Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
842 detections
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Detects the loading and service creation of the CcProtect/Alinubx kernel driver, a known technique for Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks. The rule identifies suspicious characteristics such as file name mismatches, unauthorized product/company signatures, and the creation of services associated with this malicious driver family (e.g., NvFsFilter) to facilitate EDR/AV termination or privilege escalation.
Detects the loading or presence of the Alinubx.sys kernel driver, a malicious component used for Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks. This driver facilitates the mass termination of security product processes (AV/EDR) by exposing a specific IOCTL (0x222024) to interface with kernel-mode process termination primitives (e.g., ZwTerminateProcess), often serving as a precursor to the deployment of stealers like Rapuncel.
This rule performs a hunting activity across multiple telemetry sources (Network, Email, Endpoint) to detect known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Anthropic threat intelligence reporting (September 2026). It looks for specific malware file names, command-line patterns, service installations, phishing email addresses, and C2 communication URLs.
Detects the creation of Windows services using sc.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe that reference specific DLL files (winfsp-x64.dll or DukeQt.dll). This behavior is often associated with persistence mechanisms or DLL hijacking/side-loading techniques where a malicious service is configured to load a specific library.
Detects the creation of Windows services using sc.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe that reference specific DLL files (winfsp-x64.dll or DukeQt.dll). This behavior is often associated with persistence mechanisms or DLL hijacking/side-loading techniques where a malicious service is configured to load a specific library.
Detects persistence attempts related to the NetSupport Manager remote access tool by monitoring modifications to Windows Registry keys associated with run keys, Winlogon notification packages, and services.
Detects the creation of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager', which is a known indicator of the SparroWocky backdoor attempting to establish persistence on a system.
Detects various persistence methods associated with NetSupport Manager, a legitimate remote management tool often abused by threat actors. The rule monitors for the installation of NetSupport components (specifically client32.exe) in Windows registry run keys, Winlogon configuration, service creation, and keyboard filter drivers.
This rule detects various persistence mechanisms associated with the NetSupport Manager remote access tool. It monitors for the creation of services, scheduled tasks, registry modifications (such as Run keys, Winlogon Notify packages, and keyboard filter drivers), and process executions related to NetSupport Manager (specifically client32.exe).
Detects the creation or execution of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager', which is utilized by the SparroWocky backdoor for persistence. The malware masquerades as a legitimate system audit service to evade detection.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager' via registry keys or command-line utilities. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or service manipulation for malicious purposes.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager' via registry keys or command-line utilities. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or service manipulation for malicious purposes.
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
This rule detects the installation of Windows services that utilize names or display names commonly associated with known malware, potentially mimicking legitimate system services to maintain persistence or evade detection.
Detects the loading of the Alinubx.sys (aka CcProtect.sys) kernel driver, often dropped as nvfsflt64.sys or registered as NvFsFilter, followed by a rapid, simultaneous termination of security product processes. This activity is indicative of a BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attack chain where kernel-mode primitives are used to terminate EDR/AV processes.
This rule performs a hunting activity across multiple telemetry sources (Network, Email, Endpoint) to detect known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Anthropic threat intelligence reporting (September 2026). It looks for specific malware file names, command-line patterns, service installations, phishing email addresses, and C2 communication URLs.
Detects the presence of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys) used in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to bypass security controls and facilitate kernel-mode execution, as associated with Settra ransomware campaigns.
Detects the loading of the 'gdrv.sys' driver, which is a known vulnerable driver often used in 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks to facilitate privilege escalation to kernel mode.
Detects the loading of the 'gdrv.sys' driver, which is a known vulnerable driver often used in 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks to facilitate privilege escalation to kernel mode.
This rule detects the presence, installation, or execution attempts of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys). Monitoring for this specific driver is a common practice to identify attempts to perform 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, which can be used for kernel-mode code execution and privilege escalation.
Detects the use of vulnerable kernel drivers, specifically TrueSight.sys and rentdrv2.sys, as part of a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique. This activity, associated with DragonForce ransomware, involves registering or accessing these drivers and sending specific IOCTL codes (0x22E044 or 0x22E010) to terminate security software processes.
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