Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
842 detections
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Detects creation of a Windows service named "media_updaten" (the CoolClient backdoor persistence service, installed via CreateServiceA and started with 'sc start media_updaten') or "msagent" (the signed kernel-mode driver service that grants CoolClient its rootkit capabilities: process/file/registry hiding, object callback protection, and C2 IP filtering via Nsiproxy). Both exact service names are unique to this HoneyMyte campaign and are not associated with any legitimate Windows or third-party product.
Detects SYSTEM processes initiated by non-service user accounts from user-writable locations such as AppData, Temp, Public, ProgramData, and Downloads. This behavior may indicate local privilege escalation and is relevant to post-exploitation activity associated with CVE-2026-68820.
Detects the loading of known vulnerable drivers (BYOVD - Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) by cross-referencing Sysmon Event ID 6 (Driver Loaded) image hashes with the LOLDrivers.io project database. This technique is often used by adversaries to elevate privileges to kernel mode by exploiting vulnerabilities within signed, legitimate drivers.
This rule detects the use of the Windows Service Control Manager (sc.exe) to create or configure a service named 'TaskHandler'. The rule specifically looks for command lines that reference potentially malicious files like 'F7u00ex.exe' or specific driver/restart patterns often associated with the persistence mechanism of the Spark RAT.
This rule detects the use of the Windows Service Control Manager (sc.exe) to create or configure a service named 'TaskHandler'. The rule specifically looks for command lines that reference potentially malicious files like 'F7u00ex.exe' or specific driver/restart patterns often associated with the persistence mechanism of the Spark RAT.
Detects the BYOVD kill chain for the DCRCVDrv.sys driver: drop to C:\Windows\Temp\, DCRCVDRV_U/LEGACY_DCRCVDRV_U service installation, device open, and IOCTL 0x2205c0 invocation used to terminate security/EDR processes from kernel context.
Detects the presence of known vulnerable drivers (rwdrv.sys and hlpdrv.sys) associated with 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks. Adversaries utilize these drivers to gain kernel-level access, allowing them to disable security software, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence.
Detects MsMpEng.exe creating a file in C:\\Windows\\System32\\.
This should never happen under normal operation Windows Defender does not install kernel drivers at runtime.
In the BlueHammer exploit, the TOCTOU race causes MsMpEng (SYSTEM) to write the attacker's driver payload directly into the drivers directory.
This should never happen under normal operation Windows Defender does not install kernel drivers at runtime.
In the BlueHammer exploit, the TOCTOU race causes MsMpEng (SYSTEM) to write the attacker's driver payload directly into the drivers directory.
This rule detects the creation of a Windows service named 'Cloud Sync Service' using command-line tools like 'sc.exe' or 'New-Service', or via direct service event monitoring. This behavior is often associated with malware persistence mechanisms that use misleading names to blend in with legitimate software services.
Static file-based detection of the ACRStealer dropper, encrypted AutoIt payload, and DCRCVDrv.sys BYOVD driver via filenames, service/device names, signer names, and certificate serial. Certificate/signer matches only fire in combination with the driver file or service artifacts to avoid flagging the legitimate vendor certificate alone.
Detects the creation and configuration of a Windows service named 'media_updaten' via command-line utilities (sc.exe) or direct registry modification. This service is associated with CoolClient for persistence to relaunch 'Sang.exe' with a 'work' parameter.
Detects DCRCVDrv.sys driver used in ACRStealer BYOVD campaign via attacker-specific hashes, certificate serial, or atypical staging path; vendor metadata and PDB are supportive only
Detects registry modification/deletion attempts blocked with STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED on hosts running msagent.sys, restricted to msagent/RNG-related key paths.
Detects installation of the 'media_updaten' Windows service configured to run Sang.exe with the 'work' argument, used by CoolClient for persistence.
Detects a security-software presence check (360 Total Security/eScan process names) followed within 10 minutes by a persistence-establishing event from the same parent process.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation through the abuse of a debug backdoor in the Wacom WTabletServiceISD service. It identifies when the 'PowerT' registry value is set for the service, followed shortly by the service spawning a command shell (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) under SYSTEM privileges. It specifically excludes scenarios where AutoAdminLogon is enabled, which might otherwise trigger false positives.
This KQL detects attack used TCP port 4307 for unauthenticated access and replaced public\js\locale.php with a web shell that provided persistent remote access.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation through the abuse of a debug backdoor in the Wacom WTabletServiceISD service. It identifies when the 'PowerT' registry value is set for the service, followed shortly by the service spawning a command shell (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) under SYSTEM privileges. It specifically excludes scenarios where AutoAdminLogon is enabled, which might otherwise trigger false positives.
Detects post-exploitation persistence artifacts on Windows endpoints managed by N-able N-central consistent with abuse of CVE-2026-18577, including a new Windows service named Cloudflared, registry Services key creation for Cloudflared, a file named svchost.exe written under a user's Documents folder, or process execution of cloudflared.exe or a Documents-located svchost.exe.
This rule detects two potentially malicious behaviors: 1) The creation or installation of a Windows service using the 'Cloudflared' executable, which can be leveraged for unauthorized tunneling or persistence. 2) The execution of an executable named 'svchost.exe' located within a user's Documents folder, which is a common indicator of file masquerading to evade detection.
KQL Query from file: Cloudflared Persistence & svchost.exe Masquerading Post-N-central CVE-2026-18577
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