services.
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