Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
842 detections
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This rule detects scripts that load a driver and subsequently attempt to remove its associated service and source artifacts. It specifically looks for the presence of 'NtLoadDriver' API calls, 'sc delete' commands for service removal, 'reg delete' commands for registry cleanup, and references to specific filenames like 'fsdiskbit.sys' and 'msidiskserver', which are associated with the Sprysocks malware.
Detects silent MSI installations that drop specific DLLs (autorun.dll or vcredist_x64.dll) and subsequently spawn a ScreenConnect client service within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence or remote access tool deployment.
This rule detects attempts to load kernel drivers using command-line utilities such as infinstall.exe, devcon.exe, pnputil.exe, or sc.exe. The detection specifically looks for these commands being initiated by powershell.exe, cmd.exe, or ServertoolLauncher.exe, which could indicate malicious activity like ransomware attempting to establish persistence or evade defenses.
Detects VBScript (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) attempting to create Windows services using 'sc.exe create' or adding new users using 'net user /add'. This behavior is often associated with persistence mechanisms or privilege escalation by malicious scripts.
Detects unsigned or non-Microsoft signed executables running from the Windows Media Player installation directory. This behavior is indicative of masquerading techniques used by attackers, such as the Operation DragonReturn campaign, to hide malicious services or components within trusted system directories.
Hola monitor service persistence
Cortex XDR
This rule detects the persistence mechanism of the 'hola_monitor_svc' service or 'HolaMonitorService.exe' being configured for automatic start. It specifically looks for registry modifications related to this service. The XQL view includes actor and causality fields to aid in investigation.
Detects the execution of the PsExec service (PSEXESVC) or command-line usage indicating remote service execution, including the standard PsExec '-accepteula' flag combined with network path indicators. Additionally detects the creation of the PSEXESVC service registry key, which is indicative of PsExec-based lateral movement or remote administration.
Detects the creation of a Windows Service pointing to a suspected Komari agent binary in a non-standard directory (Public, ProgramData, or Temp) to survive reboots. This rule specifically looks for 'sc.exe' being used with the 'create' command and a 'binPath' argument that includes one of the specified directories and ends with '.exe'.
Identifies the creation of the specific background system service associated with TiFlux, cementing its persistence on the host. This rule specifically looks for the 'sc.exe' utility being used with the 'create' command and 'TiFlux.start= auto' in the command line, indicating the creation of a service for persistence.
Detects potential Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks by monitoring for known vulnerable driver files being created or loaded as kernel modules, as well as the registration of kernel-mode drivers from non-standard or user-writable locations like Temp, Tmp, AppData, or Public directories.
Detects the deployment, registration, and loading of known vulnerable drivers (e.g., mhyprot2.sys, gdrv.sys, rtcore64.sys) used in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks. This rule monitors file creation, module loading, service registration via sc.exe, and registry modifications associated with service installation.
Udm Hola Monitor Service
YARA-L
This rule detects modifications to the Windows Registry related to the 'hola_monitor_svc' service. Specifically, it looks for registry keys containing 'services\hola_monitor_svc' and registry value data or process command lines that include 'holamonitorservice.exe'. This activity indicates the configuration or presence of the Hola Monitor Service, which could be associated with the Hola VPN application.
This rule detects the registration of a Windows service named 'msidiskserver' or a service whose ImagePath ends with 'fsdiskbit.sys'. This activity is associated with the 'FISHMONGERS' threat actor group and their 'SprySocks' malware, which uses a transient driver for persistence. The rule focuses on registry events related to service creation or modification.
Correlates the dropping of the vulnerable driver with sc.exe creating a kernel-level service to load it into memory.
This rule detects suspicious command-line activity indicative of direct kernel object manipulation, often associated with kernel-mode rootkits. It looks for processes executing commands containing keywords related to direct kernel access (e.g., 'directl', 'kernel call', 'ntoskrnl', 'hal.dll') in conjunction with keywords suggesting privilege escalation or driver loading (e.g., 'setprivileges', 'loaddriver', 'createremotethread'). Such combinations can signify attempts to install or interact with malicious kernel drivers or rootkits.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity originating from the DHCP Client service process (svchost.exe running with 'Dhcp' in the command line). It detects unauthorized child processes (such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe), unexpected child processes that deviate from established baselines, service crashes potentially indicative of exploitation, and anomalous network connections to non-standard DHCP ports or external IP addresses.
Detects the creation of a mutex with a specific pattern used by the MonsterV2 malware, a sophisticated RAT, loader, and stealer.
Udm Hola Monitor Service
YARA-L
This rule detects modifications to the Windows Registry related to the 'hola_monitor_svc' service. Specifically, it looks for registry keys containing 'services\hola_monitor_svc' and registry value data or process command lines that include 'holamonitorservice.exe'. This activity indicates the configuration or presence of the Hola Monitor Service, which could be associated with the Hola VPN application.
Targets service registration for msidiskserver or an ImagePath ending in fsdiskbit.sys. The UDM rule retains principal and target context for correlation.
Detects sc.exe creating a Windows service named OneDriveServers to mask ScreenConnect persistence, as observed in Operation SilentCanvas.
Detects the creation of a Windows service using administrative tools (sc.exe or net.exe) followed closely by an instruction to start that service within a 5-minute window. This behavior is often associated with the execution of malicious payloads or lateral movement.
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