Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
842 detections
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Detects OilRig registry persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
Detects the creation of a file named "MoriyaStreamWatchmen.sys" in a specific location. This filename was reported to be related to the Moriya rootkit as described in the securelist's Operation TunnelSnake report.
Detects usage of Sysinternals PsSuspend which can be abused to suspend critical processes
Detects suspicious DACL modifications to deny access to a service that affects critical trustees. This can be used to hide services or make them unstoppable.
Detects service path modification via the "sc" binary to a suspicious command or path
Detects usage of Sysinternals PsService which can be abused for service reconnaissance and tampering
Detects suspicious DACL modifications to allow access to a service from a suspicious trustee. This can be used to override access restrictions set by previous ACLs.
ServiceDll Hijack
Sigma
Detects changes to the "ServiceDLL" value related to a service in the registry.
This is often used as a method of persistence.
This is often used as a method of persistence.
This query is looking for rarely seen processes which are launched as a service.
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/rare-process-launch-as-a-service/
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/rare-process-launch-as-a-service/
The analytic detects the loading of known vulnerable Windows drivers, which may indicate potential persistence or privilege escalation attempts. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 6 to identify driver loading events and cross-references them with a list of vulnerable drivers. This activity is significant as attackers often exploit vulnerable drivers to gain elevated privileges or maintain persistence on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with high privileges, leading to further system compromise and potential data exfiltration.
The analytic detects the use of `sc.exe` to delete a Windows service. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process execution logs that capture command-line arguments. This activity is significant because adversaries often delete services to disable security mechanisms or critical system functions, aiding in evasion and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to the termination of essential security services, allowing attackers to operate undetected and potentially escalate their privileges or maintain long-term access to the compromised system.
This analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprvse.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe. This activity is significant as it often indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
The analytic detects the loading of known vulnerable Windows drivers, which may indicate potential persistence or privilege escalation attempts. It leverages Windows System service install EventCode 7045 to identify driver loading events and cross-references them with a list of vulnerable drivers. This activity is significant as attackers often exploit vulnerable drivers to gain elevated privileges or maintain persistence on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with high privileges, leading to further system compromise and potential data exfiltration. This detection is a Windows Event Log adaptation of the Sysmon driver loaded detection written by Michael Haag.
The following analytic detects the use of reg.exe to modify registry keys associated with Windows services and their configurations. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to service registry keys can indicate an attempt to establish persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to control service behavior, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution or system compromise.
The following analytic detects the modification of registry keys that define Windows services using reg.exe. This detection leverages Splunk to search for specific keywords in the registry path, value name, and value data fields. This activity is significant because it indicates potential unauthorized changes to service configurations, a common persistence technique used by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, escalate privileges, or move laterally within the network, leading to data theft, ransomware, or other damaging outcomes.
The following analytic identifies the creation of a Windows Service on a remote endpoint using `sc.exe`. It detects this activity by analyzing process execution logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments that include remote paths and service creation commands. This behavior is significant because adversaries often exploit the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.
The analytic detects the first occurrence of a Windows service running in the environment by leveraging Windows system event logs (EventCode 7036) to identify services entering the "running" state. The appearance of a new or previously unseen service could indicate the installation of unauthorized or malicious software, potentially allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges. Monitoring for new services aids in early detection of potential threats.
The following analytic detects the installation of the XMRIG coinminer driver on a system. It identifies the loading of the `WinRing0x64.sys` driver, commonly associated with XMRIG, by analyzing Sysmon EventCode 6 logs for specific signatures and image loads. This activity is significant because XMRIG is an open-source CPU miner frequently exploited by adversaries to mine cryptocurrency illicitly. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized resource consumption, degraded system performance, and potential financial loss due to unauthorized cryptocurrency mining.
This rule detects the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high-entropy name, indicating potential malicious activity. It leverages Event ID 7045 and the `ut_shannon` function to identify services with random names. This behavior is significant as adversaries often use randomly named services for persistence, lateral movement, and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.
The analytic identifies the creation of a new service on a remote endpoint using `sc.exe`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically monitoring for process creation events where `sc.exe` is used with parameters indicative of remote service creation. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or execute arbitrary code on the remote system, potentially leading to further compromise of the network.
This analytic detects the creation of a Windows service named "KrbSCM" which is associated with the KrbRelayUp tool. KrbRelayUp is known for its use in privilege escalation attacks. The detection relies on Windows System Event Log EventCode 7045, which logs service creation events. Identifying this activity is crucial as it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt that could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.
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