Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
842 detections
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Detects instances where 'TieringEngineService.exe' or 'MsMpEng.exe' (Windows Defender) create, modify, or rename executable, library, or system files within the 'C:\Windows\System32\' directory. This behavior is highly irregular as these processes should not be authoring binaries in protected system folders, and may indicate process masquerading, unauthorized persistence, or defense evasion.
Detects when the Postgres service process or account attempts to modify system-level persistence mechanisms, such as scheduled tasks (cron/schtasks) or system services (systemd/startup folders), which are typical behaviors for an adversary using database service context to maintain persistence.
Detects when the Postgres service process or account attempts to modify system-level persistence mechanisms, such as scheduled tasks (cron/schtasks) or system services (systemd/startup folders), which are typical behaviors for an adversary using database service context to maintain persistence.
Detects when the Postgres service process or account attempts to modify system-level persistence mechanisms, such as scheduled tasks (cron/schtasks) or system services (systemd/startup folders), which are typical behaviors for an adversary using database service context to maintain persistence.
Detects instances where 'TieringEngineService.exe' or 'MsMpEng.exe' (Windows Defender) create, modify, or rename executable, library, or system files within the 'C:\Windows\System32\' directory. This behavior is highly irregular as these processes should not be authoring binaries in protected system folders, and may indicate process masquerading, unauthorized persistence, or defense evasion.
Detects attempts to tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender configuration, specifically by modifying exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference), direct registry modifications, or forced Group Policy updates. It also monitors for the disabling of Tamper Protection via registry and the creation of scheduled tasks designed to apply Defender exclusions.
Detects the modification of the Print Spooler (Spooler) Windows service configuration via command-line registry utilities (reg.exe or regedit.exe). This activity may indicate an attempt to restore or re-enable the Print Spooler service, which is frequently targeted for disabling as a mitigation strategy against vulnerabilities like PrintNightmare.
Detects installation of a Windows service (Security EventID 4697)
named after known VirtualBox Guest Additions components (VBoxGuest, VBoxMouse, VBoxSF,
VBoxService, VBoxVideo, VBoxWDDM). Fires when either:
(a) the service binary is registered outside the legitimate VirtualBox install/driver
paths, or
(b) a driver-class component name (VBoxGuest/VBoxMouse/VBoxSF/VBoxVideo/VBoxWDDM) is
registered as a user-mode/own-process service instead of a kernel or file-system
driver — a structural mismatch that cannot occur with the genuine component and is
a strong indicator of name-based masquerading (T1036.005).
Adversaries reuse trusted VirtualBox names to blend malicious persistence into expected
guest-VM/EDR-noise telemetry.
named after known VirtualBox Guest Additions components (VBoxGuest, VBoxMouse, VBoxSF,
VBoxService, VBoxVideo, VBoxWDDM). Fires when either:
(a) the service binary is registered outside the legitimate VirtualBox install/driver
paths, or
(b) a driver-class component name (VBoxGuest/VBoxMouse/VBoxSF/VBoxVideo/VBoxWDDM) is
registered as a user-mode/own-process service instead of a kernel or file-system
driver — a structural mismatch that cannot occur with the genuine component and is
a strong indicator of name-based masquerading (T1036.005).
Adversaries reuse trusted VirtualBox names to blend malicious persistence into expected
guest-VM/EDR-noise telemetry.
This rule detects the termination of specific security-related processes (e.g., antivirus services) shortly after a specific driver, 'ardrv.sys', is loaded on a Windows system. This sequence is characteristic of a 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attack, where an adversary loads a signed but vulnerable kernel driver to gain elevated privileges, which they then use to disable or terminate security monitoring processes.
This rule detects the loading of specific, known-vulnerable kernel drivers (based on their SHA256 hashes) when triggered by administrative command-line utilities such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This behavior is highly characteristic of 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, where adversaries exploit vulnerabilities in legitimate, signed drivers to gain elevated (often SYSTEM or kernel) privileges.
