Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
842 detections
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Detects attempts to install or modify the 'WMI Provider Host' (WmiPrvSE) service, which is a common technique used by adversaries for persistence or to masquerade malicious activity. The rule monitors process execution, registry modifications, and service installation events specifically targeting this service name.
Detects SoftEther VPN bridge dropper/installer disguised as svchost.exe with masquerading MixedRealityOpen service, based on install script and dropped files (a.Bat, hamcore.se2, vpn_server.config)
Detects the creation of a Windows service named 'WpnUserHost' or the modification of its registry configuration where the binary path does not reside within the System32 directory. This behavior is indicative of a potential attempt to masquerade a malicious service or achieve persistence using a legitimate-sounding service name.
Detects the creation of a Windows service named 'WpnUserHost' or the modification of its registry configuration where the binary path does not reside within the System32 directory. This behavior is indicative of a potential attempt to masquerade a malicious service or achieve persistence using a legitimate-sounding service name.
Detects the execution of known potentially malicious tools cplsupport.exe and wtass.exe with install parameters, or the creation of a Windows service associated with these filenames using sc.exe. This activity is indicative of service-based persistence or malicious software installation.
Detects the loading or usage of the malicious driver 'DCRCVDrv.sys' associated with the ClearFake crypto stealer campaign, which uses a Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver (BYOVD) technique to interact with the device path '\Device\DCRCVDRV_U' to terminate or impair EDR and security tools.
Detects the execution of known potentially malicious tools cplsupport.exe and wtass.exe with install parameters, or the creation of a Windows service associated with these filenames using sc.exe. This activity is indicative of service-based persistence or malicious software installation.
Detects suspicious service creation or registry modifications involving WpnUserHost that do not reference System32.
Detects suspicious service creation or registry modifications involving WpnUserHost that do not reference System32.
Detects suspicious service creation or registry modifications related to wscl.exe that mimic persistence mechanisms.
Detects suspicious service creation or registry modifications related to wscl.exe that mimic persistence mechanisms.
Detects suspicious persistence mechanisms initiated by the 'wscl.exe' executable. The rule monitors for registry run key modifications, service installation via command-line arguments, and service creation events, specifically filtering for non-standard execution paths (outside of System32, SysWOW64, or Program Files).
This rule detects potential persistence attempts by monitoring for the execution and service installation commands of specific binaries: cplsupport.exe and wtass.exe. The rule triggers if these files are executed directly, invoked with specific command-line arguments (e.g., '--install'), or used in conjunction with the 'sc.exe' utility to create new services, which is a common technique for establishing persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects the execution of known potentially malicious tools cplsupport.exe and wtass.exe with install parameters, or the creation of a Windows service associated with these filenames using sc.exe. This activity is indicative of service-based persistence or malicious software installation.
This rule detects potential persistence attempts by monitoring for the execution and service installation commands of specific binaries: cplsupport.exe and wtass.exe. The rule triggers if these files are executed directly, invoked with specific command-line arguments (e.g., '--install'), or used in conjunction with the 'sc.exe' utility to create new services, which is a common technique for establishing persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects attempts to tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender configuration, specifically by modifying exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference), direct registry modifications, or forced Group Policy updates. It also monitors for the disabling of Tamper Protection via registry and the creation of scheduled tasks designed to apply Defender exclusions.
Detects attempts to tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender configuration, specifically by modifying exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference), direct registry modifications, or forced Group Policy updates. It also monitors for the disabling of Tamper Protection via registry and the creation of scheduled tasks designed to apply Defender exclusions.
Detects attempts to install or modify the 'WMI Provider Host' (WmiPrvSE) service, which is a common technique used by adversaries for persistence or to masquerade malicious activity. The rule monitors process execution, registry modifications, and service installation events specifically targeting this service name.
This rule detects the installation of Windows services that utilize names or display names commonly associated with known malware, potentially mimicking legitimate system services to maintain persistence or evade detection.
Detects the creation of a Windows service named 'WpnUserHost' or the modification of its registry configuration where the binary path does not reside within the System32 directory. This behavior is indicative of a potential attempt to masquerade a malicious service or achieve persistence using a legitimate-sounding service name.
Detects the creation of a Windows service named 'WpnUserHost' or the modification of its registry configuration where the binary path does not reside within the System32 directory. This behavior is indicative of a potential attempt to masquerade a malicious service or achieve persistence using a legitimate-sounding service name.
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