Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule identifies potential persistence activity on a Windows host by correlating multiple indicators such as service creation, scheduled tasks, registry run key modifications, Winlogon helper modifications, and driver loading. It specifically monitors for indicators associated with 'NetSupport' or 'client32' filenames or services. The rule triggers when two or more distinct persistence mechanisms are detected for the same host and user.
This rule detects the creation of new Windows services (Event IDs 7045 and 4697) where the service binary path points to potentially suspicious locations such as user profiles, temp directories, program data, or common command interpreters. This pattern is frequently used by adversaries for persistence mechanisms or to deploy malicious drivers/tools.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity related to the installation or misconfiguration of GitLab runner executables. It looks for unusual service creation, direct execution of runner binaries from temporary locations (e.g., C:\Windows\Temp), and the presence of configuration files or PowerShell scripts in unexpected directories that might indicate persistent access or unauthorized setup of a build runner.
Detects the installation of a GitLab Runner service on Windows, specifically identifying cases where the service is configured to run under the LocalSystem account. This is monitored via Service Control Manager (Event ID 7045), Sysmon (Registry Event ID 13), and process creation events involving sc.exe or gitlab-runner.exe.
Detects the loading of known vulnerable kernel drivers 'truesight.sys' or 'rentdrv2.sys'. These drivers are frequently abused in Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver (BYOVD) attack chains, where attackers leverage specific IOCTL calls (such as 0x22E044 or 0x22E010) to interact with the driver to perform privileged actions, such as terminating security processes.
This rule detects activities related to the loading or registration of the 'NvFsFilter' driver (nvfsflt64.sys). It monitors for command-line attempts to interact with services (using sc.exe, reg.exe, or services.exe), registry modifications involving the NvFsFilter service, and the actual loading of the nvfsflt64.sys file. This is intended to identify potential persistence mechanisms or the deployment of potentially unauthorized or malicious drivers.
Detects evidence of the Alinubx.sys kernel driver being loaded or interacted with via its device interface using a specific IOCTL (0x222024). This driver is known to be abused in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security software processes from kernel mode, effectively bypassing Windows Protected Process Light (PPL) protections.
Detects evidence of the Alinubx.sys kernel driver being loaded or interacted with via its device interface using a specific IOCTL (0x222024). This driver is known to be abused in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security software processes from kernel mode, effectively bypassing Windows Protected Process Light (PPL) protections.
This rule detects the installation of a new Windows service (Event ID 7045 or 4697) with an 'auto start' configuration that is immediately followed by the termination of multiple processes (either 'services.exe' or the service's own image file) within a 60-minute window on the same host. This pattern can indicate an unstable or malicious service deployment that causes system instability or performs rapid cleanup.
Detects the installation of Windows services with image paths containing strings associated with known commodity malware or potentially unwanted software (Alinubx, CcProtect, nvfsflt64, NvFsFilter). This activity is often indicative of persistence mechanisms or driver-based malicious components being registered on the host.
Detects signs of NetSupport Manager (client32.exe) establishing multiple persistence mechanisms simultaneously or in quick succession, including Windows service creation, Winlogon helper registration, Registry Run key modification, scheduled task creation, and keyboard filter driver installation. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized use of remote access tools to maintain persistence on a host.
Detects the loading of the Alinubx.sys (aka CcProtect.sys) kernel driver, often dropped as nvfsflt64.sys or registered as NvFsFilter, followed by a rapid, simultaneous termination of security product processes. This activity is indicative of a BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attack chain where kernel-mode primitives are used to terminate EDR/AV processes.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager' via registry keys or command-line utilities. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or service manipulation for malicious purposes.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager' via registry keys or command-line utilities. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or service manipulation for malicious purposes.
Detects the creation or modification of specific system driver files (nvfsflt64.sys, Alinubx.sys) combined with the installation or initiation of a Windows service associated with NVIDIA filter names. This behavior is often indicative of persistence mechanisms, potential rootkit activity, or the deployment of vulnerable drivers (BYOVD).
Detects the loading of the 'gdrv.sys' driver, which is a known vulnerable driver often used in 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks to facilitate privilege escalation to kernel mode.
This rule detects the presence, installation, or execution attempts of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys). Monitoring for this specific driver is a common practice to identify attempts to perform 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, which can be used for kernel-mode code execution and privilege escalation.
This rule detects the presence, installation, or execution attempts of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys). Monitoring for this specific driver is a common practice to identify attempts to perform 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, which can be used for kernel-mode code execution and privilege escalation.
Detects the creation of Windows services using 'sc.exe' with command line arguments containing 'cplsupport' or 'wtas'. These specific strings are associated with persistence mechanisms used by the MQTTDoor and MatrixDoor backdoors.
Detects the use of sc.exe or cplsupport.exe with command-line arguments often associated with service installation, configuration, or modification. This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges by creating or modifying Windows services.
This rule performs a hunting activity across multiple telemetry sources (Network, Email, Endpoint) to detect known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Anthropic threat intelligence reporting (September 2026). It looks for specific malware file names, command-line patterns, service installations, phishing email addresses, and C2 communication URLs.
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