This rule detects the use of the Windows Service Control Manager (sc.exe) to create or configure a service named 'TaskHandler'. The rule specifically looks for command lines that reference potentially malicious files like 'F7u00ex.exe' or specific driver/restart patterns often associated with the persistence mechanism of the Spark RAT.
Detects persistence and configuration activity associated with the CornFlake RAT, including the creation of malicious Windows services (e.g., 'svchost32', 'Cloud Sync Service'), registry run key modifications, and the presence of specific file artifacts like 'sync.dat' and malicious executables within AppData directories.
Detects installation of a Windows service (System EventID 7045)
named after known VirtualBox Guest Additions components (VBoxGuest, VBoxMouse, VBoxSF,
VBoxService, VBoxVideo, VBoxWDDM). Fires when either:
(a) the service binary is registered outside the legitimate VirtualBox install/driver
paths, or
(b) a driver-class component name (VBoxGuest/VBoxMouse/VBoxSF/VBoxVideo/VBoxWDDM) is
registered as a user-mode/own-process service instead of a kernel or file-system
driver — a structural mismatch that cannot occur with the genuine component and is
a strong indicator of name-based masquerading (T1036.005).
Adversaries reuse trusted VirtualBox names to blend malicious persistence into expected
guest-VM/EDR-noise telemetry.
named after known VirtualBox Guest Additions components (VBoxGuest, VBoxMouse, VBoxSF,
VBoxService, VBoxVideo, VBoxWDDM). Fires when either:
(a) the service binary is registered outside the legitimate VirtualBox install/driver
paths, or
(b) a driver-class component name (VBoxGuest/VBoxMouse/VBoxSF/VBoxVideo/VBoxWDDM) is
registered as a user-mode/own-process service instead of a kernel or file-system
driver — a structural mismatch that cannot occur with the genuine component and is
a strong indicator of name-based masquerading (T1036.005).
Adversaries reuse trusted VirtualBox names to blend malicious persistence into expected
guest-VM/EDR-noise telemetry.
This rule detects the termination of specific security-related processes (e.g., antivirus services) shortly after a specific driver, 'ardrv.sys', is loaded on a Windows system. This sequence is characteristic of a 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attack, where an adversary loads a signed but vulnerable kernel driver to gain elevated privileges, which they then use to disable or terminate security monitoring processes.
ServiceDll Hijack
Sigma
Detects changes to the "ServiceDLL" value related to a service in the registry.
This is often used as a method of persistence.
This is often used as a method of persistence.
This rule detects the loading of known vulnerable drivers on Windows systems by cross-referencing driver load events with a curated list of vulnerable drivers maintained by LOLDrivers.io. This technique, commonly referred to as 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD), is frequently used by adversaries to escalate privileges or perform kernel-mode exploitation.
Flags direct registry staging of a Boot Bus Extender service (SERVICE_SYSTEM_START) whose Args value contains ':changelist', bypassing the Service Control Manager, where the driver image lies outside the Defender platform folder or uses a randomized 8-character filename — the SCM-bypass pattern used to stage BTR.sys for boot-time or immediate execution.
Correlates the hardcoded BootClean.log creation-then-deletion lifecycle (performed by the System process) with a preceding anomalous or hash-matched BTR.sys driver load within a tight time window, reducing the otherwise high false-positive rate of alerting on the log artifact alone.
Detects msagent.sys kernel driver load events immediately followed by targeted module/filter enumeration (driverquery/fltmc) referencing the same driver.
Detects known BTR.sys driver binaries via SHA-256 hash match, or the co-occurrence of the hardcoded RC4 key fragment, the FEE1DEAD magic value, and the embedded BOOTTIMETOOL resource marker in .rdata.
Detects hash-matched BTR.sys driver loads that are validly signed by Microsoft but not initiated by a legitimate Windows Defender platform process (MsMpEng.exe/MpCmdRun.exe or the Defender Platform folder) — indicating the driver is being loaded by an unauthorized process to abuse its kernel-level file/registry operation primitive.
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