Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

842 detections

Detects service-creation commands (sc create / New-Service / reg add under a Services key) whose COMMAND LINE itself references a known NeedyMantis binary name or sideload staging folder. Requiring the malicious reference to appear in the command being executed -- rather than merely in the calling process's own folder location -- removes false matches from unrelated legitimate software that happens to be installed under a similarly-named folder.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
000
This rule detects three distinct suspicious behaviors related to potential file manipulation and persistence mechanisms: 1. Use of 'copy /b' command to reconstruct files from fragments (e.g., header.doc, body.doc), commonly associated with file joining or data reconstruction. 2. File access within '_rels' directories targeting document fragments, often used in malicious document analysis or extraction. 3. Execution of 'Windowsupdate.exe' from the 'AppData\Local' directory, a technique often used for masquerading as a legitimate Windows service to establish persistence.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
004
This rule detects the loading of a driver named 'eb.sys' (or matching a specific SHA256 hash) paired with the creation of a Windows service for that driver via the 'sc' command. This behavior is indicative of potential rootkit installation or driver-based persistence mechanisms.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
004
Detects the installation or registration of the legitimate gitlab-runner.exe binary as a persistent Windows service. Adversaries can leverage this technique to establish a command-and-control (C2) channel or persistent backdoor by masquerading as legitimate CI/CD infrastructure.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
Detects the BTR.sys driver, a tool identified as being extracted from Microsoft's MpEngine.dll and repurposed for kernel-level file and registry manipulation. The rule matches on specific SHA-256 file hashes or combinations of PE metadata strings, indicating the presence of this driver on the system.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, including service creation, local account modification, or security tool tampering, executed as SYSTEM shortly after activity associated with the ADSelfService Plus GINA logon-screen vulnerability (CVE-2026-74849).
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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SlimKQL
1 month ago
002
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, including service creation, local account modification, or security tool tampering, executed as SYSTEM shortly after activity associated with the ADSelfService Plus GINA logon-screen vulnerability (CVE-2026-74849).
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Hunters
1 month ago
002
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, including service creation, local account modification, or security tool tampering, executed as SYSTEM shortly after activity associated with the ADSelfService Plus GINA logon-screen vulnerability (CVE-2026-74849).
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
This rule detects instances where a Node.js process spawns a child Node.js process from a 'node_modules' directory using configuration flags typically associated with hidden, detached background tasks (e.g., 'detached', 'stdio', 'windowsHide', 'ignore'). It explicitly excludes common Node.js process managers and build tools to reduce false positives associated with legitimate development activities.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
004
This rule detects instances where a Node.js process spawns a child Node.js process from a 'node_modules' directory using configuration flags typically associated with hidden, detached background tasks (e.g., 'detached', 'stdio', 'windowsHide', 'ignore'). It explicitly excludes common Node.js process managers and build tools to reduce false positives associated with legitimate development activities.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
004
This rule detects instances where a Node.js process spawns a child Node.js process from a 'node_modules' directory using configuration flags typically associated with hidden, detached background tasks (e.g., 'detached', 'stdio', 'windowsHide', 'ignore'). It explicitly excludes common Node.js process managers and build tools to reduce false positives associated with legitimate development activities.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
104
Detects a sequence of activity characteristic of lateral movement and credential theft: the deployment or execution of PsExec service followed by the use of Windows utilities (vssadmin, ntdsutil, esentutl) to perform Volume Shadow Copy-based extraction of the NTDS.dit database or SYSTEM hive on the same host.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
102
Detects a sequence of activity characteristic of lateral movement and credential theft: the deployment or execution of PsExec service followed by the use of Windows utilities (vssadmin, ntdsutil, esentutl) to perform Volume Shadow Copy-based extraction of the NTDS.dit database or SYSTEM hive on the same host.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
002
Detects the creation of a remote service using 'sc.exe' where the executable was recently written to an administrative share (ADMIN$ or C$). This behavior often indicates lateral movement by threat actors deploying malicious binaries as services on remote systems.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
105
Detects a multi-stage installation of the Level RMM agent. This rule monitors for a correlation of events including the execution of 'LevelInstaller.exe' with specific installation arguments, file drops in potentially spoofed vendor paths (Dell or Level), the creation of a 'Level' service, and the addition of a 'Level Watchdog' scheduled task on the same device within a 24-hour window.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
This rule detects the execution of specific suspicious batch scripts (e.g., 'bd_test_k7old.bat') via cmd.exe, or the creation of a Windows service involving kernel drivers using sc.exe, which may indicate testing of defensive mechanisms or the deployment of potentially malicious kernel-level components.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
This rule monitors process execution and registry modifications for filenames, process command lines, or registry keys associated with 'truesight.sys' and 'rentdrv2.sys'. These artifacts are typically associated with malicious kernel-mode drivers, such as rootkits, often used for stealth or persistence on Windows systems.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
107
Detects the presence of the known vulnerable DCRCVDrv.sys kernel driver, which has been identified as being abused in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security processes via unauthorized IOCTL calls to ZwTerminateProcess.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
Detects the installation of a new kernel-mode service using system utilities like sc.exe, cmd.exe, or powershell.exe, which is a common indicator of a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attack intended to gain kernel-level privileges.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
This rule detects instances where a Node.js process spawns a child Node.js process from a 'node_modules' directory using configuration flags typically associated with hidden, detached background tasks (e.g., 'detached', 'stdio', 'windowsHide', 'ignore'). It explicitly excludes common Node.js process managers and build tools to reduce false positives associated with legitimate development activities.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
003
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