Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
112 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
68
19
8
8
4
Contributors
20
17
16
11
8
Categories
62
59
41
28
18
Platforms
105
6
4
2
1
Products / Services
55
6
4
4
3
MITRE Techniques
18,108
15,613
12,573
8,384
6,203
CVEs
2
1
IDS Classtypes
1
IDS Protocols
1
Detects the creation of persistence artifacts associated with the 'gh-token-monitor' service utilized by the Shai-Hulud worm across Linux systemd user services, macOS LaunchAgents, and Windows scheduled tasks or local application directories. This service acts as a dead-man's switch designed to wipe the user's home directory if the stolen GitHub token is revoked.
This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
Detects the modification or creation of a 'loginwindow.plist' file within the '/Library/LaunchAgents/' directory, correlated with a process containing 'renderer' and 'launchctl' or 'LaunchAgents' in its command line. This pattern suggests potential persistence mechanisms being established by a renderer process (e.g., an Electron-based application or browser process).
This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
Detects the creation of a suspicious 'com.apple.finder.agent' plist file within a user LaunchAgents directory followed shortly by the termination of known macOS notification and background management agents. This pattern is often associated with malware attempting to evade detection or manipulate user notifications by disabling system components.
Detects suspicious command execution patterns on macOS frequently associated with the 'ClickFix' technique utilized by AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer). This includes piping base64-encoded curl downloads directly to a shell, utilizing osascript to execute shell commands, and modifications to LaunchAgents for potential persistence.
Detects indicators of the Bazinga macOS backdoor and Polygon-C2 campaign, including specific command-and-control domains, C2 infrastructure IP addresses, persistence mechanisms via launch agent property lists, and associated cryptographic indicators like file hashes and wallet addresses.
Detects indicators of the Bazinga macOS backdoor and Polygon-C2 campaign, including specific command-and-control domains, C2 infrastructure IP addresses, persistence mechanisms via launch agent property lists, and associated cryptographic indicators like file hashes and wallet addresses.
Detects indicators of the Bazinga macOS backdoor and Polygon-C2 campaign, including specific command-and-control domains, C2 infrastructure IP addresses, persistence mechanisms via launch agent property lists, and associated cryptographic indicators like file hashes and wallet addresses.
Detects anomalous ADB commands used by the RatHat Android malware to achieve persistence. This includes adding apps to the battery optimization whitelist, changing application standby buckets to 'active' to bypass background restrictions, disabling specific user-mode applications, or modifying accessibility service configurations.
Detects the execution of binaries or scripts named with keywords related to AI agent plugins (e.g., 'skill', 'plugin', 'mcp-server') from potentially untrusted locations like Downloads or Temp folders. The rule further correlates this execution with post-exploitation indicators such as persistence establishment (registry keys, scheduled tasks, launch agents) or outbound network activity.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
Detects indicators of the Bazinga macOS backdoor and Polygon-C2 campaign, including specific command-and-control domains, C2 infrastructure IP addresses, persistence mechanisms via launch agent property lists, and associated cryptographic indicators like file hashes and wallet addresses.
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of plist files within macOS LaunchAgent directories that match a specific naming pattern (com.[16 letters].plist). This pattern is often used by malware or unauthorized scripts to establish persistence. The rule excludes common, legitimate system processes like Installer and softwareupdated.
Page 1 of 6