Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects various activities related to the installation, configuration, and execution of OpenSSH on Windows systems. It looks for processes adding the OpenSSH server capability, creating the sshd service, generating SSH keys, and the execution of the sshd.exe process. It also includes a specific hash for a known malicious SSH artifact and firewall rule additions containing 'SSH'.
This rule detects various activities associated with the RustDesk remote access tool, including process execution, file staging (RustCustom.zip or rustdesk.exe by hash), firewall rule creation for RustDesk, and service installation related to RustDesk. Detection is based on process names, file names, SHA256 hashes, firewall rule names, and service names.
This rule detects the execution of the Windows Service Control Manager tool (sc.exe) to interact with a service containing the string 'MixedSvc' and a reference to 'Mixed Reality.exe' in the command line. This behavior may indicate an attempt to manipulate or execute suspicious services using names that masquerade as legitimate Windows Mixed Reality components.
This rule detects the use of sc.exe to create or interact with Windows services related to 'Mixed Reality' components, such as 'MixedSvc' or 'Windows Mixed Reality Service'. This activity is often associated with the installation of persistence mechanisms or service-based execution by masquerading as legitimate Windows components.
Detects the creation of a Windows service named 'MixedSvc' that points to the suspicious path 'C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\Mixed Reality.exe'. This behavior is associated with DcRAT's Operation DragonReturn, where the malware attempts to establish persistence on the host by masquerading as a Windows Media Player component.
Detects the creation of a Windows service named 'MixedSvc' or services with lure-themed display names (e.g., related to 'Windows Mixed Reality') executing binaries from suspicious, user-writable directories. This pattern is consistent with the DcRAT persistence mechanism observed in the Operation DragonReturn espionage campaign.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service configured for automatic startup under the LocalSystem account that references the GitLab Runner executable. This pattern is commonly used for persistence via CI/CD runner abuse, including threats like the Shai-Hulud worm.
Detects various methods employed by LCRYX ransomware to disable security software and firewall configurations. The rule identifies suspicious process executions, including PowerShell commands to modify Windows Defender settings, netsh commands to disable firewalls, sc.exe commands to stop security services, and the termination of various antivirus processes (e.g., MsMpEng.exe, avp.exe, bdagent.exe) via taskkill. It specifically monitors these actions when spawned from script hosts like wscript, cscript, or shells like powershell and cmd.
Detects attempts to stop, disable, delete, or configure the Sysmon service using standard administrative utilities (sc.exe, taskkill.exe, or PowerShell). Attackers often perform these actions to blind defensive visibility before executing further malicious activity.
Detects the execution of 'code.exe' with 'tunnel service install' command-line arguments, initiated by 'WINWORD.EXE'. This activity indicates an attempt to install a persistent tunnel service, potentially as part of a phishing attack chain.
Detects potential Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks by monitoring for known vulnerable driver files being created or loaded as kernel modules, as well as the registration of kernel-mode drivers from non-standard or user-writable locations like Temp, Tmp, AppData, or Public directories.
Detects the establishment of persistence via Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, or Windows Services, where the executed file or binary path is located in suspicious directories such as AppData, Temp, or ProgramData. This indicates potentially malicious code staged in temporary or user-writable locations to maintain access.
This rule detects the loading or execution of known vulnerable kernel drivers. These drivers are often leveraged by adversaries in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to achieve privilege escalation by exploiting vulnerabilities in the driver to execute code in kernel mode.
Detects the creation of a Windows service using administrative tools (sc.exe or net.exe) followed closely by an instruction to start that service within a 5-minute window. This behavior is often associated with the execution of malicious payloads or lateral movement.
Detects the attacker utilizing SimpleHelp's elevated privileges to create or modify Windows services to ensure persistent remote access independent of the RMM.
Detects the creation of a named object with the specific name 'MakeAmericaGreatAgain'. This string has been associated with various malware and potentially unwanted programs, often used as a mutex or other synchronization object to ensure only one instance of the malicious process is running.
This rule detects various stages of exploitation activity associated with the System Informer PHSVC (Process Hacker Service) proof-of-concept (PoC). It monitors for the loading of the PoC DLL via rundll32, the spawning of processes using the specific PoC marker string, unexpected elevated child processes spawned by SystemInformer.exe, and the creation of services or PoC artifacts that facilitate privilege escalation or persistence.
This rule detects suspicious activities associated with the exploitation of AnyDesk, specifically targeting COM printer impersonation for privilege escalation and subsequent persistence. It monitors for: 1) AnyDesk or AnyDesk-runtime spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd, powershell, sc), 2) unauthorized processes accessing the 'adprinterpipe' named pipe used for privilege escalation, and 3) the creation of new Windows services originating from the AnyDesk process chain.
Detects exploitation of the SystemInformer phsvc service via ALPC port abuse and trusted-host bypass. The attack involves loading a malicious DLL into the Microsoft-signed rundll32.exe process to bypass trust checks, subsequently connecting to the '\BaseNamedObjects\SiSvcApiPort' to invoke privileged APIs for LPE.
Detects potential local privilege escalation attempts targeting the SystemInformer PhSvc service. The rule identifies suspicious child processes spawned from rundll32.exe (acting as a proxy) or other common binaries, where the process chain indicates an interaction with the SiSvcApiPort or the use of phsvc-related command-line arguments, potentially leading to unauthorized elevated process creation or service installation.
Detects local privilege escalation attempts targeting the SystemInformer (formerly Process Hacker) PHSVC service. Adversaries can abuse the SiSvcApiPort ALPC port by using rundll32.exe to load specific malicious payloads that call privileged service APIs, such as PhSvcCreateProcessIgnoreIfeoDebugger or PhSvcCreateService, effectively bypassing standard user restrictions.
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