Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
842 detections
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The following analytic detects the installation of the XMRIG coinminer driver on a system. It identifies the loading of the `WinRing0x64.sys` driver, commonly associated with XMRIG, by analyzing Sysmon EventCode 6 logs for specific signatures and image loads. This activity is significant because XMRIG is an open-source CPU miner frequently exploited by adversaries to mine cryptocurrency illicitly. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized resource consumption, degraded system performance, and potential financial loss due to unauthorized cryptocurrency mining.
Detects potential persistence establishment where an AOMEI-related process writes a DLL file to disk, followed by the creation or modification of a Windows service pointing to that same DLL within a 15-minute window.
This rule detects suspicious driver loading from user-writable paths, kernel driver service creation, disabling of driver signing, loading of Linux kernel modules, and the usage of LD_PRELOAD for rootkit functionality.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service (EventCode 7045) where the service binary path (ImagePath) points to the ProgramData directory, with exclusions for known legitimate paths such as Windows Defender, Package Cache, and Chocolatey.
Detects the VS Code CLI (code-insiders / code) being used to install a remote tunnel as a service, run from outside normal application install locations (e.g. the Windows debug folder). Keyed on the tunnel service install behavior and unusual location rather than a specific file path, so renamed or relocated copies still match. Abuse enables covert remote access via Microsoft tunnel infrastructure. Rotation test: still fires if the actor changes the directory, flags order or infrastructure, as long as the binary is run with tunnel + service install outside standard paths.
The following analytic detects when a known remote access software is added to common persistence locations on a device within the environment. Adversaries use these utilities to retain remote access capabilities to the environment. Utilities in the lookup include AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, TeamViewer and much more. Review the lookup for the entire list and add any others.
Detects hosts exhibiting multiple persistence mechanisms (Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, and Windows Services) within a short timeframe, indicating potential adversary persistence setup.
Detects Sysmon registry events (EventCode 12, 13, 14) writing Run/RunOnce keys or Service ImagePath values that reference esetservice.exe from a user-writable path (AppData, ProgramData, Temp, Public, Downloads), excluding the legitimate Program Files\ESET install location.
Detects the use of tscon.exe to specify a destination session without a password (potential RDP session hijacking) or the creation of a Windows service related to tscon execution.
The following analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprvse.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions.
This activity is significant as it could indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions.
This activity is significant as it could indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
The following analytic identifies the creation of a new service on a remote endpoint using sc.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically monitoring for EventCode 7045, which indicates a new service creation. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or execute arbitrary code on the remote system, potentially leading to further compromise of the network.
The following analytic detects potential RDP Hijacking attempts by identifying the creation of a Windows service using sc.exe with a binary path that includes tscon.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates an attacker may be trying to hijack a disconnected RDP session, posing a risk of unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain control over an existing user session, leading to potential data theft or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects the creation of a new service named WerFaultSvc with a binary path in the Windows WinSxS directory. It leverages Windows System logs, specifically EventCode 7045, to identify this activity. This behavior is significant because it indicates the presence of Snake malware, which uses this service to maintain persistence by blending in with legitimate Windows services. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute Snake malware components, leading to potential data exfiltration, system compromise, and long-term persistence within the environment.
The following analytic detects the loading of known vulnerable Windows drivers, which may indicate potential persistence or privilege escalation attempts. It leverages Windows System service install EventCode 7045 to identify driver loading events and cross-references them with a list of vulnerable drivers. This activity is significant as attackers often exploit vulnerable drivers to gain elevated privileges or maintain persistence on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with high privileges, leading to further system compromise and potential data exfiltration. This detection is a Windows Event Log adaptation of the Sysmon driver loaded detection written by Michael Haag.
The following analytic detects the creation of a Windows Service with a known suspicious or malicious name using Windows Event ID 7045. It leverages logs from the `wineventlog_system` to identify these services installations. This activity is significant as adversaries, including those deploying Clop ransomware, often create malicious services for lateral movement, remote code execution, persistence, and execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code, and potentially escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows service registry keys where the ImagePath points to a binary with a non-standard file extension (e.g., .s, .c, .l). This behavior is associated with the NeedyMantis malware family, which utilizes non-standard naming for persistence mechanisms to evade basic detection.
Detects the loading of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys) on Windows systems. Attackers leverage this driver as part of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to perform privilege escalation by exploiting kernel-mode vulnerabilities.
Detects a sequence of events indicative of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) exploitation. The rule correlates the creation of a new service with kernel-mode drivers, the loading of a signed driver, and the subsequent termination or disabling of common EDR security processes within a short timeframe, suggesting the exploitation of the driver to bypass EDR defenses.
This rule detects potential unauthorized or suspicious installation of an RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) agent on a Windows host. It flags cases where a process performs multiple suspicious actions within a 24-hour window, specifically combining the installation or starting of a service related to an RMM agent, the creation of a Windows Firewall rule for the RMM agent executable, and/or the creation of log events related to the installer.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events characteristic of NeedyMantis's hands-on-keyboard activity. The rule identifies file staging (creation or modification of suspicious DLLs from network shares) followed by remote command execution (via Impacket-like service interaction) and subsequent execution of binaries vulnerable to DLL sideloading.
This rule detects potential unauthorized or suspicious installation of an RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) agent on a Windows host. It flags cases where a process performs multiple suspicious actions within a 24-hour window, specifically combining the installation or starting of a service related to an RMM agent, the creation of a Windows Firewall rule for the RMM agent executable, and/or the creation of log events related to the installer.
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