Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
842 detections
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Detects exploitation of the SystemInformer PhSvc service by monitoring for rundll32.exe launching with command-line arguments indicative of loading a proof-of-concept DLL and attempting to communicate with the SiSvcApiPort ALPC port. This activity is associated with abusing privileged helper APIs to perform unauthorized SYSTEM-level process creation or service installation.
Detects the creation or starting of a Windows service on a remote host using the Service Control Manager (sc.exe) utility. This is a common method for lateral movement and remote execution of malicious payloads.
Detects the creation of a mutex with a specific pattern used by the MonsterV2 malware, a sophisticated RAT, loader, and stealer.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows services using sc.exe where the binary path (binpath) points to suspicious or user-writable directories such as User profiles, AppData, Temp, or Public folders, which are often used by adversaries for persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects the use of the sc.exe utility to create a new service on a remote system by specifying a path using a UNC share. This behavior is indicative of lateral movement, where an attacker attempts to execute code on a remote host by installing a service via SMB/Admin Shares.
This rule detects attempts to load kernel drivers using command-line utilities such as infinstall.exe, devcon.exe, pnputil.exe, or sc.exe. The detection specifically looks for these commands being initiated by powershell.exe, cmd.exe, or ServertoolLauncher.exe, which could indicate malicious activity like ransomware attempting to establish persistence or evade defenses.
This rule detects the use of the Windows Service Control Manager (sc.exe) to create or start a service on a remote host, identified by the presence of UNC paths (\\) and service management commands (create, start) in the command line.
Detects various indicators associated with the SilverFox loader deploying the Sauron RAT, including registry markers, service creation, self-copying of svchost.exe, specific marker file artifacts, and known C2 communication.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity originating from the DHCP Client service process (svchost.exe running with 'Dhcp' in the command line). It detects unauthorized child processes (such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe), unexpected child processes that deviate from established baselines, service crashes potentially indicative of exploitation, and anomalous network connections to non-standard DHCP ports or external IP addresses.
This rule detects potentially malicious lateral movement or persistence activities by monitoring the creation or modification of executable files in remote network shares and startup folders, as well as the use of administrative tools like sc.exe or schtasks.exe to create services or tasks. The rule specifically filters out processes signed by Microsoft, focusing on non-standard or unsigned binaries that perform these administrative actions across multiple instances, indicating potential automated lateral propagation.
Detects the loading of the K7RKScan.sys driver, which has been associated with CVE-2025-1055 and used in 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) campaigns, specifically mentioning Backdoor.Turn. This activity can be indicative of privilege escalation or defense evasion.
Detects the installation of a Windows service associated with the TrymeLocker ransomware strain. The rule monitors System and Security event logs for specific service names ('rageservice') or file paths ('win_guard_', 'ragecore_') indicative of this malware's persistence mechanism.
Detects the creation of new Windows services that masquerade as or use names associated with the Windows Update Service (wusvc), specifically looking for service binaries located in suspicious paths or containing 'wusvc.exe' in the name. This pattern often indicates an adversary attempting to establish persistence or masquerade malicious processes as legitimate system services.
Detects indicators of the SNOWLIGHT dropper establishing persistence by either creating a malicious Windows service named 'wusvc', modifying the Windows registry to add a service entry for 'wusvc', or executing a 'wusvc.exe' binary from a non-standard file path (outside of System32 or SysWOW64).
Detects the execution of wusvc.exe (Windows Update service) from non-standard locations, specifically the user Downloads folder or locations other than the authorized C:\Windows\System32\ directory. This pattern is commonly used to masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate system services.
Detects evidence of the SNOWLIGHT dropper establishing persistence by registering malicious services (e.g., 'wusvc', 'RageService') or executing known malicious binaries (e.g., 'wusvc.exe', 'win_guard_0.exe') via service creation utilities or registry modifications.
This rule detects unauthorized modifications to the ImagePath registry value for the Windows Update service (wusvc). By changing this path to a non-standard executable or DLL, an attacker can achieve persistence and elevate privileges by having their code execute when the service starts.
Detects the SNOWLIGHT dropper creating a malicious Windows Service masquerading as the legitimate 'Windows Update Service' (wusvc), followed by outbound TLS network connections to non-Microsoft infrastructure within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of C2 communication from a compromised system.
Detects the unauthorized deletion of cmd.exe from System32 or SysWOW64 by a non-system process, correlated with the creation of a new service or scheduled task on the same host within 60 seconds, which is characteristic of TrymeLocker malware persistence and tampering.
Detects potential persistence attempts by the SNOWLIGHT dropper, which masquerades as the legitimate Windows Update service (wusvc). The rule monitors for unauthorized execution of wusvc.exe, the use of sc.exe to register a wusvc service, and direct modification of registry keys associated with the wusvc service path.
Detects local privilege escalation attempts targeting the SystemInformer service (phsvc.exe) IPC mechanism. The rule identifies suspicious process activity, including the side-loading of a PoC DLL into rundll32.exe, the spawning of child processes from the SystemInformer service context, and the presence of PoC artifacts in system paths, which are used to gain SYSTEM-level execution.
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